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Theories of global justice are often criticised for being ineffective or unrealisable. The 
aim of this interdisciplinary thesis is to examine whether this motivational criticism 
holds regarding Singer’s Principle and Pogge’s theory of global egalitarian justice. First, I 
will show that the effectiveness argument is unconvincing: the underlying effectiveness 
criterion is either incoherent or not defined, and existing effectiveness predictions are 
empirically unsatisfactory. Second, I will analyse whether Singer’s interactional Principle 
satisfies the ‘ought implies can’ (OIC) criterion, which holds that obligations must be 
within the capacities of individuals. Having discussed the rationale and standard of the 
OIC criterion, I will show that the philosophical literature does not offer a convincing 
empirical justification of possibility evaluations. Drawing on psychological explanations 
of moral heroism, I will conclude that compliance with Singer’s Principle is possible for 
ordinary persons, i.e. that ‘every person is a hero in waiting’.  
Third, turning to the feasibility of Pogge’s theory of global egalitarian justice, I will 
discuss how the standard, time-frame, weight and rationale of the feasibility criterion 
should be defined. Based on psychological and sociological explanations about moral 
behaviour, social norms and identity, I will evaluate the empirical arguments advanced in 
the philosophical literature. In addition, I will consider how the long-term trends of 
globalisation are likely to influence the role of nationality, identity and global 
institutions. I will conclude that Pogge’s theory of egalitarian global justice is 
conditionally feasible, i.e. if we assume that domestic egalitarian justice is feasible. This 
implies that nationalism will not necessarily play a dominant role during the centuries to 
come. Overall, possibility and feasibility evaluations remain uncertain and partly 
subjective. I will thus argue that a burden of proof should be established to limit the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
But if there is a sense of reality, and no one will doubt that it has its 
justifications for existing, then there must also be something we can call 
a sense of possibility. Whoever has it does not say, for instance: Here 
this or that has happened, will happen, must happen; but he invents: 
Here this or that might, could, or ought to happen. If he is told that 
something is the way it is, he will think: Well, it could probably just as 
well be otherwise. So the sense of possibility could be defined outright as 
the ability to conceive of everything there might be just as well, and to 
attach no more importance to what is than to what is not.  
         Robert Musil (1968: 16) 
 
One year after the MakePovertyHistory Campaign and the G8 Summit 2006 in 
Gleneagles, I was distributing leaflets about the Edinburgh World Justice Festival to be 
held annually in remembrance of the G8 Summit. A young woman passed by, and when 
I asked whether she was interested in the MakePovertyHistory Campaign, she replied 
with an Eastern European accent: “I wish somebody would make my poverty history.” 
Then she took a bunch of leaflets out of my hand and angrily marched on. 
While the plight of the woman is vivid if one considers her situation from a local 
perspective, this picture changes if we adopt a global perspective. Given the fact that 
over one billion individuals live in absolute poverty1 having to fight for their physical 
survival, the situation of immigrants or families living on social welfare in Western 
countries appears to be relatively less problematic. In his seminal article ‘Famine, 
Affluence, and Morality’ published in 1972, Singer claims that individuals should make 
the reduction of suffering, regardless of where it takes place, the dominant aim of their 
lives. In fact, Singer’s Principle holds that “if it is in our power to prevent something 
bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral 
importance, we ought, morally, to do it” (1972: 231). To live up to this Principle, nearly 
all citizens of Western countries would have to fundamentally change their lives. In 
                                                 
1 Whereas ‘relative poverty’ is the condition of having less than other individuals being part 
of a social group or society, ‘absolute poverty’ refers to the material living conditions of 
individuals. The World Bank defines absolute poverty as living on less than US $1.25 per day at 
purchasing power parity (PPP) (see Sachs 2005: 20). 
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practice, however, only rare individuals act in accordance with Singer’s Principle; an 
enormous gap between the demands of moral theory and practice exists. 
While most philosophical debates focus on the desirability of demanding principles 
like Singer’s (Fishkin 1982; Murphy 2000),2 the focus of this thesis lies on the 
motivational foundations of Singer’s Principle. The first question of this thesis relates to 
the possibility of compliance with Singer’s Principle. This question is based on the 
Kantian ‘ought implies can’ (OIC) which holds that, for an obligation to be valid, an 
agent must have the capacity to comply (Kant 1991; Griffin 1992; Elster 2007). The 
challenge here is to offer an empirically justified evaluation about which agents have the 
capacity to comply or should be exempted from the obligations of Singer’s Principle. 
Would it be possible for the young woman from Eastern Europe, for example, to put 
aside her personal desire to escape from a situation of relative poverty and to donate all 
money not necessary for her survival towards the eradication of absolute poverty? 
The second question relates to the effectiveness of the moral demands propagated by 
Singer’s Principle. Should Singer’s Principle be rejected for being ineffective? To answer 
this question, the rationale of the effectiveness criterion must be defended and a 
coherent definition of the effectiveness standard must be offered (Carens 1996; Gross 
1997). Thereafter carrying out empirical effectiveness evaluations would further support 
these steps. Would it be more effective, for example, to ask individuals to come a 
meeting of the World Justice Festival than to ask them to make the reduction of poverty 
the dominant aim of their lives?  
The motivational analysis of Singer’s Principle represents the first part of this thesis. 
The nature of the analysis is interdisciplinary. On the one hand, a philosophical 
examination of the rationale and definition of the two metaethical criteria – the OIC 
criterion and the effectiveness criterion – needs to be offered. On the other hand, the 
analysis has to draw on psychological and sociological theories to evaluate what is 
possible for individuals and which moral principles are likely to be effective (Oliner and 
Oliner 1988; Colby and Damon 1992; Gross 1997; Zimbardo 2007). 
While the first part of this thesis considers the motivational foundations of Singer’s 
interactional Principle, the second part deals with the motivational foundations of 
                                                 
2 The ‘demandingness’ of moral duties refers to the height of the sacrifices demanded from 
an agent; Murphy speaks of ‘extreme demands’ if an agent is unable “to live the life of one’s 
choice” (2000: 12). 
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institutional principles of global justice.3 While principles of justice refer to the 
regulation of social institutions in general, theories of global justice examine the moral 
principles and institutions that should regulate the global realm. Considering the 
motivational assumptions of principles of global justice, the fundamental difference of 
the analysis of Singer’s Principles is a concern with the capacities of collectives. 
While political actors and political scientists are concerned with short- and middle-
term aims like the Millennium Development Goals or the end of absolute poverty,4 the 
moral aims propagated by philosophers relate to long-term goals. Historically, 
philosophers were primarily interested in an ideal of social justice; the ideal societies 
propagated by Plato, Aristotle and More – and also Rawls (1999a) – focus on social 
institutions of domestic societies. The regulation of the global realm was limited to a law 
of nations concerned with legitimate wars and means of warfare (Grotius 1913) and, 
more progressively, with the establishment of a league of nations (Kant 1932). During 
the recent decades, however, philosophers increasingly focus on principles of global 
justice. While some philosophers argue that the global realm should only be regulated by 
principles of basic justice lacking a distributive component (Miller 1995; Rawls 1999b), 
other philosophers argue for more demanding theories of global justice which would 
include a distributive component (Beitz 1979; Pogge 1989; Caney 2005).  
The focus of this thesis lies on Pogge’s (1989) theory of global egalitarian justice. 
Challenging the moral significance of nationality, Pogge maintains that the Rawlsian 
principles of social justice should be extended to the global realm. The resulting theory 
                                                 
3 Pogge (2002: 45) makes a distinction between ‘interactional’ moral principles (regulating the 
interaction between moral agents independently of institutional relationships) and ‘institutional’ 
moral principles (assigning rights and duties in a political entity). It resembles Rawls’ (1999a: 98) 
distinction between ‘natural duties’ and ‘obligations of justice’. 
In moral philosophy, the study of interactional principles is often said to belong to the field 
of ‘ethics’ (Singer 1993) whereas the study of institutional principles corresponds to the field of 
‘justice’ (Rawls 1999a). In sum, it would be best to speak of principles of ‘global morality’ to 
refer to both Singer’s Principle and to institutional principles of global justice. In the literature, 
however, it is common to use the term ‘theories of global justice’ to broadly refer to all kinds of 
global moral principles; this use is adopted in the title and occasionally also in the body of this 
thesis. 
4 The moral aim propagated by the Edinburgh World Justice Festival and the 
MakePovertyHistory Campaign (MPH) is a world free of absolute poverty; this ideal is also 
considered to be feasible: “World poverty is sustained not by chance or nature, but by a 
combination of factors: injustice in global trade; the huge burden of debt; insufficient and 
ineffective aid. Each of these is exacerbated by inappropriate economic policies imposed by rich 
countries. But it doesn’t have to be this way. These factors are determined by human decisions” 
(MPH 2009). 
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of justice is egalitarian since the fundamental focus lies on an equal distribution of social 
goods independent of morally arbitrary factors. The theory is global since the scope of 
the principles of justice is the world at large; the ideal of global egalitarian justice would 
be realised if global, national and local institutions were regulated by the same 
fundamental principles of justice.5 
As in the case of Singer’s Principle, this project focuses on the motivational 
assumptions of Pogge’s theory of global egalitarian justice, and not on its desirability. 
The first question relates to the ‘feasibility criterion’ which requires that it must be 
possible to bring about the social ideals recommended by a moral theory (Nagel 1991; 
Räikkä 1998; Rawls 1999a). The question is, therefore, whether the ideal of global 
egalitarianism is feasible. The second question is the application to the effectiveness to 
Pogge’s theory (Carens 1996; Gross 1997). Is the propagation of demanding moral 
ideals likely to be ineffective? If so, how does this evaluation affect the cogency of 
principles of global egalitarian justice? 
Again, the nature of the feasibility and effectiveness analyses is interdisciplinary. To 
begin with, the rationale and definition of the feasibility and effectiveness criterion must 
be explored. Subsequently, feasibility and effectiveness evaluations must be based on 
empirical explanations of moral behaviour and institutional change (Nagel 1991; Miller 
1995; 1999a; Hurrell 2001; Caney 2005; Beck 2006). Drawing on these insights, 
philosophers have to offer their own feasibility and effectiveness evaluations. 
In sum, this thesis offers a motivational analysis of two highly demanding theories of 
global justice. It applies two motivational criteria (OIC/feasibility and effectiveness) to 
Singer’s Principle and to Pogge’s theory of egalitarian global justice. The primary 
analysis consists in the definition of the OIC criterion (Chapter 3) and its application to 
Singer’s Principle (Chapter 5). The secondary analysis consists in the definition of the 
feasibility criterion (Chapter 6) and its application to global egalitarianism (Chapter 7). 
The final analysis offers a joint discussion of the effectiveness criterion, Singer’s 
Principle and Pogge’s theory (Chapter 2). 
This Chapter offers an overview of each of the three analyses. In this respect, due 
time will be given to the normative justification of Singer’s Principle and Pogge’s theory 
of egalitarian global justice. 
                                                 
5 In the following, the terms ‘global egalitarian justice’ and ‘global egalitarianism’ are meant to 
refer exclusively to Pogge’s theory. 
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1.1 Singer’s Principle, the OIC criterion and individual capacities 
As outlined before, Singer’s Principle holds that “if it is in our power to prevent 
something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable 
moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it” (Singer 1972: 231). To understand the 
moral demands of Singer’s Principle, three aspects have to be interpreted. First, Singer 
makes the fundamental assumption that suffering and death caused by a lack of food, 
shelter or medical care are ‘something bad’. Second, the argument is based on the 
empirical assumption that most citizens of Western states have the financial means that 
can, in light of technological progress, prevent suffering in many other places in the 
world (Singer 1993: 232). 
Third, the term ‘comparable moral importance’ signifies that compliance must occur 
“without causing anything else of comparably bad to happen, or doing something that is 
wrong itself, or failing to promote some moral good, comparable in significance to the 
bad thing that we can prevent” (1972: 231). Negative side-effects, deontological 
constraints and duties to promote the good may thus override the obligations of 
Singer’s Principle. The most important aspect in this is that the suffering of the duty-
bearer is equal to the suffering of any other individual. It follows that, under 
circumstances of extreme suffering, individuals have to give “to the point of marginal 
utility, at which by giving more one would cause oneself and one’s dependants as much 
suffering as one would prevent in Bengal” (ibid: 234).6 The Singer’s Principle thus 
demands impartial behaviour in the face of suffering. 
We can now situate Singer’s Principle in its philosophical context. Dealing with the 
moral obligations between individuals independently of institutional relationships, 
Singer’s Principle can be regarded as an interactional moral principle (Pogge 2002: 245). 
Accordingly, the obligations of Singer’s Principle do not depend on social ties like 
friendship, a shared nationality or citizenship. Next, there is a wide array of notions to 
describe moral obligations being concerned with the prevention of suffering or the 
promotion of another person’s good.7 While obligations to benefit others can be 
                                                 
6 The point of marginal utility is reached when the positive and negative effects of giving are 
equal; any further action would increase the amount of overall suffering. 
7 Shue (1996: 60) refers to the duty ‘to aid the deprived’, Murphy (2000: 5) speaks of ‘duties 
of beneficence’, Miller (2002: 107) of obligations of ‘altruism’ and Barry (2006: 724) to ‘duties of 
humanity’. The difference of these duties lies in the formulation of the content and not in the 
terminology. 
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subsumed under the heading of ‘positive’ duties,8 Singer’s Principle does not directly fall 
into this category since it deals with the reduction of suffering. But under present 
circumstances, this distinction is hardly relevant: given the large amount of suffering in 
this world, duties to promote the well being of the worst-off lead to similar demands as 
duties to prevent suffering. Finally, note that compliance with Singer’s Principle is 
considered to be morally obligatory, as individuals cannot chose to comply from time to 
time but are, by its very definition, always obliged to do so.9 
Given the enormous amount of suffering caused by absolute poverty in today’s 
world, the wealth of the inhabitants living in industrialised countries and the 
technological means to affect living conditions in other parts of the world, Singer’s 
Principle leads to extreme demands. To comply with Singer’s Principle, citizens of 
Western states would have to give away a large share of their possessions and dedicate 
their lives to the fight against absolute poverty. In this respect, the claims that domestic 
or global institutions should do the job, or that it is unfair if other duty-bearers remain 
inactive, does not alter the demands of Singer’s Principle. Singer’s Principle thus belongs 
to the sphere of ‘non-ideal theory’, dealing with the moral obligations of an agent under 
“circumstances where at least some others are not doing what they are required to do” 
(Murphy 2000: 5).10 The question is therefore not whether institutions should do the 
job, but what each individual should do if others remain inactive. 
While compliance with Singer’s Principle is incompatible with a materially abundant 
lifestyle, it is not incompatible with a high level of well-being of duty-bearers. In fact, 
the demands of Singer’s Principle can be summarised by the maxim: ‘Maximise your 
                                                 
8 While ‘positive’ duties refer to the protection or promotion of the good of another 
individual, ‘negative’ duties require not harming other individuals (Rawls 1999a: 98). In this 
respect, a hotly debated question is whether positive and negative rights can be distinguished by 
the nature of their corresponding duties (positive rights only entailing positive duties and vice 
versa). See Shue (1996) and Tasioulas (2007). 
9 Obligatory duties can be contrasted with supererogatory (or voluntary) duties, where it 
would be good to comply but not morally required. Kant (1974), for example, argues that the 
moral demand to benefit others should be seen as imperfect duty of charity, since it cannot be 
known how frequently and to what extent individuals should benefit others. The OIC criterion 
is only concerned with obligatory duties; it would make little sense to examine whether an 
individual can comply if she is not obliged to do so. For a discussion on the relation between 
charity, justice and the status of duties see Buchanan (1987). 
10 The distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory has been introduced by Rawls (1999a: 
8). While ‘ideal theory’ is concerned with designing a blueprint for a perfectly just society and 
assumes full compliance, ‘non-ideal theory’ deals with questions of injustice and partial 
compliance. 
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contribution to the reduction of suffering, giving equal importance to you own 
suffering’. Whether the maximisation of an agent’s social impact requires a sacrifice of 
well-being is an open question. A life of moral commitment, even under conditions of 
material poverty, may lead to a high level of well-being; the study of ‘moral exemplars’ 
will offer various examples (Colby and Damon 1992). In other cases, compliance is 
likely to lead to both material deprivation and a sacrifice of well-being. Consider the 
example of a person who lives at subsistence level, donating all further funds to the 
fight against absolute poverty. Unless the person draws extraordinary internal rewards 
from her moral commitment, she is likely to lead an unhappy life.11 
It is now time to shortly outline the debates about the normative desirability of 
Singer’s Principle. Since its first promulgation, Singer’s Principle has provoked fierce 
resistance among philosophers and the wider public. A first line of argument is that 
Singer’s Principle is too demanding, i.e. that individuals should not be asked to give up 
most of their personal aims to reduce the suffering of distant strangers. In this respect, 
Fishkin (1982: 72) claims that a legitimate ‘cut-off for heroism’ should limit the demands 
of positive obligations.12 A second line of argument is that Singer’s Principle would be 
unfair to those who comply if most other individuals do not comply (Miller 1999a; 
Murphy 2000).13 Despite the intense debates taking place over various years, the 
philosophical literature is still divided regarding the normative adequacy of Singer’s 
Principle. It seems as unjustified to ask individuals to dedicate their lives to the service 
of others as to allow individuals to pursue their personal pleasures in the face of 
suffering and starvation. The analysis of this thesis, however, does not depend a 
particular stance on the normative desirability of Singer’s Principle. 
Finally, the gap between the theoretical demands of Singer’s Principle and practice 
                                                 
11 Although a luxurious lifestyle is incompatible with Singer’s Principle, a relatively abundant 
lifestyle may be required for some agents to participate in the political and social life of Western 
societies thus influencing decision-makers (Singer 1972: 238). 
12 Wolf (1982) and Nagel (1991) defend a similar viewpoint. Murphy (2000: 15), by contrast, 
defends Singer’s Principle against the charge of ‘over-demandingness’. His argument is that 
either every demanding principle (referring to positive and negative obligations) should be 
rejected for being over-demanding or none. Since demanding principles are accepted by most 
philosophers in other spheres, Murphy concludes that the charge of over-demandingness is 
unconvincing. See Unger (1996) and Singer (1993) for a further defence of Singer’s Principle. 
13 Murphy (2000: 84) advances a ‘principle of collective beneficence’ requiring agents only to 
do as much as would be required of each agent under conditions of full compliance. This 
suggestion is rejected by Mulgan (1997) who argues that considerations of fairness amongst 
duty-bearers are of limited importance when compared with prevented suffering. 
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also deserves note: only rare individuals live up to the obligations of Singer’s Principle. 
Although Singer’s Principle often has a strong initial effect, few individual think they 
should comply, and even fewer actually comply. Although it is tempting to reject 
Singer’s Principle in light of the gap between theory and practice, this line of argument 
is unconvincing. The problem is that a direct link between people’s beliefs, desires and 
behaviour and the content of moral principles cannot be established: the ‘is’ and the 
‘ought’ cannot be linked in a direct way. This position can be expressed by Hume’s 
(1992) claim that the ought can never be derived from the is; it is equally contained in 
Moore’s (1903) ‘naturalistic fallacy’ argument challenging Mill’s (1962) justification of 
utilitarianism. Taken together, the arguments by Hume and Moore represent “one of the 
best-known ways of drawing a sharp distinction between moral facts and all other, 
between description and evaluation” (Mackie 1990: 64).14 
The OIC criterion 
The OIC criterion represents an indirect way to evaluate moral principles in light of 
empirical findings. As Albert (1991: 92) puts it, the OIC criterion thus functions as a 
‘bridge-principle’ (‘Brücken-Prinzip’) allowing for the empirical evaluation of moral 
principles. In its basic form, the OIC criterion holds that an agent must have the 
capacity (‘can’) to comply with a moral obligation (‘ought’); the concept of a duty is thus 
said to presuppose the possibility of compliance (Kant 1991: 61). In addition, it can be 
said that it would be ‘absurd’ or ‘pointless’ to demand the impossible (Singer 1993: 242; 
Griffin 1992: 123). Summarising these claims, we can refer to the ‘conceptual rationale’ 
of the OIC criterion. The form of possibility evaluations is dichotomous: compliance is 
either considered to be possible or not. If compliance is impossible, an individual is 
exempted from the moral obligation in question. The OIC functions as an absolute 
constraint that must be satisfied to assign a moral obligation to an agent.15 
                                                 
14 A further question about the relation between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ relates to the 
relevance of people’s moral judgments. Miller considers the latter to be relevant, claiming that 
the adequacy of principles of justice “is to be tested, in part, by its correspondence with our 
evidence concerning everyday beliefs about justice” (1999a: 51). Elster, by contrast, maintains 
that, “the idea that a theory of justice can be refuted by experiment seems hopelessly naïve” 
(1995: 95). He thereby explicitly refers to Oppenheimer’s (1992) rejection of the Rawlsian 
difference principle in light of empirical evidence. For an overview of experimental studies 
showing the arbitrariness of people’s moral judgments, see Unger (1996). 
15 The OIC criterion is pitched at the individual level. The question is whether a specific 
13  
Furthermore, a distinction can be made between the physical, cognitive and 
motivational capacities required for compliance. In the case of physical capacities, many 
obvious examples for impossible demands can be given; evaluating whether an action is 
motivationally possible, by contrast, it is often more difficult. As Griffin (1992: 128), 
Elster (2007: 73) and Huber (2008: 5) point out, the evaluation of an agent’s 
motivational capacities is a highly uncertain and challenging task. 
To deal with this task, a precise definition of the research question is a requisite for 
the application of the OIC criterion. Though the OIC criterion is endorsed by most 
philosophers (Griffin 1992: 122), no standard definition of the OIC criterion exists. The 
first part of the analysis consists in the definition the research question via the following 
four parameters. First, the evaluative standard defines under which conditions 
compliance should be considered ‘possible’. Moreover, it determines whether the OIC 
criterion only applies to cases where individuals are already motivated to act or whether 
it applies to all individuals independent of their present motivational state.  
Second, the parameter motive defines whether compliance has to occur for a specific 
set or reasons. Third, the degree of compliance defines the conditions under which the 
behaviour of an individual should be considered as in line with Singer’s Principle.16 
Fourth, the parameter agency indicates for which specific individuals or groups 
compliance should be considered to be possible or impossible. 
Throughout Chapter 3, a research question will be developed that is both 
philosophically convincing and which can be connected to empirical studies about 
moral behaviour. The critical research question is: Can ordinary persons chronically, or at least 
once, comply with Singer’s Principle? The discussion of the OIC criterion will also show that 
many philosophers do not offer a precise definition of their research question. This 
criticism holds regarding the definition of the standard, the degree of compliance and 
the agency of compliance. Considering these three parameters in a systematic way, the 
present work will offer a more extensive and coherent definition of the research 
                                                                                                                                          
 
individual has the capacity to comply with a moral principle. Thus, the OIC criterion does not 
attempt to evaluate the motivational validity of moral principles; this task, by contrast, is 
performed by the feasibility criterion regarding institutional principles. 
16 Following Zimbardo’s (2007: 481-482) empirical distinction between ‘acute’ and ‘chronic’ 
heroism, I will make a philosophical distinction between acute and chronic (or sustained) 
compliance with Singer’s Principle. 
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question. This will improve the applicability of the OIC criterion. 
Application 
The aim of the application of the OIC criterion is to offer an empirically justified 
evaluation whether ordinary persons can chronically, or at least once, comply with 
Singer’s Principle. Considering philosophical literature, the stunning result is that 
empirically informed applications of the OIC criterion are, apart from one or two 
exceptions, entirely missing. This result echoes Miller’s claim that “almost without 
exception political theorists have failed to consider the bearing that empirical findings 
might have on their formulations” (1992: 555). In fact, most philosophers writing on the 
OIC criterion neither offer their own possibility evaluations nor discuss those of other 
philosophers (Griffin 1992; Elster 2007; Huber 2008). While the difficulties in applying 
the OIC criterion are mentioned, the implications of this ‘epistemic problem’ (Elster 
2007: 73) are barely considered. Other philosophers like Singer (2004) make possibility 
evaluations but do not offer an empirical justification for their judgment. For this 
reason, the present work will concentrate on Miller’s (2002) analysis of the relation 
between studies on altruism and demanding moral principles like Singer’s.17 
The second step is the examination of empirical explanations of moral behaviour; 
our capacity to evaluate what is likely to be possible in the future depends on our 
understanding of the determinants of moral behaviour. Since social scientists do not 
focus on the explanation of compliance with abstract moral principles, we have to 
identify forms of moral behaviour that are (i) researched by social scientists, and (ii) in 
line with Singer’s Principle. If it can be shown that a certain form of behaviour is either 
possible or impossible for an agent, it can be inferred that compliance with Singer’s 
Principle is also likely to be classified as either possible or impossible. In the scientific 
literature, extreme forms of moral behaviour are summarised under the heading of 
‘moral heroism’ (2007). Most empirical studies about moral heroism consulted in this 
thesis belong to the field of social psychology; the underlying assumption of this field is 
that “behaviour is best explained as the result of an interaction between personal and 
external social, or situational, factors” (Oliner and Oliner 1988: 10).  
                                                 
17 A sign for the neglect of the empirical application of the OIC criterion – and also the 
feasibility criterion – is that, in his taxonomy of the empirical study of justice, Elster (1995) does 
not mention possibility or feasibility evaluations. 
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The distinction between personal and situational factors – i.e. whether moral 
behaviour should be seen as ‘Fixed and Within’ or ‘Mutable and Without’ (Zimbardo 
2007: 6) – fits well with the argumentative structure of possibility evaluations. (i) The 
more important personal factors are, the better we are able to predict the behaviour of 
specific individuals. If it could be shown that a dispositional factor is a necessary 
requirement for a certain kind of action, the prediction would directly follow from the 
explanation. While necessary determinants can be found in the natural sciences, they 
scarcely exist with regard to human affairs. The best we can hope for is to find personal 
factors that are ‘almost’ necessary for a certain type of behaviour. (ii) The more 
important situational factors are, the more likely it is that individuals can act in a large 
array of ways – including acts of heroism and extreme cruelty. Consequently, it becomes 
more difficult to predict the behaviour of specific persons. 
The empirical literature on moral heroism can be split into studies on ‘acute heroism’ 
and ‘chronic heroism’; this distinction corresponds to the research question of whether 
ordinary persons can chronically, or at least once, comply with Singer’s Principle. The 
research on acute heroism focuses on single instances where an individual has accepted 
a significant risk to their own well being to assist another person (Zimbardo 2007). The 
principal question is whether acute heroism is largely influenced by the personality of 
individuals or by situational factors.18 
Next, the study of chronic heroism focuses on the lives of individuals who showed 
sustained moral commitment over an extended period. The principal question is 
whether chronic heroes are exceptional people with fundamentally different qualities or 
whether each individual has the developmental potential to become a chronic hero. To 
answer this question, the present work focuses on Colby and Damon’s (1992) in depth 
study of 23 contemporary moral exemplars.19 
                                                 
18 With regard to the nature of moral motivation, the distinction between empathy-based 
(Hoffman 2000) and rationalistic accounts (Kohlberg 1981) will play an important role 
throughout this thesis. In opposition, the conceptual distinctions between reasons, desires and 
intentions, emphasised by the ‘reasons-for-action’ literature, are hardly considered in the 
literature from social psychology. In this respect, see Davidson (2006) for a classic defence of 
the view that reasons possess motivational force. This view is also endorsed by Scanlon, who 
argues that “[a]ny attempt to explain what it is to be a reason for something seems to me to lead 
back to the same idea: a consideration that counts in favor of it” (2000: 17). For an overview of 
the ‘reasons-for-action’ literature, see Mele (2003). 
19 An interesting aspect of this study concerns the relationship between sustained moral 
commitment and the well-being of the moral exemplars. The question is whether the following 
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Third, based on the empirical explanations of moral heroism, philosophers have to 
offer their own possibility evaluations. These evaluations have to be based on the 
empirical explanations of moral heroism and on predictions about the potential of 
ordinary persons offered by social psychologists (Oliner and Oliner 1988; Colby and 
Damon 1992; Zimbardo 2007). In this respect, it is important to explore whether these 
predictions can be linked to the standard of the OIC criterion. If no exact 
correspondence can be established, I will offer an account of my own possibility 
evaluations in an attempt to provide an explanation and fill this gap. 
1.2 The conditional feasibility of Pogge’s theory of global egalitarian justice 
The second analysis of this thesis deals with the feasibility of Pogge’s (1989) theory 
of global egalitarian justice. Since Pogge’s theory is an extension of the Rawls’ (1999a) 
theory of domestic egalitarianism, this section considers the normative justification of 
Rawls’ and Pogge’s theories. 
To begin, the distinction between a full and conditional feasibility evaluation will be 
examined. A ‘full’ feasibility evaluation of global egalitarianism includes, as a first step, 
an argument about the feasibility of domestic egalitarian justice.20 A ‘conditional’ 
feasibility evaluation, by contrast, starts with the assumption that domestic egalitarian 
justice is feasible. The conditional evaluation thus examines whether the empirical 
differences between the domestic and global level are sufficiently important to justify 
diverging feasibility evaluations.21 
                                                                                                                                          
 
‘grim’ popular image (characterised by Colby and Damon) is correct, namely that “moral 
exemplars endlessly reflect on what is right or wrong, that they constantly struggle with 
temptation, fear, and doubt; that they lead grim, joyless, or dreary lives; that they fight many of 
their battles in splendid isolation” (1992: 4-5). 
20 It seems plausible to defend the view that the feasibility of domestic egalitarian justice is a 
requirement for the feasibility of global egalitarian justice. This assumption is based on the view 
that the adoption of egalitarian values positively depends on the existence of a shared identity, a 
feeling of solidarity and a similar standard of living (Nagel 1991: 177; Miller 1999a: 18-19). Since 
these conditions are more likely to be met at the domestic than at the global level, it is 
reasonable to assume that, if domestic egalitarian justice is considered unfeasible, global 
egalitarian justice should also be considered unfeasible. 
21 The conditional feasibility evaluation resembles Caney’s ‘domestic-compatibility’ criterion, 
which requires philosophers to show “how one can consistently adopt certain principles at the 
domestic level and yet not adopt them at the global level” (2005: 132). The criterion of 
‘domestic-compatibility’ is satisfied if it can be shown that certain factors, which are required for 
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This thesis focuses on the conditional feasibility of global egalitarianism. The first 
reason is that, given the complexity of the feasibility debate about domestic egalitarian 
justice (Nagel 1991; Rawls 1999a), a full feasibility evaluation of global egalitarianism is 
beyond the scope of the present project. As will be shown in Chapter 6, the breadth of 
debate makes it questionable which psychological, social or political theories are most 
relevant to the justification of feasibility evaluations. The second reason is that the main 
interest of this project refers to theories of global justice and the empirical differences 
between the domestic and global level. Taking these differences into account, Boswell 
argues that once liberal conceptions of rights or justice “are applied to international 
questions of human rights, distributive justice or humanitarian assistance, then liberal 
theory faces a serious problem of feasibility” (2005: 1). A conditional feasibility 
evaluation allows us to evaluate whether this different treatment of the domestic and 
global realm is justified. 
Rawls’ theory of domestic egalitarian justice 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls (1999a) offers a blueprint for an ideal society regulated by 
two fundamental principles of justice. These principles apply to the ‘basic structure’ of a 
bounded domestic society, that is the major institutions affecting the life chances of 
individuals via the distribution of primary social goods; justice is thus regarded as the 
‘first virtue of social institutions’ (ibid: 3). Rawls’ conception is political (and not 
metaphysical) in that it seeks to find an ‘overlapping consensus’ behind a set of moral 
principles regulating political institutions while each individual is free to pursue their 
own conception of the good within this framework (ibid: 16). Furthermore, it is 
individualistic since people – and not social groups – are considered to be the primary 
units of moral concern.22 
                                                                                                                                          
 
the feasibility of a theory of justice, exist at the domestic but not at the global level. A shared 
national identity is an example. The distinction between Caney’s ‘domestic-compatibility’ 
criterion and my conditional feasibility evaluations is that the former can only be used to 
evaluate the positions of philosophers like Miller (1999a) who make feasibility evaluations 
regarding both the domestic and global level. A conditional feasibility evaluation, by contrast, 
can be led independently of a domestic feasibility evaluation. 
22 To reach an agreement on the content of the principles of justice, Rawls’ (ibid: 15-19) uses 
the hypothetical device of the ‘original position’ which characterises a situation of equal liberty: 
being hidden behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, all individuals are unaware of personal characteristics 
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Rawls’ theory is ‘egalitarian’ since the fundamental emphasis of the two principles of 
justice lies on the equality of individuals. The first principle of justice holds that “[e]ach 
person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of basic liberties 
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all” (ibid: 266). The second principle – its 
first part also being called the ‘difference principle’ – holds that:  
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the 
greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of 
fair equality of opportunity.  
  Rawls 1999a: 266 
 The underlying assumption of the difference principle is that economic incentives 
are assumed to be necessary to motivate the ‘talented’ to work hard, thereby creating 
extra wealth to be distributed.23 Normatively, the resulting inequities are justified by the 
criterion of Pareto optimality. A distribution is Pareto optimal “whenever it is 
impossible to change it so as to make some persons (at least one) better off without at 
the same time making other persons (at least one) worse off” (ibid: 58). The absolute 
level of well-being of the worst-off is considered to outweigh the intrinsic disvalue of 
inequalities.24 
Finally, it is important to note that Rawls (1999a: 96-98) makes a fundamental 
distinction between the ‘obligation of justice’ pertaining to the public sphere and 
‘natural duties’ relating to the private sphere. This means that feasibility evaluations of 
Rawls’ principles of justice and of Pogge’s (1989) theory of global egalitarian justice only 
                                                                                                                                          
 
like sex, religion, talent or other personal preferences. The veil of ignorance thus assures the 
impartiality of the agreement: the term ‘justice as fairness’ expresses this focus on the process of 
finding an agreement (ibid: 12). While the motivation of the parties of the original position are 
egoistic, Rawls assumes that in real life, compliance with the ‘obligations of justice’ primarily 
takes place for moral reasons (ibid: 128). 
23 Rawls does not claim that all talented individuals require incentives to be fully productive, 
but does claim that it is impossible for a sufficiently large percentage of the population to act in 
this way.  
24 Rawls’ theory of justice has been criticised for a range of normative concerns. From the 
right, libertarians like Nozick (1974) argued that is unduly paternalistic, inferring with the liberty 
rights of individuals. From the left, so-called communitarian philosophers – emphasising the 
role of social relationships regarding the formation of identities – criticised Rawls’ individualistic 
conception of the self (MacIntyre 1981; Sandel 1982; Walzer 1983; Taylor 1989). For a response 
to the communitarian critique, see Rawls’ (1996) Political Liberalism. For an overview of the 
debate between liberals and communitarians, see Mulhall and Swift (1992). 
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relate to the obligations of justice and not to the private behaviour of individuals.25 
Accordingly, we then reach a clear distinction between the feasibility analysis of 
principles of justice and the application of the OIC criterion to interactional principles 
like Singer’s. 
Pogge’s theory of global egalitarian justice 
Pogge (1989) maintains that the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure as well as his 
conceptions of human beings as free and equal moral persons point to the globalisation 
of the his conception of justice. The argument is that if global institutions affect the life 
chances of individuals, these institutions form part of the basic global structure and 
should thus be regulated by the two principles of justice. Accordingly, Pogge infers that 
the most convincing solution is to envision “a single, global, original position”, which 
does not change Rawls’ general argument, but considers the relevant closed scheme “to 
be the world at large” (ibid: 247).26 Nationality should thus be regarded as “just one 
further deep contingency (like genetic endowment, race, gender, and social class), one 
more potential basis of institutional inequalities that are inescapable and present from 
birth” (ibid). To minimise the arbitrary effects of nationality, Pogge argues that ideally, 
the parties of the global original position would want a scheme of global justice “to be 
maximally supportive of basic rights and liberties, to foster equality of fair opportunity 
worldwide, and to generate social and economic inequalities only insofar as these 
optimize the socioeconomic position of the globally least advantaged persons” (ibid: 
254). 
While Pogge rejects the desirability objections made by nationalists against the 
globalisation of the two principles of justice,27 he maintains that the argument about 
                                                 
25 Cohen (2000) challenges Rawls’ distinction between the public and private spheres. Under 
the slogan “the personal is political”, Cohen maintains that what ultimately matters is the 
distribution of benefits and burdens, and since this distribution is a result of “the structure and 
of people’s choices within it”, principles of distributive justice should apply to both domains 
(ibid: 122, 130). If the difference principle is needed to motivate the talented, we should not 
speak of a just society in the Rawlsian sense; the talented do not live up to the fundamental idea 
of the principles of justice in their daily lives (ibid: 126). 
26 Pogge thus rejects Rawls (1999b) argument for two distinct original positions, one at the 
national and one at the international level where the parties are representatives of states. For an 
elaboration of this position, see Pogge (1989: 240). 
27 Nationalistic authors like Miller (1995) and Tan (2005) criticise the individualistic 
conception of the self on which global egalitarianism is based, claiming that we should start our 
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cultural diversity could, to a point, be valid in such a way that the Rawlsian principles of 
justice, which “may cohere well with our cultural heritage and our considered judgments” 
are “nevertheless inappropriate on account of existing intercultural diversity of 
traditions and moral judgments” (ibid: 267). If the diversity of cultures made it 
impossible to reach an overlapping consensus of considered judgments, the objection 
continues, this would provide grounds to question the idea of global principles of justice 
as some would argue that it would be wrong to impose Western liberal values on other 
cultures. 
Pogge responds, however, that “[t]he fact of disagreement is no reason not to act in 
light of whatever (factual) and moral beliefs we now think are best supported. Our 
considered judgments support a conception of justice whose scope is universal, even 
though the present appeal is not” (ibid: 270). Western philosophers should not feel 
disheartened by pessimistic expectations about finding an overlapping consensus, but 
propagate their own conception of justice and enter a cross-cultural discourse about 
substantive moral issues. Such discourse may render moral conceptions less parochial, 
since participants may accommodate what they find “tolerable or even valuable in other 
cultural traditions” (ibid: 271).28 The parties of the global original position may, in light 
of the cultural diversity argument, decide to allow the principles of global justice to be 
sensitive to cultural differences. 
Incorporating cultural differences, Pogge suggests that the globalised first principle 
of justice  
might be viewed as requiring a ‘thin’ set of basic rights and liberties (analogous to 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and including an effective right to 
emigrate), which each national society could, in light of its national conception of 
domestic justice, ‘inflate’ and specify into its own bill of rights. 
ibid: 272 
Pogge argues, for example, that the first global principle may allow for enforced 
religious fasting in some domestic societies. Torture, in contrast, would have to be ruled 
out by all domestic societies. 
                                                                                                                                          
 
reasoning from existing forms of social cooperation. 
28 Pogge adds that a Rawlsian conception of justice is especially suitable for such an cross-
cultural discourse, since “[i]t is based upon a small set of widely accepted values and ideas, and it 
can offer a good deal of flexibility for acknowledging and incorporating cultural diversity” 
(Pogge 1989: 271). 
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Regarding the globalised second principle, the requirements for the organisation of 
domestic societies 
would be less stringent than Rawls’ requirement that each society must satisfy the 
difference principle internally. This may be so because a country’s choice among 
various forms of economic organization (more or less egalitarian than Rawls’s 
national difference principle would require) does not affect the globally worst 
representative share of social primary goods or because this choice is protected by 
the basic political liberties which allow the citizens of each nation to choose, within 
certain limits, their own mode of economic organization. 
ibid: 272 
In light of these adaptations of the two principles of justice, Pogge concludes that the 
“global institutional ideal would then allow each society a good deal of choice regarding 
its internal practices (and moral principles)” (ibid). At the same time, he concedes that, 
“these details are only illustrative speculation” (ibid: 273). In sum, the most important 
aspect is that the second principle of global justice demands the maximisation of the 
well-being of the globally worst-off. 
At this point, Pogge’s principles of global egalitarian justice can be compared with 
alternative suggestions advanced in the literature. While Miller (1999a) and Rawls 
(1999b) reject the view that any substantial principles of global distributive justice 
should be endorsed, cosmopolitans generally endorse principles of global distributive 
justice (Beitz 1979; Caney 2005). In summary, Pogge’s theory has the advantage that it is 
derived in a straightforward way from the premise that individuals are the unique 
bearers of moral concern and that nationality is an arbitrary factor. Alternatively, we 
should be critical about Pogge’s claim that the two globalised principles of justice pay a 
good deal of attention to cultural diversity: to maximise the share of the globally worst-
off strongly limits the ways in which economic systems may be arranged. Having 
described the content of the principles to be tested, we can now turn to the definition 
and application of the feasibility criterion. 
The feasibility criterion 
The aim of the ‘criterion of feasibility’ is to ensure that the ideal proclaimed by a 
moral theory can be implemented (Räikkä 1998: 31). While the OIC criterion relates to 
individual capacities, the criterion of feasibility focuses on the collective capacities of 
social entities like nation-states and humanity at large are. The common rationale is that 
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neither individuals nor collectives should be obliged to pursue moral ideals beyond their 
capacities. In the philosophical literature, several authors subsume the analysis of 
collective capacities under the heading of the OIC criterion (O’Neill 2004: 250; Elster 
2006: 41);29 others do not stress the link (Miller 1999a; Boswell 2005; Laegaard 2006). 
Apart from agency, the fundamental difference between OIC and the feasibility criterion 
concerns the standard and time frame of the analysis. While the OIC criterion asks 
whether an individual can comply with a moral obligation at a specific point of time, the 
feasibility criterion examines whether a moral ideal can be realised within a certain time 
frame. Accordingly, the feasibility criterion does not refer to the present capacities of a 
collective but to its future capacities, that is, its potential. 
Since the philosophical literature does not offer a standard definition of the feasibility 
criterion, we are confronted with an extremely limited range of more or less precise 
definitions (Nagel 1991; Miller 1999a; Rawls 1999a; Caney 2005; Räikkä 1998).30 
Consequently, the first task of this project is to develop a coherent and systematic 
definition of the feasibility criterion. The discussion of the feasibility criterion in 
Chapter 6 will lead to the following definition of the research question: Are the chances 
that the social ideal recommended by a moral theory will be brought about – by legitimate means and 
within the time frame T – unequal to zero? The conditional feasibility question is: Should, if 
we assume that egalitarian justice is feasible at the domestic level, Pogge’s theory of 
global egalitarian justice also be considered feasible? 
Application 
Having defined the feasibility criterion, the second task is the conditional feasibility 
evaluation of Pogge’s theory of egalitarian justice. Starting with the assumption that 
domestic egalitarian justice is feasible,31 empirical arguments must be offered as to why 
                                                 
29 O’Neill, for example, holds that: “Only if we conclude that an agent – individual, 
institution, or collectively – can carry a certain obligation does the further question arise as to 
whether it ought to carry that obligation…obligations presuppose capabilities for their 
discharge” (2004: 250-251). 
30 While the feasibility criterion is widely endorsed in the literature, Cohen (2008) rejects both 
the feasibility and OIC criterion, arguing that ultimate normative principles should be fact-
insensitive. Fact-insensitive ultimate normative principles should have the form “One ought to 
do A if it is possible to do A” (ibid: 251). 
31 In Chapter 6, Rawls’ (1999a) and Nagel’s (1991) arguments about the feasibility of 
domestic egalitarian justice will be analysed. The focus lies on the kind of empirical theories 
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the ideal of global egalitarianism should be considered conditionally feasible or ruled 
out. In analogy to the application of the OIC criterion, the fundamental idea is that our 
capacity to realise feasibility evaluations increases with the understanding of the factors 
determining the behaviour of individuals, the functioning of political systems and 
institutional change.32 
To evaluate the predictive arguments, a first step is the assessment of the explanatory 
assumption on which the feasibility evaluations of philosophers are based. Miller’s 
(1995: 57) argument that compliance with universalistic principles requires rational 
motivation, for example, can be assessed in light of psychological theories of moral 
motivation (Kohlberg 1981; Colby and Damon 1992; Hoffman 2000). The second step 
consists in the assessment of the empirical arguments advanced by philosophers to 
justify their feasibility evaluations. Surveying the philosophical literature, it is a stunning 
fact that only few philosophers take part in the feasibility debate of theories of global 
egalitarian (or distributive) justice. 
But this scarcity also has the advantage that most of the empirical arguments offered 
in the philosophical literature can be discussed in this thesis. One the one hand, Miller 
(1995; 1999a) and Nagel (1991) challenge the feasibility of global egalitarianism in light 
of the importance of a shared national identity. On the other hand, Caney rejects 
Miller’s view for being ‘too static’ (2005: 133) and defends the feasibility of principles of 
global distributive justice. Apart from evaluating the arguments advanced by Miller, 
Nagel and Caney, this thesis examines to what extent Beck’s (2006) ‘cosmopolitan 
vision’ and the analysis of long-term trends of globalisation can be used to justify 
feasibility evaluations. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
 
adduced, the predictive arguments offered, the definition of the feasibility criterion and the form 
of evaluations. It will not be attempted to evaluate whether domestic egalitarian justice should 
be considered to be feasible. 
32 Räikkä describes this task of applying the feasibility criterion as follows: “If there is a fact 
of moral psychology that says that certain social arrangements can never be morally accepted, and 
if these arrangements cannot be carried out without general moral acceptance, then a political 
theory that endorses them endorses unfeasible arrangements. But it may be hard to discover 
which social arrangements can never be accepted – as we know, for example, slavery can be 
accepted” (1998: 30). Apart from retaining Räikkä’s emphasis on the difficulty to accomplish 
feasibility evaluations, it remains to be seen whether feasibility arguments can indeed be justified 
by certain ‘facts’ of moral psychology. 
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The effectiveness criterion and its application 
The third analysis of this thesis focuses on the effectiveness of moral principles. 
Should Singer’s Principle and Pogge’s theory of global egalitarian justice be criticised (or 
even be rejected) for being ineffective? While it is generally acknowledged that 
effectiveness considerations should play an important role in individual decision-making 
and public policy issues,33 no consensus exists whether they should also influence the 
content of ultimate moral principles (Gross 1997; Singer 2004). Consequently, the 
rationale and definition of the effectiveness criterion must be defended and it must be 
shown how effectiveness evaluations can be realised empirically. Drawing on the 
effectiveness framework of economic theory, this PhD considers the effectiveness 
criteria as outlined by Carens (1996) and Gross (1997). 
While examining the applicability of the effectiveness criterion, this thesis focuses on 
Gross’ (1997) Ethics and Activism – The Theory and Practice of Political Morality. Apart from 
examining Gross’ definition of the standard and weight of the effectiveness criterion, 
the question is whether the empirical application to three case studies leads to 
convincing results. Gross work is highly interesting since it represent a truly 
interdisciplinary endeavour that combines a philosophical discussion of the effectiveness 
criterion with its empirical application. If the analysis of Carens’ (1996) and Gross’ 
(1997) work leads to a convincing definition of the effectiveness criterion, the next step 
consists in the evaluation of the effectiveness of Singer’s Principle and Pogge’s theory of 
global egalitarian justice. 
In addition, this thesis explores the connection between the effectiveness criterion 
and the OIC/feasibility criterion: it will be shown that a clear distinction is often not 
reached (Nagel 1991; Carens 1996; Rawls 1999a). 
1.3 Relevance and lines of argument 
As the preceding discussion has shown, the empirical application of the 
OIC/feasibility and the effectiveness criterion is underdeveloped. This thesis will make 
                                                 
33 The Stern Review (2007) on the economics of climate change is an example for a long-
term effectiveness evaluation; its aim is to offer an integrated assessment model comparing the 
costs of climate change with the costs and benefits of measures reducing the emission of 
greenhouse gases. The assessment leads to the conclusion that “the benefits of strong, early 
action considerably outweigh the costs” (ibid: ii). 
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a significant contribution with respect to three gaps that exist in various strands of the 
philosophical literature. First, this thesis offers a definition of the OIC/feasibility that is 
both philosophically convincing and sensitive to its empirical application. This step is a 
requirement for the present empirical application as it provides the basis for future 
interdisciplinary work on the motivational foundations of moral principles. 
Furthermore, the argument that a burden of proof (Walton 1988) should be established 
to limit the costs of false evaluations under conditions of uncertainty fills a theoretical 
lacuna related to the definition of the OIC and feasibility criteria. It will also be 
demonstrated that the philosophical literature defines the effectiveness criterion in an 
insufficiently precise manner (Carens 1996; Gross 1997). This thesis thus offers a 
significant contribution to the theoretical literature on the OIC/feasibility and 
effectiveness criterion. 
Second, this project contributes to our understanding of how scientific research 
results can inform the empirical application of the OIC/feasibility and effectiveness 
criterion. Drawing on the methodological framework of scientific predictions, the 
varying methodological and analytical tools used in the philosophical assessment of 
empirical arguments will be discussed at length. These tools allow us, on the one hand, 
to scrutinise the justification of evaluations; on the other hand, the methodological 
distinction between the subjectivity and objectivity of predictions (Knight 1933) and the 
related concept of the degree of uncertainty strengthen our ability to describe and 
evaluate the reliability of evaluations. Moreover, the degree of uncertainty serves as the 
basis for the assignment of the burden of proof. Finally, the empirical work 
accomplished in this thesis will allow us to evaluate the potential and limits of empirical 
research results to the evaluation of moral theories, thereby making a significant 
contribution to the relevant interdisciplinary literature (Oppenheimer 1992; Elster 1995; 
Walter and Schleim 2007). 
Third, and most significantly, this project applies the OIC/feasibility and 
effectiveness criteria to Singer’s Principle and Pogge’s theory of global egalitarian justice. 
Given the limited number of attempts to apply these criteria, the findings of this make a 
significant contribution to the applied literature on global justice by defending the 
motivational foundations of Singer’s Principle and Pogge’s theory of egalitarian global 
justice. 
The analysis of the effectiveness criterion leads to the finding that the effectiveness 
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criticisms advanced against demanding theories of global justice fail. As Chapter 2 will 
show, no convincing defence of the rationale and definition of the effectiveness 
criterion is offered in philosophical literature (Carens 1996; Gross 1997). In addition, 
Gross’ (1997) empirical application of the effectiveness criterion is unconvincing. Since 
the philosophical literature does not offer a satisfactory definition or application of the 
effectiveness criterion, this thesis concludes that Singer’s Principle and Pogge’s theory 
should not be criticised for being ineffective. 
The application of the OIC criterion to Singer’s Principle shows that the 
philosophical literature does not offer convincing arguments to justify possibility 
evaluations (Miller 2002). Thus, further analysis of the empirical explanations 
demonstrates the importance of situational factors and points out that no personal 
factors necessary for moral heroism can be identified. Turning to possibility predictions 
made by social psychologists, Zimbardo’s (2007) ‘banality of heroism’ and Colby and 
Damon’s (1992) ‘developmental continuities’ theses hold that acute and chronic moral 
heroism should be considered possible for ordinary persons. However, since the 
standard of possibility predictions and the OIC criterion differ, philosophers have to 
make their own possibility evaluations. Since evaluations are partly subjective and 
uncertain, I argue that a burden of proof should be established to limit the negative 
effects of false possibility evaluations. I close my analysis with the conclusion that acute 
and chronic compliance should be regarded as possible for ordinary individuals. 
The application of the feasibility criterion  to Pogge’s theory of egalitarian global 
justice shows the difficulty in justifying feasibility evaluations in light of specific 
psychological, social or political theories. Therefore, the analysis focuses on empirical 
arguments advanced in the philosophical literature (Nagel 1991; Miller 1995; 1999a; 
Caney 2005) and examines how long-term trends of globalisation can inform feasibility 
evaluations (Hurrell 2001; Beck 2006; NIC 2008). Taking all empirical arguments into 
account, this thesis concludes that Pogge’s theory of global egalitarian justice should be 
considered conditionally feasible. In light of the subjectivity and uncertainty of this 
result, it will be argued that a burden of proof should be established to limit the effects 
of false evaluations. 
Chapter outline 
The analysis of this thesis begins in Chapter 2, where the definition and application 
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of the effectiveness criterion will be examined. Having considered how the concept of 
‘effectiveness’ and ‘efficiency’ are defined in economics, Carens’ (1996) argument about 
the role of effectiveness with regard to the ‘realistic approach’ to morality and Gross’ 
(1997) argument about the effectiveness of ultimate moral principles will be examined. 
Subsequently, Singer’s (2004) and Dobson’s (2006) suggestions about how we can 
practically deal with the motivational problem of demanding moral principles will be 
considered.  
Chapter 3 begins with an exploration of the origin and rationale of the OIC criterion 
(Kant 1991; Huber 2008). In addition, Elster’s (2007) and Griffin’s (1992) evaluations of 
the applicability of the OIC criterion will be analysed. Next, to create a firm basis for the 
empirical application of the OIC and feasibility criteria, Chapter 4 focuses on the 
framework of scientific predictions. Considering Knight’s (1933) distinction between 
subjective and objective predictions, the Chapter subsequently discusses the degree of 
uncertainty of predictions and the concept of the burden of proof (Walton 1988; Hahn 
and Oaskfort 2007). Furthermore, three conditions for the assessment of predictive 
arguments will be outlined; considering the National Intelligence Council’s Report 
Global Trends 2025 (2008), I will analyse how methods of trend extrapolation and 
scenarios can be used to inform predictions. 
Chapter 5 deals with the empirical application of the OIC criterion to Singer’s 
Principle. Starting with an analysis of Miller’s (2002) work on the relevance of empirical 
studies of altruism, this Chapter turns to the empirical study of acute and chronic moral 
heroism (Oliner and Oliner 1988; Colby and Damon 1992; Zimbardo 2007). Here, the 
possibility predictions made by social psychologists will be linked to the standard of the 
OIC criterion. The Chapter concludes with a discussion of the burden of proof and the 
argument that compliance with Singer’s Principle should be considered possible for 
ordinary persons. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the definition of the feasibility criterion. To formulate the 
research question, I will discuss how to best define the standard, motive, agency, time 
frame and legitimacy constraints (Räikkä 1998; Rawls 1999a; Elster 2007). Furthermore, 
the debate about the feasibility of domestic egalitarian justice will be examined (Nagel 
1991; Rawls 1999a); the focus lies on the kind of empirical arguments advanced and the 
underlying definition of the feasibility criterion. Next, Chapter 7 turns to the conditional 
feasibility of Pogge’s (1989) theory of global egalitarian justice. The focus lies on the 
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empirical arguments advanced by Nagel (1991), Miller (1995; 1999a) and Caney (2005). 
In addition, the contribution of Beck’s (2006) ‘cosmopolitan outlook’ and long-term 
trends of globalisation (Hurrell 2001; Beck 2006) to the justification of feasibility 
evaluations will be examined. The Chapter concludes with a discussion of the burden of 
proof and the conditional feasibility evaluation of Pogge’s theory. Finally, Chapter 8 
summarises the findings of this thesis, analyses the contribution of the social sciences to 
the evaluation of moral theories and outlines avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2: The Effectiveness Criterion and Its Application  
The aim of this Chapter is to examine the oft-stated criticism that theories of global 
justice should be rejected for being ineffective. To evaluate this criticism, it must be 
explored whether a convincing definition of the effectiveness criterion can be offered 
and how effectiveness evaluations can be realised (the question of whether the 
effectiveness criterion should be endorsed at all will be left aside for the moment). The 
first task is to offer a precise and philosophically convincing definition of the 
effectiveness criterion. In contrast to the OIC criterion, no basic standard rationale or 
definition of the effectiveness criterion exists in the philosophical literature assessed for 
this prospect. Political theorists often mention that principles should be effective, or 
that a certain principle should be rejected for its potential counterproductiveness, but do 
not offer a definition or defence of the criterion on which such statements are based 
(Boswell 2005). To offer a systematic analysis of the effectiveness criterion, this Chapter 
begins with a discussion of the economic concepts of effectiveness and efficiency. 
Subsequently, the parameters necessary to define the philosophical criterion of 
effectiveness will be outlined and used to analyse the definitions of the effectiveness 
criterion offered by Carens (1996) and Gross (1997). 
The second aim of this Chapter is the empirical application of the effectiveness 
criterion: philosophers must offer predictive arguments as to why the propagation of a 
given moral principle is likely to be ineffective. Gross (1997) is one of the few 
philosophers attempting to apply the effectiveness criterion to theories of political 
morality. Focusing on the causes of political activism in the face of unjust public 
policies, Gross aims to show that undemanding theories of political morality are more 
effective and are therefore preferred. Gross’ study is especially interesting since it is an 
interdisciplinary work that attempts to define and apply the effectiveness criterion at the 
same time. If the present analysis can offer a precise definition of the effectiveness 
criterion and if it can be shown that the latter is applicable, the next step is to test the 
effectiveness of Singer’s Principle and Pogge’s theory of global egalitarian justice.  
In order to effectively accomplish these aims, this Chapter proceeds as follows: 
Section 2.1 outlines how the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness are used in 
economic theory. Moreover, the parameters necessary to define the philosophical 
30  
effectiveness criterion (standard, agency, motive, weight) will be outlined. Section 2.2 
examines Carens’ (1996) view on the relation between the effectiveness of moral 
principles and the ‘realistic approach’ to morality. In Section 2.3, Gross’ (1997) work on 
the effectiveness of ultimate moral principles will be analysed. Section 2.4 discusses 
Singer’s (2004) and Dobson’s (2006) practical suggestions as to how we can deal with 
the ineffectiveness of moral principles without changing their ultimate content. Finally, 
Section 2.5 evaluates the cogency of the criticism that demanding theories of global 
justice should be rejected for being ineffective. 
2.1 Defining the effectiveness framework 
In the philosophical literature, the terms ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ are often used 
interchangeably (Carens 1996; Gross 1997); other philosophers also speak to the 
counterproductiveness of highly demanding principles (Singer 1993: 245; Boswell 2005: 
50). It is worthwhile to clarify the differences between these concepts. Efficiency is a 
quantifiable measure referring to the ratio between inputs and outputs: an efficient 
solution either maximises the output or minimises the input. In discussing maximising 
the output, take, for example, maximising the profit of a vineyard. While the input is 
given (the size of the vineyard and the size of the labour force), the task is to maximise 
the profit. As regards minimising the input, the issue becomes achieving a certain profit 
in which labour input can be minimised. Efficiency thus relates to the economic or 
optimal use of resources, either relating to the maximisation of benefits, personal well-
being and public welfare or to the minimisation of costs and negative effects. 
Effectiveness refers to the capability to produce an effect. An effective car engine, 
for example, sets a car in motion. Effectiveness also refers to the idea of ‘getting the 
right things done’. In practice, the term effectiveness is often used with regard to non-
quantifiable tasks, e.g. whether a person is good at song writing or is an able 
administrator. In cases like these, the result is mostly not quantified or set in relation to 
inputs – effectiveness is thus a broader concept than efficiency. The imprecision 
becomes clear if we consider an expression like ‘more effective’: unless a standard of 
comparison is given, we cannot give a precise meaning to this statement. In sum, the 
concept of effectiveness is often used in a more general way and tends to focus on the 
output (or effects) of actions. Efficiency, by contrast, refers to the exact relation 
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between certain inputs and outputs.34 
Considering the analysis of moral principles, we are dealing with a situation where 
the input (the propagation of a moral principle) must be seen as fixed; the question 
becomes how the content of the principle is likely to affect the level of compliance. 
Consequently, the concepts ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ can both be used to 
characterise effects of the propagation of moral principles. What fundamentally matters 
is not the term itself, but that its underlying meaning is defined in a precise manner. 
Since Carens (1996) and Gross (1997) mainly refer to the effectiveness of moral 
principles rather than their efficiency, I will also use ‘effectiveness’ when referring to this 
concept.  
This leads to the question of how the philosophical effectiveness criterion should be 
defined. In the case of interactional principles, the effectiveness of a moral principle 
depends on its ability to motivate duty-bearers to comply for moral reasons. The 
parameter agency thus refers to the universe of duty-bearers, while the parameter 
motive requires that compliance occur for moral reasons. In the case of institutionalised 
moral obligations (e.g. to pay taxes), the effectiveness of a moral theory also depends on 
the social and legal sanctions that can be created to motivate compliance; this means we 
must also consider compliance for non-moral reasons. Since Carens (1996), Gross 
(1997), Singer (2004) and Dobson (2006) focus on non-institutionalised moral 
obligation, the analysis presented in this Chapter only considers instances of voluntary 
compliance. If necessary, the present analysis could, in future work, be complemented 
by considering the role of the mechanisms of enforcement. 
 The standard of the effectiveness criterion can be defined in two ways. (i) If we aim 
at maximising the expected output, we maintain that the most effective moral principle 
should be endorsed while all other principles should be ruled out. The object of 
maximisation, and the standard (or meter) by which it is assessed, depends on the moral 
                                                 
34 Furthermore, the concept of ‘counterproductiveness’ needs to be examined (cf. Boswell’s 
(2005: 50) claim that cosmopolitan principles are ‘potentially counterproductive’). A principle is 
effective if this brings us significantly closer to the desired state of affairs, ineffective if it hardly 
brings us closer and counterproductive if the propagation moves us farther away. Accordingly, 
ineffectiveness and counterproductiveness are situated on the same scale, particularly if we 
consider the opportunity cost foregone in comparison to an effective principle. The problem 
with the concept of ‘counterproductiveness’ is that it cannot be used to compare the results of 
two distinct principles; it can only be used to compare the propagation and non-propagation of 
a single principle. For these reasons, it is advantageous to use the more flexible concepts of 
‘effectiveness’ or ‘efficiency’. 
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principle in question. With regard to positive duties, for example, we would endorse the 
level of demands expected to maximise positive consequences for recipients. An output 
maximising effectiveness standard is a very strong standard since, comparing the relative 
effectiveness of principles, it is only satisfied by the most effective moral principle while 
all other principles are ruled out.  
(ii) A weaker requirement is that a moral principle has to satisfy a minimum level of 
effectiveness. For example, one could require the expected level of compliance be above 
a certain threshold (e.g. c percent). If we endorse such a standard, it makes sense to 
speak of (absolute) minimum effectiveness constraints, which could be satisfied by 
principles independent of the expected effectiveness of other moral principles. It may 
be argued that the probability of a random individual complying with a moral principle 
should be higher than 1 percent where, if a statistical assessment showed the probability 
at 0.5 percent, the obligation would be invalid. The most important advantage of the 
probability threshold relates to its applicability. If statistical data exists, the probability of 
compliance can be predicted with a high degree of certainty. The option of defining the 
effectiveness standard by a probability threshold will be reconsidered in Section 2.4. 
The final question relates to the weight of the effectiveness criterion. What should be 
the consequences if a moral principles fails to satisfy the effectiveness criterion? Two 
options exist. (i) If we assign absolute weight to the effectiveness criterion, ineffective 
moral principles are ruled out. Accordingly, no weighing with other criteria takes place 
(the OIC criterion is an example for a metaethical constraint being of absolute weight). 
(ii) Effectiveness can also have relative weight, meaning that it is necessary to balance it 
against other criteria. In this case, the failure to satisfy the effectiveness criterion would 
only represent one mark against the principle. If the principle marked high from a 
desirability perspective, for example, it could still be chosen as the most adequate 
principle to use. 
Having outlined a conceptual framework about the effectiveness of moral principles, 
the following two sections explore Carens’ (1996) and Gross’ (1997) use of the 
effectiveness criterion and its underlying definition. 
2.2 Carens on the ‘realistic approach’ to moral theory 
Carens (1996) argues that a fundamental distinction between two approaches to 
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morality can be made. On the one hand, the ‘realistic approach’ should be concerned 
with practical moral principles and be sensitive to effectiveness considerations. On the 
other, the ‘idealistic approach’ deals with ultimate moral principles independent of 
effectiveness considerations. For the present analysis, the focus lies on Carens’ 
justification of the realistic approach and on the definition of the effectiveness standard. 
Moreover, whether or not Carens’ effectiveness evaluations are based on empirical 
evidence needs to explored. 
Outlining the role of the realistic approach, Carens maintains that it is “especially 
attentive to the constraints which must be accepted if morality is to serve as an effective 
guide to action in the world in which we currently live” (1996: 156). Dealing with short- 
and middle-term issues, the realistic approach demands that certain behavioural, political 
and institutional constraints should be taken as fixed. Considering the relation between 
the realistic and idealistic approach, Carens maintains that both approaches should be 
seen rather as representing “differing sensibilities and strategies of inquiry than of 
logically incompatible positions. Formally it is possible to construct an ethical account 
that incorporates both realistic and idealistic concerns, and ultimately it is desirable to 
do so” (1996: 156). 
The first task is to examine the rationale of the realistic approach. Carens’ primary 
claim is that moral principles should be effective guides to action. This guidance 
function would be hampered, however, if ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ significantly diverged; 
Carens claims that the “emphasis of avoiding too large a gap” between the practice and 
moral theory should be seen as “the essential realism of this sort of approach” (1996: 
160). Moreover,  
it should not be unreasonable to expect people to conform to moral requirements 
and most of the time most of them will do so for the most part…Because a 
realistic approach is concerned, above all, with guiding action, it also encourages us 
to pay attention to the factors that make morality effective in the world. 
Carens 1996: 160 
I find that Carens’ way of relating (i) the role of the gap, (ii) the guidance function of 
morality, and (iii) effectiveness considerations is problematic. First, the ultimate 
rationale of the realistic approach is unclear. If the realistic approach is primarily 
concerned with guiding action, then the avoidance of the gap is only of secondary 
importance; the existence of a gap might rather be seen as an indicator for a guidance 
problem and not as the problem itself. Second, it is questionable that the realistic 
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approach is ‘above all’ concerned with guiding behaviour and only ‘also’ with the 
effectiveness of moral principles. It seems more adequate to say that guidance matters 
because it is instrumentally valuable; moral principles fulfilling the guidance function 
lead to a more effective implementation of the aims of morality. Overall, the triple 
emphasis on the gap between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’, the guidance function and on the 
effectiveness of moral principles is confusing. It would be more coherent to consider 
the effectiveness of moral principles as the ultimate rationale of the realistic approach. 
Thus, let us turn to the standard of the realistic approach. Since Carens offers no 
clear definition of the effectiveness standard, his definition should be reconstructed. 
With regard to the ethics of migration, Carens maintains that the following constraints 
illustrate the functioning of the realistic approach: behavioural, institutional and 
political. (i) Behavioural constraints relate to the moral demands of interactional 
principles and the motivation of individuals. In the case of the ethics of migration, a 
behavioural constraint should rule out the “ethical demand that we give up half of our 
wealth to provide for the immigrants and refugees of the world”, since the latter “would 
be bound to be ignored, regardless of the force of the moral argument supporting it” 
(Carens 1996: 163). In addition, Carens holds that  
[i]f everybody is falling short of some supposed moral duty, then a realist would 
say that the duty is too demanding, that it violates the principle that ought implies 
can. From a realist perspective, moral norms should not stray away from what 
most actors are willing to do most of the time…What is morally obligatory 
depends on an important extent on what is being done. 
1996: 158 
Evaluating the above statement, the first problem is that Carens falls back on the 
OIC criterion to describe the demands of the realistic approach. The OIC criterion 
should, however, be kept strictly separate from the realistic approach.35 Furthermore, 
the OIC criterion is endorsed by realists (Miller 2002) as well as by idealists (Singer 
1972); thus, it should not be adduced to point out the differences between these two 
strands of thinking.  
Next, the argument that moral principles should be close to ‘what most actors are 
willing to do most of the time’ is not a precise definition of the effectiveness standard. 
In addition, Carens’ emphasis on present compliance is problematic, i.e. that moral 
                                                 
35 The OIC criterion is justified by a conceptual rationale and not with regard to 
effectiveness considerations (cf. Section 3.1). 
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obligations depend ‘on what is being done’. As I argued earlier, the effectiveness 
standard should relate to the expected degree of compliance. Overall, the example 
characterising behavioural constraints is very imprecise. 
(ii) Political constraints are meant to ensure that only politically feasible decisions are 
adopted: 
Part of the task of realistic ethics of migration is to make some assessment of what 
policy options are politically feasible and to focus one’s evaluation on those, 
leaving aside options that have no chance of adoption. Of course, the question of 
what is feasible in a given context may be highly contestable, but a concern for 
political feasibility will nevertheless shape and constrain the inquiry in significant 
ways. 
Carens 1996: 159 
Carens goes on to add that political constraints lead to the “realm of real choice in 
the real world, where only a fairly specific range of different outcomes is possible” 
(1996: 159). However, Carens’ definition of political feasibility is misleading as policy 
makers do not distinguish between a specific range of ‘possible’ outcomes and those 
having ‘no chance of adoption’. Instead, policies should be classified as politically 
feasible if there are good chances that they will be successfully implemented. In sum, 
Carens’ definition of political constraints is imprecise and runs the risk of confusing 
issues of political feasibility with questions about the philosophical feasibility of ultimate 
moral ideals.36 
(iii) Finally, Carens advances the institutional constraint that proposals for a world 
government should be ruled out in advance for having “no chance of being 
implemented” (1996: 158). If this is true, a clear distinction between the realistic and the 
idealistic approach is only reached in a situation where proposals for a world 
government are ruled out by the realistic approach but endorsed as a feasible ultimate 
ideal by the idealistic approach. Overall, I conclude that the discussion of the three 
constraints endorsed by the realistic approach has not yielded a coherent definition of 
the effectiveness standard.  
The last issue at hand is the application of the effectiveness standard. Unfortunately, 
Carens does not offer a general evaluation regarding the applicability of the 
effectiveness standard, i.e. how and to what extent, the effectiveness of moral principles 
                                                 
36 See the discussion of the feasibility criterion in Section 6.1. In the case of behavioural 
constraints, a similar confusion between effectiveness considerations and the OIC criterion took 
place. 
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can be predicted. The most interesting question would be whether general evaluations 
valid across time and different cultures could be made or whether the effectiveness of a 
moral principle could only be estimated with respect to specific circumstances.37 
Additionally, Carens’ analysis seems to assume that demanding principles are ineffective. 
But this view is not justified in light of empirical evidence; the relative effectiveness of 
demanding and undemanding principles is not compared. The applicability of the 
realistic approach thus plays a minor role in Carens’ work. 
Having considered the rationale of the realistic approach as well as the effectiveness 
standard and its application, we can summarise the findings. First, Carens has failed to 
clearly define the rationale of the realistic approach (working with a triple emphasis on 
the gap between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’, the guidance function of moral principles and 
effectiveness considerations). Second, it remains unclear by which standard the 
effectiveness of moral principles should be assessed. Third, Carens does not evaluate 
the general applicability of the effectiveness standard. 
In relation to this last point, it can be asked whether we can indeed speak of an 
independent realistic approach to morality. In fact, Carens observes that the realistic 
approach is “less developed theoretically” (1996: 157). This may not, however, be due to 
a gap in the philosophical literature, but instead to the nature of practical moral issues. It 
may well be the case that moral theory can only offer certain broad principles from 
which practical decisions about how to act in a given situation cannot directly be 
derived. This view is expressed by Kant’s (1991: 61) claim that an ‘act of judgment’ is 
necessary to apply empirical and moral theories (cf. Section 3.1).38 I am thus sceptical of 
whether the realistic approach should be seen as a distinctive approach to morality. The 
fact that Carens has not offered distinctively realistic moral principles should make us 
                                                 
37 Carens only discusses which kind of behaviour would be effective in specific situations. In 
the case of slavery, Carens (1996: 165) maintains that it might be better, under certain 
circumstances, to argue for a more humane treatment of slaves than to argue for the 
abolishment of slavery. This may well be the case; taking the expected consequences into 
account, one may conclude that the best strategy is to refrain from making certain demands at a 
given time. But it is questionable whether such broadly consequentialist (or strategic) reasoning 
should be called an independent ‘realistic approach’ to morality. 
38 In a similar way, outlining the idea of the ‘ethic of responsibility’, Weber (1991: 120) argues 
that theoretical moral reflections cannot tell individuals how to act in certain practical situations. 
The responsibility for a moral decision rests with the individual. An example is the question of 
how politicians act in light of the means-ends conflict being part of their daily lives. 
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wonder whether such principles could be defined at all.39 Instead, it may be more 
advantageous to make distinctions between questions of practical reasoning and 
ultimate moral principles. Independent of this issue, the basic finding of this section is 
that Carens has not been able to offer a precise definition of the effectiveness criterion. 
2.3 Gross on the effectiveness of ultimate moral principles 
This section examines Gross’ (1997) position on the effectiveness of ultimate moral 
principles. It thereby complements Carens’ work on the effectiveness of short- and 
middle-term moral principles. In Ethics and Activism – The Theory and Practice of Political 
Morality, Gross (1997) offers an interdisciplinary research project combining a 
philosophical discussion of the effectiveness criterion and an empirical study on the 
conditions of activism. In light of the relevant literature, the breadth of this study – both 
regarding the philosophical pretensions and the scope of the empirical research – is 
highly unusual. 
Philosophically, Gross maintains that the effectiveness criterion should be used to 
evaluate the cogency of ultimate moral principles. His specific aim is to compare the 
relative effectiveness of an undemanding ‘weak’ and a highly demanding ‘strong’ theory 
of political morality. To realise this empirical evaluation, Gross designs an explanatory 
model of activism that he considers to be an “unprecedented attempt to combine 
cognitive and rational theories of moral action empirically” (1997: 13). Subsequently, 
this model of the conditions of activism is tested in three empirical studies. In light of 
these empirical results, Gross compares the relative effectiveness – and, thus, overall 
cogency – of weak and strong theories of political morality. 
This section begins by outlining Gross’ definition of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ theories of 
political morality, the effectiveness standard and the empirical research findings. 
                                                 
39 The complexity of practical questions becomes obvious with regard to the following 
example. Considering the protection of basic rights, Shue argues that philosophers and decision-
makers should engage in a process of strategic reasoning which is sensitive to the following 
elements: “Institutional design must combine judgments about what it is fair to expect people to 
do, what it is efficient to ask people to do, and what it is possible to motivate people to do. All 
this depends upon subtle judgments about sense of duty, sense of fairness, sense of identity, 
sense of solidarity, self-interest, incentives, and coercion – especially hard choices about which 
aspects of individuals and societies can be changed while which others remain fixed” (1996: 
170). The large array of relevant considerations shows the difficulty to define (realistic) moral 
principles which explicitly stipulate how agents should act in given situations. 
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Subsequently, a critical evaluation of Gross’ framework and findings will be offered. 
The effectiveness standard and the empirical research model 
Gross defines political morality as the “ethical principles and norms of action guiding 
citizens in their relationship to the state” (1997: 225). His focus lies on the obligations of 
individuals if the state violates the limits of defensible public policy; activism thus 
“reflects the obligation to undertake concerted political action should the state breach 
these limits” (1997: 225). The required actions may be campaigning activities, acts of 
collective civil disobedience and so on. In light of its role of securing the integrity of the 
modern democratic state, activism is considered to be of crucial importance.40 
To compare the relative effectiveness of theories of political morality, Gross makes a 
broad distinction between two kinds of theories. The term ‘weak’ political morality 
refers to relatively undemanding theories of political morality like Madison’s protective 
democracy or competitive pluralism. As Gross observes, “[p]luralism in all its variants is 
oriented towards political efficacy, parochial affections and enlightened self-interest” 
(1997: 38). The term ‘strong’ political morality entails highly demanding moral theories 
making “maximum demands on moral cognition and political action to safeguard 
political integrity” (Gross 1997: 40). Standing in the tradition of Locke, the theories of 
Rawls (1999a) and Habermas (1990) are cited as examples for strong theories of political 
morality (Gross 1997: 41). 
This being the case, I now want to examine the effectiveness standard used to 
compare weak and strong theories of political morality. Unfortunately, Gross does not 
give a clear name to the criterion that he attempts to apply: he rather speaks of the need 
to “develop a theory of political morality consistent with empirical evidence”, that we 
should examine the “behavioral constraints of moral judgment and political action”, or 
he asks whether weak or strong political morality is “correct” (1997: 18, 3, 10). Given 
the overall focus on the conditions of “effective political action” (1997: 230), as well as 
the evaluation of moral theories in light of these conditions, it seems reasonable to use 
the term ‘effectiveness criterion’ to describe Gross’ attempt of evaluating the ‘ought’ in 
light of empirical research.41 
                                                 
40 See Rawls (1999a: 319) and Singer (1993: 292) for a discussion of civil disobedience from a 
liberal and utilitarian perspective. 
41 On one hand, Gross seems to refer to the OIC criterion: “Knowing how individuals can 
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For Gross, morality is effective if it can motivate successful collective activism in the 
face of unjust public policies. This means that the effectiveness evaluations only deal 
with collective campaigning or rescuing activities and not with individual action – 
collective action is considered to be necessary to successfully oppose unjust public 
policies (Gross 1997: 90). Furthermore, Gross maintains that collective activism 
crucially depends on the leadership of ‘politically competent’ individuals who can 
overcome collective action problems by administrating moral and non-moral 
incentives.42 Considering the rescue of Jews in the Second World War, Gross highlights 
that  
[b]y and large, rescuers were not self-motivated but enlisted by others and 
provided with the means necessary to sustain rescue activities. Under these 
circumstances, any salient motivation would be sufficient to promote action if it 
could be successfully tapped and administered by organizational leaders. 
1997: 153 
In sum, two requirements must be fulfilled for a moral theory to be effective: a leader 
must (i) be motivated by the moral theory to become active, and must (ii) be able to 
start and administer collective action. 
The next task is to establish a link between theories of political morality and the 
behaviour of individuals; i.e. it needs to be shown that a given act is the effect of a 
specific moral principle. Gross’ first strategy to establish such a link relates to 
Kohlberg’s (1981) theory of moral development.43 Gross (1997: 92, 121) assumes that 
                                                                                                                                          
 
act helps us understand how they ought to act. Understanding their limitations forces us to 
rethink our image of the ideal citizen and his political obligations” (1997: 19). Throughout the 
rest of his work, by contrast, Gross clearly deals with the effectiveness of moral theories. 
42 Apart from various moral motivations (the desire to help, to act justly, to ‘pitch in’ for 
friends etc.), Gross (1997: 94) offers the following list of non-moral incentives which may be 
used by leaders or organisations to motivate collective action: material and solidarity incentives, 
informational benefits, educational benefits (lectures and conferences), fraternal benefits, 
making new friends and meeting like-minded people. 
43 In comparison to Piaget’s (1932) theory of cognitive development, Kohlberg (1981; 1984) 
argues that the moral development of individuals can be represented by six stages. Each stage 
offers a morally and cognitively superior form of thinking, integrating a larger array of morally 
relevant concerns. Stage 1 and 2 belong to pre-conventional level, characterised by a devotion to 
authority and rules of reciprocity. Stage 3 and 4 form the conventional level, where individuals 
begin to understand principles of justice in relation to political systems, as opposed to mere 
personal choice. Stage 5 and 6 represent the post-conventional; individuals become autonomous 
moral reasoners questioning the validity of social norms and the political systems (Kohlberg 
1981: 147-161). The stage of moral development can be assed by the moral development tests 
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abstract reasoners (defined by a high stage of moral development) are more likely to be 
motivated by a strong theory of political morality. Non-abstract reasoners defined by a 
low stage of moral development are, by contrast, more likely to be motivated by a weak 
theory of political morality. Gross’ (1997: 141-145) second strategy concerns the 
motives of behaviour where rationalistic or empathy-based motives are respectively 
linked to a strong or weak conception of political morality. Overall, the argument is that 
we can measure the effects of a moral theory by considering the kind of people – and 
the motives for which they have acted – who have successfully administered collective 
action. The research model thus aims “to tease out the conditions of morally inspired 
collective action by drawing on elements of both cognitive and rational choice theories 
of action” (Gross 1997: 120).44 
 The research model is applied to three cases: the rescue of Jews during the Second 
World War, (anti-)abortion movements in the United States and pro/anti peace-
movements in Israel.45 The results of the application are as follows. First, abstract moral 
reasoners often fail to organise or take part in collective activism, since they either lack 
the consistency-motivation to live up to their own moral conviction or they lack the 
ability to administer collective activism. Second, successful collective activism has 
mostly been organised by non-abstract reasoners, sufficiently encumbered in their local 
communities to administer moral and non-moral incentives, thus overcoming the 
                                                                                                                                          
 
based on hypothetical moral dilemmas (cf. Lind and Wackenhut 1985). 
With respect to the origin of moral motivation, Kohlberg maintains that the “moral force in 
personality is cognitive”, i.e. that “one follows moral principles because one feels that they 
correctly define that situation” (1981: 187-188). Kohlberg thus argues that a positive relation 
between the stage of moral development and moral action exists. The rationalistic account of 
moral motivation is criticised by a range of authors on theoretical and empirical grounds (Rest 
1986; Hoffman 2000; Bergman 2002). Colby and Damon (1992: 8) conclude that the empirical 
evidence supporting Kohlberg’s rationalistic view of moral motivation is scarce. A further 
criticism was Gilligan’s (1982) claim that Kohlberg’s theory is unduly insensitive to the 
reasoning of women, who rather think in terms of care than of justice. 
44 For a discussion of rational choice theories of action and the collective action problems, 
see Olson’s (1971) The Logic of Collective Action. For a discussion of Olson’s work and a recent 
study of the conditions of environmental activism, see Jordan and Maloney (2006). 
45 Each case study was based on qualitative and quantitative interviews with activists 
exploring the motives of behaviour and assessing the stage of moral development of each 
activist by Lind and Wackenhut’s (1985) moral judgment test (MJT). Furthermore, the 
organisational incentives used to motivate collective action were examined (Gross 1997: 13-18). 
While the study of the rescue of Jews was realised 50 years afterwards, the study of pro/anti 
peace activists in Israel and Palestine and of (anti-)abortion activists in the US took place in 
1992. 
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collective action problem. Gross thus concludes, “[t]he most politically competent individuals 
are, most often, the least morally competent” (1997: 11). 
Based on these findings, Gross comes to the overall conclusion that weak political 
morality is more effective than strong political morality; consequently, the former 
conceptions should be endorsed and the latter ruled out. Accordingly, weak political 
morality “reasserts the normative value of the parochial conditions that best facilitate 
collective action. In doing so, it restructures our image of the ideal citizen” (Gross 1997: 
226). In opposition, the model of strong political morality should be rejected, being “at 
best insignificant and at worse incoherent”, and that “post-material motivations…fail to 
have any significant effect on most forms of political activism. Individuals may espouse 
these values with great fervor, but they fall short when measured against action” (Gross 
1997: 228). Consequently, the emphasis should be shifted from doing the right thing, 
which is linked to higher stages of moral development, to doing anything at all (i.e. to 
overcome the collective action problem).46 
Evaluating Gross’ definition and application of the effectiveness criterion 
Overall, Gross’ work suffers from a range of defects leading us to question the 
conclusion that strong political morality should be rejected for being ineffective. These 
defects concern the definition of strong and weak political morality, the definition of 
effectiveness and their empirical application. First, Gross’ distinction between weak and 
strong theories of political morality is very broad, comprising of the moral theories of a 
range of different authors. Moreover, Gross considers the duty to resist unjust state 
policies, though he neglects the question of whether individuals are likely to comply 
with just state policies. The problem in this is, based on the supposed result that weak 
political morality is more effective with regard to collective activism against unjust state 
policies, that Gross rejects strong theories of political morality. The inference from the 
supposed effectiveness of one part of a moral theory is insufficient to reject a moral 
theory altogether. This inadequacy undermines Gross’ general conclusion, which 
                                                 
46 To a certain extent, Gross is also aware of the limits of what can be done by politically 
competent but morally incompetent individuals: “Cognitive constraints, however, limit the 
scope of effective moral communities…While the focus of moral concern broadens with 
cognitive development, rarely do individuals surpass these limitations to consider the interests of 
large, cosmopolitan, or distant communities” (1997: 230). However, this limitation of weak 
political morality does not lead Gross to question his overall conclusion. 
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explicitly argues against the entire tradition of strong political morality.47 
There are two other tricky issues regarding Gross’ definitions. To begin with, Gross 
only considers the practice of collective resistance of face-to-face groups; individual acts 
such as sabotage, solitary protest, anonymous donations to resistance groups are not 
included in his study. Next, what matters for Gross is not that people make the effort to 
live up to a principle, but, as discussed earlier, whether their effort is effective or 
successful. This focus reduces the generality of Gross’ findings. It is unclear whether the 
effective administration of collective action is always the crucial element in the case of 
opposing unjust public policies. 
Second, turning to the effectiveness criterion, Gross fails to explicitly defend the 
rationale of the effectiveness criterion. While most philosophers would agree that it is 
good if moral principles are expected to motivate compliance, they would reject the idea 
that the expected effectiveness should influence the cogency of ultimate moral 
principles (Singer 2004: 27). Consequently, Gross cannot draw on an implicit standard 
justification of the effectiveness criterion (which exists, by contrast, in the case of the 
OIC criterion as will be shown in Chapter 3). It is especially important to point out how 
highly contingent effectiveness evaluations should be allowed to influence ultimate 
moral principles. Neglecting the rationale of the effectiveness criterion, Gross fails to 
justify the basis of his project. 
Subsequently, we can observe that the form of the effectiveness standard is relative; 
Gross compares two conceptions of political morality and endorses the more effective 
one. This leads us to question whether, if four conceptions of political morality where 
compared, Gross would equally argue that only the most effective conception satisfies 
the effectiveness criterion. Gross does not, however, offer an explicit justification of the 
form of the effectiveness standard. In addition, considering the claim that strong 
political morality is ‘at best insignificant and at worst incoherent’, it can be inferred that 
Gross assigns absolute weight to the effectiveness criterion in such a way that a moral 
theory not satisfying the effectiveness criterion is ruled out. The combination of a 
relative standard of absolute weight is problematic; such a definition signifies that all but 
the most effective conception of morality are ruled out. In sum, the standard and the 
weight of the effectiveness criterion are not explicitly defined or justified. 
                                                 
47 A more rigorous research design would have focused on a specific moral obligation, for 
example on Rawls’ (1999a: 319) principle of civil disobedience. 
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Thirdly, let us address Gross’ application of effectiveness criterion. Stepping back for 
a moment, we realise that Gross is not concerned with effectiveness evaluations. Gross’ 
focus exclusively rests on the explanation of past behaviour. This is entirely 
unsatisfactory – an explanation of behaviour can only be the basis for effectiveness 
evaluations. Effectiveness evaluations must relate to the expected level of future 
compliance, including the effects of changing circumstances. 
A further problem relates to the link between moral principles and moral behaviour. 
Abstract reasoners may also act in light of non-abstract reasons. The claim that the 
individual has indeed been motivated by a moral theory requires the researcher to have a 
detailed knowledge of the individual’s motives – but such knowledge is rare. With 
regard to the rescue of Jews, for example, Gross not only assesses the moral 
development of the rescuers 50 years later, but also their motives. This seems especially 
unusual as some of the moral theories tested by Gross – like Rawls’ (1999a) theory of 
justice – had not yet existed at that time. Moreover, even if an individual has acted for 
abstract reasons, it remains to be shown how these reasons relate to a specific moral 
theory. An individual must know the principle in question, act and report that she has 
done so for the very reasons offered by the principle. Based on these rationales, I argue 
that Gross’ research model inadequately deals with these challenges.48 
In sum, considering Gross’ failure to evaluate the future effectiveness of moral 
theories, the unclear link between moral theories and action and the focus on local 
activism, the application of the effectiveness criterion remains unconvincing. The 
promise to offer an ‘unprecedented’ theoretical contribution about the conditions of 
activism, to test this contribution empirically and to work out the consequences for the 
cogency of moral principles is not fulfilled.49 For this thesis, the most important finding 
                                                 
48 Gross’ emphasis of face-to-face communities as a requirement for effective collective 
activism is also problematic. Due to the process of globalisation, for example, small-scale 
communities unable to resist global unjust policies are likely to lose some of their importance. 
To deal with phenomena like climate change or unfair trade policies, global virtual networks 
might be needed. The factors motivating individuals to participate in such networks are, 
however, likely to be significantly different from those that led French villagers to shelter 
prosecuted Jews. 
49 In general, it seems difficult to solve such a threefold task in one piece of work; the 
complexity is extremely high and there is a severe risk of confusing different approaches. 
Moreover, an author can easily get lost in the details of specific debates, thus neglecting the 
question how the realms of the ‘is’, ‘can’ and ‘ought’ should be related. In this respect, it is 
surprising that Gross effectively dealt with three extensive empirical case studies but spent very 
little time examining the link between moral theory and practice. 
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is that Gross fails to offer a precise and convincing definition of the effectiveness 
criterion and that, as a consequence, the application of the effectiveness criterion is also 
unsatisfactory. It follows that we should reject Gross’ conclusion about the primacy of 
weak theories of political morality. 
2.4 Singer’s and Dobson’s practical solutions 
So far, the discussion of Carens’ and Gross’ work has not led to a convincing 
defence or definition of the effectiveness criterion. This section, then, considers two 
practical solutions in relation to the effectiveness of moral principles: first, Singer (1993) 
argues that a less demanding moral principles might be propagated in public to motivate 
compliance; second, Dobson (2006), who suggests the rationale of various moral 
principles may be combined to overcome the ‘motivational problem’ of 
cosmopolitanism. 
Singer’s argument for a public/private split 
Singer (2004: 27) rejects the idea of an effectiveness criterion, claiming that the 
expected degree of compliance should not affect the cogency of moral principles. Singer 
concedes that it is then likely that extreme demands will indeed demotivate compliance 
– although he maintains that there is “not much evidence to go by” (1993: 245). To 
avoid such negative motivational effects, Singer suggests that lower demands may be 
propagated in public. But this should not affect the cogency of extremely demanding 
moral principles: 
Of course we ourselves – those of us who accept the original argument, with its 
higher standard – would know that we ought to do more than we publicly propose 
people ought to do, and we might actually give more than we urge others to give. 
There is no inconsistency here, since in both our private and our public behaviour 
we are trying to do what will most reduce absolute poverty. 
ibid: 245 
The idea of the public/private split is thus to endorse the original version of Singer’s 
Principle in private and to propagate lower demands in public. Singer claims that “[f]or a 
consequentialist, this apparent conflict between public and private morality is always a 
possibility, and not in itself an indication that the underlying principle is wrong” (ibid: 
245). 
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The following example shows how the public/private split could work in practice. 
The leaders of an NGO, say Oxfam, are convinced that Singer’s Principle is morally 
adequate, but assume that its public propagation will demotivate compliance. 
Consequently, Oxfam’s public slogan is not ‘Donate until you are in the same position 
as the worst-off’, but, ‘If you donate 10 percent of your income, you will fulfil the 
demands of beneficence’. If the aim of 10 percent is reached by a certain part of the 
population, for example in 25 years, Oxfam might revise its public slogan and claim that 
beneficence now demands the donation of 20 percent. If some curious journalists made 
an inquiry why the principle of beneficence should have changed, Oxfam might either 
reply that the circumstances have changed, or that the (new) leaders of the organisation 
have thought harder about the question, which led them to a different conclusion. 
An open issue is whether the public/private split is a legitimate mean to motivate 
compliance as it serves as a classic example of a means-ends conflict. Here the question 
is whether it is justified to deceive the public in order to motivate moral action. The 
answer depends on the conception of the morality endorsed,50 the moral principle in 
question and the circumstances. In conclusion, the public/private split can serve as a 
practical solution if it should be true that extreme demands demotivate compliance. 
Dobson on the ‘motivational problem’ of cosmopolitanism 
Dobson (2006) offers another perspective on the ‘motivational problem’ of 
demanding moral principles. Considering the low level of compliance with 
cosmopolitan principles, Dobson begins his analysis by asking 
whether it is something about the principles of cosmopolitanism as they are usually 
expressed that fails to turn an intellectual commitment to them into a 
determination to act on them. I shall suggest that there is indeed a motivational 
problem with these principles, and I shall try to fill the motivational space that I 
identify at cosmopolitanism’s heart.  
2006: 165 
Interpreting this statement, we can firstly see that Dobson takes a lack of 
consistency-motivation to be responsible for non-compliance. There is an ‘intellectual 
commitment’ to cosmopolitanism, which is sufficient “to get us to ‘be’ cosmopolitan’s 
                                                 
50 For consequentialists, as Mackie points out, “no morally relevant distinction between 
means and ends” (1990: 159) exists. Instead, positive and negative consequences simply have to 
be weighed against each other. 
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(principles)”, but not “to motivate us to ‘be’ cosmopolitan (political action)” (Dobson 
2006: 169). This view is unsurprisingly problematic; while the use of the ‘us’ may be 
justified in the case of many philosophers, the assumption that the majority of Western 
individuals endorse cosmopolitan principles is highly questionable. We can thus 
question the explanatory adequacy of Dobson’s foundation. 
Second, the source of the motivational problem is, according to Dobson, the 
justification of cosmopolitan principles. Positive duties and arguments about a ‘shared 
humanity’ are insufficient to motivate compliance. The motivational problem is thus a 
problem of ‘nearness’; people do not feel close enough to other people living in distant 
parts of the world (Dobson 2006: 182). 
Dobson’s suggestion is that we can overcome the motivational problem of 
cosmopolitanism by relying on a causal responsibility approach (i.e. on negative duties). 
This idea is based on the motivational assumption that “we are more likely to feel 
obliged to assist others in their plight if we are responsible for their situation” (Dobson 
2006: 171). Climate change is an example where the causal responsibility approach can 
be applied. Moreover, Dobson (2006: 173) suggests that economic interdependence may 
be interpreted as leading to causal relationships between distant individuals. In 
conclusion, Dobson’s argument maintains that we should rely on the causal 
responsibility approach to realise the moral aims of concepts cosmopolitanism. 
Evaluating this argument, we have to be aware that Dobson’s interpretation of the 
motivational problem is practical and not philosophical. Dobson avoids the question of 
whether cosmopolitan principles – which do not rely on the causal responsibility 
approach – should be changed if the degree of compliance is low. The suggestion to 
work with negative duties is only a practical solution to overcome the problem of a low 
degree of compliance. Furthermore, the causal responsibility approach only works if a 
clear causal relationship between individuals exists: in the absence of such a relationship, 
the problem remains that positive obligations often fail to motivate individuals. The 
functioning of Dobson’s suggestion depends on the circumstances; therefore, I do not 
agree with Dobson’s conclusion that the causal responsibility approach can fill the 
“motivational vacuum at the heart of cosmopolitanism” (2006: 165).51 
                                                 
51 Additionally, the causal responsibility approach should not be seen has having a special 
connection to cosmopolitan accounts of global justice. Negative duties are endorsed by all 
prominent theories of global justice; Miller (1999b: 197), for example, explicitly endorses a 
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In conclusion, Singer and Dobson have offered two ways how to deal with the 
ineffectiveness of moral principles without changing the fundamental content. Whether 
these solutions work depend on circumstances; it would be extremely difficult to make a 
general evaluation in either case. Indeed, the flexibility of the discussed options is a 
major advantage; one can react to practical requirements without having to alter the 
basis of one’s moral convictions. Since practical solutions do not relate to the cogency 
of ultimate moral principles, a clear distinction between short-term question of practical 
reasoning and political feasibility on the one side, and ultimate moral principles on the 
other side, is reached.52 
2.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this Chapter has been to examine the criticism that demanding theories 
of global justice should be rejected for being ineffective. To evaluate this criticism, this 
Chapter has analysed how the rationale, definition and applicability of the effectiveness 
criterion are defined in the philosophical literature. The results question the cogency of 
the effectiveness criterion. First, no convincing defence of the rationale of the 
effectiveness criterion has been offered (Gross 1997). Second, neither Carens nor Gross 
have offered a coherent and convincing definition of the effectiveness criterion. 
Especially the definition of the effectiveness standard remained unclear; in addition, no 
clear distinction between the effectiveness considerations and the OIC and feasibility 
criterion has been reached (Carens 1996). Third, the applicability of the effectiveness 
criterion has not been demonstrated. While Carens hardly considers how effectiveness 
evaluations can be accomplished, Gross’ attempt to show the ineffectiveness of 
demanding theories of political morality remains unconvincing. The main problem is 
                                                                                                                                          
 
principle of non-exploitation. The debate between cosmopolitans and communitarians rather 
concerns the question whether there should be any principles of global distributive justice (cf. 
Section 1.2).  
52 In a similar way, Lichtenberg argues for a practical focus on motivation, namely “partly for 
philosophical reasons, and partly for practical reasons, we ought to change the subject – that we 
should concern ourselves less with the question of obligation and more with the question of 
motivation” (2004: 94). Focusing on the motivational question how individuals can be 
motivated to act, however, signifies that one leaves the domain of philosophy. Furthermore, see 
Goodin’s (1992) Motivating Political Morality for a practical discussion of moral argumentation and 
motivation. 
48  
that Gross exclusively focuses on the explanation of past behaviour and not on the 
expected future effectiveness of moral principles. 
Having focused on the definition and applicability of the effectiveness criterion, the 
first conclusion of this Chapter is that a precise definition is lacking and that it remains 
unclear how effectiveness evaluations should be realised. It follows that effectiveness 
criticisms remain imprecise and unconvincing unless they are based on a more solid 
ground. In addition, effectiveness criticisms must be accompanied by a defence of the 
rationale of the effectiveness criterion. This finding implies that the effectiveness 
criticisms raised against demanding theories of global justice like Singer’s Principle and 
Pogge’s theory of global egalitarian justice should be rejected. 
Obviously, by contrast, practical decisions about how to act and questions of political 
feasibility should be influenced by expected consequences. Nonetheless, it remains 
unclear whether such questions can be answered by recurrence to moral principles 
belonging to the realistic approach to morality (Carens 1996) or whether such decisions 
should be seen as belonging to the sphere of practical or strategic reasoning. If this is 
the case, Singer’s (2004) and Dobson’s (2006) suggestions about how to deal with the 
motivational problem of demanding moral principles become relevant. 
Finally, drawing on the effectiveness framework of economic theory outlined at the 
beginning of this Chapter, it is worthwhile to point out what a coherent definition of the 
effectiveness criterion could look like. Such a definition could be based on a probability 
threshold requiring that the likelihood of compliance be above a certain threshold. The 
probability threshold is related to the concept of ‘motivational difficulty’, which 
compares the capacities of an agent with the challenges of a given action (Cohen 2000: 
171). 
If the effectiveness criterion is justified by the view that moral principles are 
defective if they are unlikely to lead to compliance (i.e. if compliance is motivationally 
difficult), the effectiveness standard could be defined in the following way: A moral 
principle is defective if the probability that an agent A – within the time frame T and for 
the motive M – will comply is lower than the probability threshold t. For example, the 
level of the probability threshold could be defined at 5 percent. Accordingly, a principle 
would be defective if, for a random individual, the probability of compliance was below 
this threshold. To apply the effectiveness criterion, probability predictions could be 
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based on empirical predictions.53 
While the probability threshold is not explicitly defended in the philosophical 
literature, it resembles Carens’ claim that ‘it should not be unreasonable to expect 
people to conform to moral requirements and most of the time most of them will do so 
for the most part’ (1996: 160). Moreover, the probability threshold via the concept of 
motivational difficulty can be related to Nagel’s claim that “[i]f real people find it 
psychologically very difficult or impossible to live as the theory requires, or to adopt the 
relevant institutions, that should carry some weight against the ideal” (1991: 21). The 
problem is, however, that neither Carens’ nor Nagel’s theories expand on these ideas.54 
An effectiveness criterion defined by a probability threshold corresponds to the 
following parameters (cf. Section 2.1): (i) The probability threshold represents a 
minimum constraint. It is only expected that the probability of compliance is higher 
than the probability threshold; no relative effectiveness comparisons are made. (ii) The 
weight of the effectiveness criterion could be absolute or relative. Nagel suggests that 
the weight might be relative; if a principle is too difficult, this ‘should carry some weight 
against the ideal’ (1991: 21). (iii) It seems reasonable to define the effects of a moral 
principle with respect to an individual’s effort to comply, and not by the effects of 
compliance as endorsed by Gross (1997: 90). While the probability threshold represents 
a basis for a coherent definition of the effectiveness criterion, the effectiveness criterion 
should only be endorsed if a convincing rationale can be offered.55 
                                                 
53 The probability that an agent will donate a certain amount of her income can be calculated 
in light of econometric studies; an example is Yen’s (2002) econometric analysis of household 
donations in the USA. For an overview of the determinants of giving behaviour with regard to 
time, money and blood, see Lee, Pilavin and Call (1999). 
54 Nagel’s claim is rather a side-remark in relation to his discussion of the feasibility criterion 
(see Section 6.1). 
55 The probability threshold could also be used in a further way. If the application of the 
OIC criterion should show that possibility evaluations are very difficult to realise, it could be 
argued that an individual should be exempted from a given moral obligation if the probability of 
compliance is extremely low (i.e. below probability threshold). While the modification of the 
evaluative standard could thus increase the applicability of the OIC criterion, it is a different 
question whether a probability threshold is compatible with the rationale of the OIC criterion. 
50  
Chapter 3: The ‘Ought Implies Can’ Criterion 
The second analysis of this thesis is the application of the OIC criterion to Singer’s 
Principle. The analysis is split up in two parts; I will focus on the definition of the OIC 
criterion in the present Chapter and will look at the empirical application of the OIC 
criterion in Chapter 5. 
This Chapter begins with an analysis of the origin and rationale of the OIC criterion: 
Why should we demand that compliance with a moral principle is possible? Which 
objections are made against the OIC criterion? Thereafter, the Chapter turns to the 
definition of the OIC criterion. Although the OIC criterion is at least superficially 
endorsed by most philosophers, no standard definition exists; it thus needs to be 
explored how the evaluative standard as well as the motive, agency and degree of 
compliance should be defined (Kant 1991; Räikkä 1998; Singer 2004; Elster 2007). The 
overall aim of this Chapter is to develop a definition of the OIC criterion that is 
philosophically convincing and precise enough to be tested empirically. 
This Chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.1 offers a discussion of the origin and 
rationale of the OIC criterion; Section 3.2 defines the standard of the OIC criterion 
before, finally, Section 3.3 explores how the motive, agency and degree of compliance 
should be defined. In addition, the Chapter will outline how various philosophers 
evaluate the applicability of the OIC criterion; in other words, the Chapter will explore 
to what extent we are confronted with an ‘epistemic problem’ (Elster 2007: 73). 
3.1 Origin and rationale 
The OIC criterion is often associated with Kant, so much that, as Stern (2004: 53) 
observes, some theorists call it ‘Kant’s dictum’. This ascription is surprising since the 
idea that obligations are restricted by the capacities of an individual was prominent in 
earlier times. In Roman legal philosophy, as Huber (2008: 3) points out, the OIC 
criterion was expressed by its negative equivalent: ‘Impossibilium nulla obligatio est’, i.e. that 
‘The impossible cannot be obligatory’. This claim is also expressed by the statement 
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‘Ultra posse nemo obligator’ (‘Nobody is obligated beyond their capacities’).56 
We can now turn to Kant’s understanding of the connection between moral duties 
and individual capacities. It is important to note that Kant has not offered an explicit 
definition of the OIC criterion. Instead, Kant maintains that the concept of a duty 
presupposes the possibility of compliance: his position can thus be characterised by the 
statement ‘I ought, therefore I can’. To understand this claim, it is worthwhile to 
consider Kant’s general conception of the relationship between theory and practice. 
Kant holds that 
[a] collection of rules, even of practical rules, is termed a theory if the rules 
concerned are envisaged as principles of fairly general nature, and if they are 
abstracted from numerous conditions which, nonetheless, necessarily influence 
their practical application. Conversely, not all activities are called practice, but only 
those realisations of a particular purpose which are considered to comply with 
certain generally conceived principles of procedure. 
1991: 61 
Since rules are often abstract, a supplementary “act of judgment whereby the 
practitioner distinguishes instances where the rule applies from those where it does not” 
(ibid: 61) is required. However, if a theoretical understanding is combined with an 
adequate interpretation of specific circumstances, the effects of practice will correspond 
to the theoretical expectation. In engineering, for example, a cannonball will hit its target 
if the theoretical understanding of ballistics is sound and if the cannon guard has a 
practical understanding of how to correctly operate a cannon (ibid). Hence, no gap 
between theory and practice arises.57 
For Kant, the claim that what is true in theory is also true in practice can also be 
applied to the case of moral theory: 
in a theory founded on the concept of duty, any worries about the empty ideality of 
the concept completely disappear. For it would not be a duty to strive after a 
                                                 
56 While the negative equivalent has the same content as the OIC criterion, the inverse 
conclusion that ‘a capacity implies an obligation’ is not true (Huber 2008: 3). Furthermore, 
Huber (ibid: 2) argues that the OIC criterion is also encapsulated in Hobbes’ argument that 
contracts are only valid if they can be kept. 
57 This view can be contrasted with the idea that, though it may be true in theory, it is not 
maintainable in practise. Kant ascribes the latter to the ‘ignoramus’ or “would-be expert who 
admits the value of theory for teaching purposes, for example, as a mental exercise, but at the 
same time maintains that it is quite different in practice, and that anyone leaving his studies to 
go out into the world will realise he has been pursuing empty ideals and philosopher’s dreams – 
in short, that whatever sounds good in theory has no practical validity. (This doctrine is often 
expressed as: ‘this or that proposition is valid in thesi, but no in hypothesi’)” (1991: 62). 
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certain effect of our will if the effect were impossible in experience (whether we 
envisage the experiences as complete or as progressively approximating to 
completion).  
ibid: 62 
The notion of an ‘impractical duty’ would thus be a contradiction in terms.  
In the following discourse, I will use the term ‘conceptual rationale’ to refer to Kant’s 
justification of the OIC criterion. A conceptual rationale implies that the OIC criterion 
(i) functions as an absolute constraint (impossible duties are ruled out, the weight of the 
OIC criterion being absolute), and (ii) that the form of evaluations is dichotomous 
where compliance should be considered to be either possible or impossible.58 
In contemporary philosophical literature, the OIC criterion is often defended by a 
rationale similar to Kant’s conceptual rationale. Singer, for instance, maintains that it 
would be “absurd to say that we ought to do what we cannot do” (1993: 242). This 
captures what people mean if they say moral principles must be realisable as else it just 
wouldn’t make sense. In a similar way, Griffin holds that “[a]ction-guiding principles 
must fit human capacities, or they become strange in a damaging way: pointless” (1992: 
123).59 As it will be shown in Chapters 4 and 5, the rationale of the OIC criterion 
matters with regard to possibility evaluations under conditions of uncertainty. To assign 
the burden of proof, thereby attempting to limit the negative effects of false possibility 
evaluations, we need to understand why it is important that a moral obligation satisfies 
the OIC criterion. 
Having outlined the rationale, let us now consider two objections raised against the 
OIC criterion.60 The first objection relates to the meaning of the term ‘ought’. Consider 
an example where an agent sees two drowning children, but has time to only save one. 
Since no other people are around, one child will die. Consequently, the objection holds 
that ‘ought implies can’ dictum is flawed: how could we say that both children should be 
                                                 
58 A conceptual rationale can be distinguished from a justification informed by effectiveness 
considerations and dealing with the consequences of the propagation of possible or impossible 
ideals. In this respect, Mackie states that the propagation of “an utterly impossible ideal is likely 
to do, and surely has in fact done, more harm than good” (1990: 132). 
59 Furthermore, Elster (2007: 69) claims that the OIC criterion possesses ‘almost logical 
force’, but this claim is misleading. The OIC criterion cannot be derived in a logical way from 
the concept of a duty (Huber 2008: 3). Additionally, the term ‘almost logical’ is confusing; a 
relation is either logical or not. 
60 Independent of these objections, as stated in the Introduction, Cohen (2008) rejects the 
OIC criterion altogether in light of the argument that ultimate moral principles should be fact-
insensitive. 
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saved if this is impossible? As Elster (2007: 58) points out, however, the objection 
confuses two different meanings of ‘ought’. On the one hand, ‘ought’ can refer to the 
moral obligations of an agent; in this case, the OIC criterion applies. On the other hand, 
‘ought’ can relate to desirable states of affairs, e.g. that both children should be saved. In 
this latter sense, to claim that it would be good if both children were saved is compatible 
with the fact that this may sometimes not be possible. Since the objection refers to the 
‘ought’ in this second sense, it does not invalidate the OIC criterion exclusively 
concerned with the moral obligation of individuals and not with desirable states of 
affairs. 
The second objection relates to future obligations. It holds that the OIC criterion is 
invalid since it allows individuals to escape from their moral obligations by planning to 
be unable to comply in the future. An agent could get intentionally drunk, for example, 
to avoid the obligation of driving a sick person to the hospital. By endorsing the OIC 
criterion, the objection continues, we would allow people to illegitimately avoid 
obligations. While it is true that individuals should not be able to escape obligations in 
such a manner, the OIC criterion may be modified to deal with cases like this. Elster 
(2007: 78, 76) thus argues that the OIC criterion should be complemented by a 
‘principle of future obligations’ which holds that “[w]e have an obligation to ensure that 
we are capable of performing our moral duty in the future”. If we amend the OIC 
criterion in this way, the objection that the OIC criterion allows individuals to escape 
from their obligations is no longer valid.61 
Having rejected the two objections, we can turn to an intermediary conclusion about 
the role of the OIC criterion in the literature of global justice. In general, a broad 
consensus exists behind the view that the OIC criterion should be endorsed. As Griffin 
puts it, “[i]n a certain loose sense, ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. All moral theories work 
implicitly with a picture of what lies within the human capacity. The limits of human 
capacity help to define the limits of moral obligation” (1992: 122). Griffin’s remark that 
                                                 
61 The extended version of the ‘principle of future obligations’ holds that: “We have a pro 
tanto prima facie present obligation to ensure that we are capable of performing our all-things-
considered prima facie moral duty in the future” (Elster 2007: 78). Since this definition is highly 
complex, I will only focus on the basic idea that agents are not allowed to consciously attempt 
to minimise their future duties by making themselves incapable to act. In any case, the problem 
of future obligation is of little relevance with regard to Singer’s Principle, since the latter already 
demands that individuals maximise their lifelong contribution to the reduction of suffering, 
assigning equal importance to their own suffering. 
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the OIC criterion is often used in an implicit way points to the next task of defining the 
research question of the OIC criterion in a precise manner. 
3.2 Motivational capacities and the possibility standard 
A full definition of the OIC criterion requires the specification of the evaluative 
standard and the motive, agency and degree of compliance. To accomplish this goal, this 
section opens with a discussion on the role of different capacities – physical, cognitive 
and motivational – and how they may be required for compliance. Next, the concept of 
motivational capacities is analysed with particular focus on whether or not the OIC 
criterion should only be applied to cases where individuals are already motivated to act. 
This is followed by a brief analysis of the possibility standard. 
To begin, it is important to note that a broad distinction can be made between the 
physical, cognitive and motivational capacities. To rescue a drowning person, for 
example, an agent has to possess the physical ability to swim and the motivational 
capacity of wanting to perform the act. For an obligation to be possible, each demand 
must be within the capacities of an individual. 
The plausibility of the OIC criterion is most obvious regarding physical capacities. 
Various examples for physically impossible actions can be given. (i) No individual will 
ever be able to “grow wings and fly” (O’Neill 2004: 250). (ii) No individual can save a 
dozen drowning people in a short span of time. Consequently, a claim like “You ought 
to have saved all the people from the sinking ship” violates the OIC criterion (Singer 
1993: 243). (iii) A fully paralysed person cannot normally jump into a river to save a 
drowning person though, by contrast, it should be physically possible for healthy 
individuals to wade into a shallow pond to save a drowning child. These analyses of 
physical capacities have two important features. First, they are based on the assumption 
that the individual wants to act; this allows us to focus on the physical capacities of the 
individual. Second, the three examples lead to uncontroversial possibility evaluations. It 
would be highly implausible to argue that any individual could fly, or that one individual 
could save dozens of people at once. 
The OIC criterion also entails that the decision procedures required by moral 
principles be within the ‘cognitive capacities’ of agents. Cognitive capacities are needed, 
for example, to answer questions about the causal responsibility of absolute poverty or 
55  
how an agent can most effectively contribute to the eradication of poverty. A list of 
cognitive capacities includes, amongst others, the following: interpreting moral 
dilemmas, mathematical calculus and analytical skills. The limits of cognitive capacities 
are relevant, for example, with regard to the utilitarian calculus. Griffin (1992: 128) 
argues that the utilitarian calculus cannot be performed, since it is beyond the cognitive 
capacities of agents. Since Singer’s Principle is not considered by others in the field to 
require a complex decision-making procedure (Singer 1993: 231-232), cognitive 
capacities are of less relevance to this thesis. 
In opposition to physical and cognitive capacities, it is more difficult to define the 
concept of motivational capacities62 and to determine what is motivationally possible for 
an agent. One of the problems is that the term ‘motivation’ itself is used in a variety of 
ways by different authors and within different disciplines. To offer a clear definition of 
the concept of motivation, I draw on Kohlberg’s ‘model of reasoning’ (1981: 517-518). 
This model, widely used in social psychology, describes four steps that lead from 
abstract reasoning to action, all of which must be completed for an individual to act. 
Kohlberg proposes that (i) the ‘interpretation of the situation’ stands at the beginning 
of the process of reasoning. The individual has to make various factual judgments about 
how the situation in question should be interpreted. (ii) The moral reasoning of the 
individual results in the ‘deontic judgment’ that describes the individual’s belief about 
what an abstract individual in her situation should do. To proceed to the next step, the 
individual must think something along the lines of ‘I think I should act’. (iii) The ‘moral 
judgment’ relates to the individual’s decision on whether to adopt the deontic judgment 
as a plan for action. If the deontic judgment and the moral judgment coincide, the 
individual shows full consistency-motivation between what she thinks she ought to do 
and what she decides to do.63 Otherwise, the individual shows a lack of consistency-
motivation: ‘I think I should act but I have no desire to act’. (iv) To implement moral 
judgment, various ‘follow-through skills’ may be required, examples of which being the 
                                                 
62 In the literature, various expressions are used to refer to motivational capacities. Singer 
(2004: 28) speaks of people’s ‘moral powers’, Griffin (1992: 127) about the ‘limits of the will’, 
and Carens (1996: 158) of the ‘behavioral’ realities that constrain morality. 
63 In this case, the individual finds herself in the ‘motivational state’ of wanting to act. Batson 
defines a motivational state as a “goal-directed psychological force within an organism” with 
four features: “(a) The organism desires some change in his or her experienced world; (b) a 
force of some magnitude exists, drawing the organism toward the goal; (c) if a barrier prevents 
direct access to the goal, alternative routes will be sought; and (d) the force disappears when the 
goal is reached” (1991: 108). 
56  
strength of the will, concentration, delaying gratification, etc. If the individual possess 
the required follow-through skills, the individual is able to carry out the action. In the 
case of inaction, the individual thinks: ‘I want to act but I cannot act’.64 
Bridging the philosophical definition of ‘motivationally possible’ with the OIC 
criterion, two options exist. It can either be argued that the OIC criterion only applies to 
those cases where the individual has adopted the moral judgment to act or one can 
argue that the OIC criterion be applicable to all cases. (i) Assuming the motivation to 
act (‘can if one wants to’): According to this less demanding interpretation, the OIC 
criterion only refers to those cases where the individual is already motivated to act. 
Consequently, the question is only whether the individual possesses the follow-through 
skills required to carry out their decision. 
The less demanding interpretation is defended by Elster, who argues that OIC 
criterion applies only to ‘can if one wants to’ cases, “where an agent wants to do X, but 
(for some reason or other) cannot be motivated to do X” (2007: 64). Elster claims that 
“[t]his reading of the OIC-principle is necessary because wanting to do X is a 
psychologically necessary condition of being able to do X, so that in one sense, one 
cannot do X if one does not want to do X” (ibid). Considering the case of smoking, we 
would only ask whether smokers who currently want to give up have a chance to 
succeed. If the smoker failed, she would say ‘I want to stop but I am unable to do so’. 
By contrast, we would not ask whether those smokers who currently do not want to 
give up smoking may change their decision and give up.  
(ii) No assumption (‘can at all’): The more demanding interpretation does not rely on 
the assumption that the agent is already motivated to act. The question is whether an 
agent – independent of their present motivational state – can comply with a moral 
obligation. Considering the example of smoking, we would ask whether it is possible for 
any smoker to give up smoking. The demanding interpretation is defended by various 
authors. Huber, for example, states that “The incapacity is fundamental; it springs no 
moods, animosity or aversion of the obligated” (“Das Nicht-Können ist ein prinzipielles, es 
entspringt keiner Laune, Abneigung oder Widerwillen des Verpflichteten”) (2008: 3). Singer (2004: 
27) also endorses the claim that all individuals have the obligation to comply with his 
                                                 
64 The importance of follow-through skills depends on the moral action in question; to 
donate money to charity, follow-through skills are hardly required. To resist oppression, by 
contrast, courage and a strong will are necessary. 
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Principle since each agent (not only those who are already motivated to act) is ‘capable’ of 
acting impartially. Singer explicitly highlights the fact that simply because most 
individuals will not comply does not mean that individuals cannot comply.65 
In my view, this second option is acceptable. It is unclear why the OIC criterion 
should only apply to cases where individuals are already motivated to act. In analogy, the 
normative assignment of duties does not depend on whether a duty-bearer thinks that 
she should act. We also have to note that the attitudes of individuals change. So while I 
agree with Elster’s claim that wanting to do X is usually a necessary condition for action, 
I maintain that the OIC criterion should include the question whether it is possible that 
an agent will be motivated to do X at some point in the future.66 
Thus, what matters is whether a moral principle makes any demands that an 
individual cannot meet. Since the attitudes of an individual can change, the present 
motivation to act is not a requirement for future action. Moreover, the fact that an 
individual does not want to comply does not mean that she cannot comply. In this 
sense, ‘motivational capacities’ refers to the deontic and moral judgment adopted by an 
individual and whether the individual has the follow-through skills to carry out her 
decision to act. 
The standard of the research question can thus be expressed in two ways. The long 
version is: Can an individual form the deontic judgment that she should act, adopt the 
moral judgment to act and possess the follow-through skills to carry out the required 
actions? The short version (to be used in the following analysis) is: Can an individual 
comply?67 Since compliance with Singer’s Principle generally does not depend on an 
individual’s physical or cognitive capacities, the question whether an individual has the 
                                                 
65 In a similar way, the ‘motivational condition’ endorsed by Kagan does not presuppose that 
an agent is already motivated to act. Instead, “it must be possible for the agent to be motivated to 
react in the required manner” (1999: 277). Kagan distinguishes the ‘motivational condition’ from 
the less demanding interpretation of the OIC criterion, which requires that an “agent could react 
in the given manner if he wanted to” (ibid).  
66 The more demanding interpretation also corresponds to the focus of most scientific 
studies about moral heroism (cf. Chapter 5). The primary question of these studies is how likely 
it is (or whether there is any chance at all) that an individual, defined by personal characteristics, 
will act morally under certain conditions. Moreover, if situations require spontaneous action, it is 
difficult to draw a clear distinction between the motivation to act and follow-through skills. 
67 Note that the obligation to comply with Singer’s Principle refers to an agent’s entire (adult) 
life. The question is, therefore, whether an individual can comply at a specific point of time (or 
at each point of time of her life). The importance of this point will become evident in Section 
5.4 with regard to the comparison between the possibility predictions of social psychologists and 
the possibility evaluations of philosophers (which are based on the OIC criterion). 
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motivational capacity to comply is, in most cases, equal to the question whether the 
individual can comply. 
Thus, having concluded that no assumption about the motivation to act should be 
made, the next question is how the standard of the OIC criterion should be defined. I 
maintain that the phrase ‘ought implies can’ should be taken literally, i.e. that 
compliance has to be possible (and not merely likely). This view is also endorsed by 
Singer, who argues that: “‘Ought’ implies ‘can’, not ‘is likely to’”, adding that there “is 
nothing contradictory or incoherent in saying: ‘Everyone ought to do X’ and ‘It is 
certain that most people will not do X.’” (2004: 27).68  
The possibility standard should be clearly distinguished from the probability 
threshold, which requires that compliance is not too unlikely (cf. Section 2.5). Such a 
clear separation is not always reached; an example is Nagel’s claim that “[i]f real people 
find it psychologically very difficult or impossible to live as the theory requires, or to 
adopt the relevant institutions, that should carry some weight against the ideal” (1991: 
21). The problem of this statement is that it appeals both to a possibility standard and to 
a probability threshold. Furthermore, it is important to note that the probability 
threshold is more demanding than the possibility standard as each action that is 
sufficiently likely is also possible. 
It is not, however, an easy task to make a clear conceptual distinction between 
impossible and highly unlikely events. Consider the example of a young boy reflecting 
about his future:  
He said it was very difficult to become an astronaut. I said that I knew. You had to 
become an officer in the air force and you had to take lots of orders and be 
prepared to kill other human beings, and I couldn’t take orders. Also I didn’t have 
20/20 vision which you needed to be a pilot. But I said that you could still want 
something that is very unlikely to happen. 
 Haddon 2004: 32 
Although the chances of success are slim, it is possible for the boy to become an 
astronaut. In a similar way, a philosopher must ultimately decide herself whether an 
event should be considered to be possible or not: she cannot claim to apply a possibility 
standard and say, at the same time, that an event should be considered to be impossible 
                                                 
68 The possibility standard is also endorsed by Elster, who claims that: “If, within a given 
conception of morality, a prima facie moral duty is motivationally impossible to perform, then 
the action in question is actually not a moral duty” (2007: 47). 
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if the chances that the event will occur are below a certain probability level. In cases 
where such a level is used, the philosopher would apply a probability threshold and not 
a possibility standard.  
To outline the functioning of the possibility standard, let us draw a tie to empirical 
predictions. Here, the claim that an action is possible signifies that the probability of an 
individual acting in a certain way is unequal to zero. We can ask, for example, whether 
there are any chances that an amateur football player will change his chosen sport to 
tennis. If the probability is unequal to zero, the individual has the potential to realise the 
action in question. Consequently, the research question ‘Can an individual comply?’ can 
be reformulated in the following way: Is there any chance that a given individual will, at 
a certain point in time or over a given period, comply with the demands of a moral 
principle? Again, it is important to note that such a chance must exist in each situation 
or during each period of time in order for an obligation to satisfy the OIC criterion. 
3.3 The motive, agency and degree of compliance 
The parameter motive stipulates whether compliance must occur for specific reasons 
or whether no restrictions should be made. Social scientists usually distinguish between 
altruistic and egoistic motives where altruism is defined as “a motivational state with the 
ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare”, while egoism is “a motivational state with 
the ultimate goal of increasing one’s own welfare” (Batson 1991: 108). Social scientists 
and philosophers often differentiate between various kinds of moral motives, for 
instance, whether an individual aims to behave justly, to be virtuous and so on (Lerner 
1980; Batson 1991; Zimbardo 2007). Alternatively, philosophers speak of a prudential 
motive if an agent complies with a moral obligation to avoid social or legal sanctions.69 
Since Singer’s Principle is an interactional, non-institutionalised principle, the 
possibility that agents act for the prudential motive to avoid legal or strong social 
sanctions is ruled out. The question is, therefore, whether individuals should be allowed 
                                                 
69 See Mill (1962) for the distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ sanctions. The internal 
sanction of duty – the effects of an individual’s moral conscience – is characterised as “a feeling 
in our own mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty, which in properly 
cultivated moral natures rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking from it as an 
impossibility” (ibid: 281). External sanctions, by contrast, are the social or legal costs or benefits 
imposed by an agent’s social surrounding or the state (ibid: 280).  
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to comply for other self-interested reasons. Although it is unlikely that compliance with 
demanding moral obligations is the best way to maximise one’s self-interest, this option 
cannot be ruled out. Additionally, it may sometimes be the case that an act is motivated 
by various reasons that can be moral and non-moral.70 Unless one occupies a Kantian 
position and assigns intrinsic weight to the motive of compliance, there is no strong 
reason to stipulate that compliance must take place for moral reasons. In fact, most 
philosophers do not make the requirement that it must be possible for an agent to 
comply for purely moral reasons (Singer 2004). Following this choice, the parameter 
motive will not make any requirements with regard to the reasons of compliance.71 
At this point, it is good to remind ourselves that the function of the OIC criterion is 
to ensure that moral obligations are within the capacities of duty-bearers. Among the 
universe of duty-bearer, the parameter agency thus refers to the group of individuals for 
which compliance should be considered to be possible or impossible. If it is possible to 
realise possibility evaluations with regard to specific groups of individuals defined by 
certain personal characteristics, the onerous task of setting a different possibility 
evaluation for each agent can be avoided. 
A first strategy is to explore whether a moral principle is so demanding that 
compliance is impossible for all individuals. If this should be the case, it can be said that 
the demands in question are outside of ‘human capacities’ or ‘human nature’. The 
following story about the scorpion and the frog illustrate this case:  
A scorpion asks a frog for help crossing a river. Intimidated by the scorpion’s 
prominent stinger, the frog demurs. ‘Don’t be scared’, the scorpion says. ‘If 
something happens to you, I’ll drown.’ Moved by this logic, the frog puts the 
scorpion on his back and wades into the river. Half way across, the scorpion stings 
the frog. The dying frog croaks, ‘How could you – you know that you’ll drown?’ 
‘It’s my nature’, gasps the sinking scorpion.  
Leon 1999 
                                                 
70 Regarding the occurrence of various motives, Batson states that “egoistic and altruistic 
motives are assumed to be distinct, but to the extent that the goals of these motives are 
compatible, their magnitudes should sum” (1991: 114). Furthermore, see Goodin’s (1989) ‘Do 
Motives Matter?’ for an argument that, in the majority of cases, the attempt to identify the 
motives of one’s own or other people’s actions is either likely to fail or to have negative 
consequences. 
71 Nonetheless, since there are few self-interested reasons to comply with Singer’s Principle, 
it is likely that agents will comply for moral reasons. In addition, we should note the empirical 
study of ‘moral heroism’ (cf. Chapter 5) deals with behaviour dominantly motivated by moral 
reasons. 
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Although the circumstances are most conducive to moral behaviour, particularly 
since it coincides with prudential behaviour, it is motivationally impossible for the 
scorpion to stick to his promise. Given the nature of scorpions, the disposition ‘sting a 
frog whenever you can’ outweighs all other considerations. 
Regarding human affairs, the moral obligation to save all the drowning persons on a 
sinking ship is an example for an action that is impossible for all human beings (Singer 
1993: 243). Consequently, no individual has the obligation to comply with this moral 
obligation. In addition, the moral obligation itself becomes irrelevant for all practical 
purposes. In this special case, the OIC criterion does not only exempt all present and 
future individuals but can also be used to reject the moral obligation in question.72 If 
compliance is possible for at least one individual, the demands of a moral principle are 
within the realm of human nature, thus tapping into what Flanagan describes as 
“possibility space over which human personality can range” (1991: 16). Hence, the 
question is for which individual is compliance possible or impossible?  
Let us then examine whether compliance is possible for all individuals. The 
statement that compliance with a given moral principle is possible for all healthy 
individuals can be called the ‘ordinary persons’ thesis. Singer defends this thesis with 
regard to his Principle, claiming that “[e]ach of us, individually, is capable of acting 
impartially, even if most of us, most of the time, choose not to do so” (2004: 27). The 
opposite view is the ‘exceptional people’ thesis, which holds that though compliance is 
possible for some exceptional individuals, it is impossible for others. This view can be 
associated to Elster’s claim that “it is a plausible supposition that motivational capacity 
can vary from person to person, and from situation to situation, so that if something 
                                                 
72 There are two further issues concerning the limits of human nature. A first issue is 
whether actions can at least partly be motivated by the ultimate goal of benefiting others, a view 
that is rejected by proponents of ‘psychological egoism’. While psychological egoism has been 
prominent in the past (Hume 1992), it is by now widely rejected in philosophy (Feinberg 2002) 
and social psychology (Oliner and Oliner 1988; Batson 1991). Since the definition of the OIC 
criterion does not concern any restriction of the motive of compliance, the empirical correctness 
of psychological egoism is not relevant for the present analysis. 
The second issue is whether moral action can occur for a purely moral motive, i.e. whether 
any individual can “totally separate his desire for happiness from the concept of duty, in order 
to preserve the latter’s purity” (Kant 1991: 69). Kant argues that while “no-one can have certain 
awareness of having fulfilled his duty completely unselfishly”, individuals can be aware of the 
“maxim of striving towards moral purity” (ibid). According to Kant, this should be seen as 
sufficient to speak of the observation of a moral duty. With regard to the identification of 
motives, social psychologists agree with Kant’s claim that it is impossible to identify all reasons 
standing behind a given action (Oliner and Oliner 1988; Batson 1991). 
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were impossible for Paul, it might not be so for Peter, and it might not be possible for 
Paul in another situation” (2007: 67). In Chapter 5, the empirical application of the OIC 
criterion will begin with an examination of the ‘ordinary persons’ thesis. Should it be 
verified, we can conclude that ordinary persons can comply with Singer’s Principle. 
Should it turn out to be inadequate, the next task is to identify those exceptional 
individuals for which compliance is possible. 
Finally, it is important to distinguish the OIC criterion, pitched at the individual level, 
from metaethical criteria relating to the collective level. An example for such a criterion 
is Flanagan’s ‘Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism’ (PMPR), which holds that 
one must ensure, “when constructing a moral theory or projecting a moral ideal, that the 
character, decision processing, and behavior prescribed are possible, or are perceived as 
possible, for creatures like us” (1991: 32).73 While the OIC criterion “implies that it is 
irrational to require particular individuals to do what they cannot do”, the PMPR 
accepts that obligations may be impossible for some individuals: it only stipulates “that 
is irrational to ask persons in general (the ‘type’ person) to have personalities, 
motivational structures, and so on that they cannot possibly have” (ibid: 340). To satisfy 
the PMPR, the demands of a moral principle thus have to be within the capacities a 
specific type of person.  
The problem, however, is that Flanagan does not specify what ‘creatures like us’ 
means, i.e. how the latter concept can be operationalised. One option is to require, for 
example, that compliance must be possible for a certain percentage of individuals (e.g. 
50 or 95 percent). Alternatively, certain personal characteristics could be used to define 
a certain group of individuals for whom compliance must be possible. Overall, we have 
to bear in mind that the OIC criterion focuses on the capacities of specific individuals 
while the PMPR evaluates the motivational demands of moral principles.74  
The degree of compliance is the final parameter to be defined. The function of the 
degree of compliance is to stipulate how regularly an individual must act in line with 
Singer’s Principle to be counted as a complier. A distinction can be made between three 
                                                 
73 The ‘perceived as possible’ clause holds that it is sufficient if compliance is possible for 
“distant descendants of ours” (Flanagan 1991: 340). 
74 In the special case where compliance with a moral principle is impossible for all 
individuals, both the OIC criterion and the PMPR conclude that the moral principle should 
respectively be considered irrelevant for all practical purposes or be rejected. 
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degrees of compliance: perfect, chronic and acute. The higher the degree of compliance, 
the less likely it is that compliance is possible for a given individual. 
Perfect compliance means that an individual always acts according to a moral 
principle; at least throughout her adult life, she may never perform an egoistic act. In the 
case of Singer’s Principle, taking a day off for one’s own pleasure signifies that an agent 
fails to comply in a perfect manner. It is questionable whether perfect compliance with 
Singer’s Principle is within the ‘possibility space’ (Flanagan 1991: 16) of human beings. 
While some philosophers like Kagan (1999) argue that perfect compliance with highly 
demanding moral principles should be considered possible for some individuals, most 
psychologists reject this view. Colby and Damon, for example, maintain that 
psychological research has to accept the “inevitable problem of human imperfection,” 
(1992: 27) and thus are proponents of the imperfect degree of compliance that this 
thesis supports. Furthermore, in the context of this thesis, it is more important to ask 
whether ordinary persons can comply with a moral principle in an imperfect manner 
than to ask whether at least one individual can comply in a perfect manner. Working 
with an imperfect degree of compliance signifies that the focus shifts to ‘real-life saints’ 
who “have ordinary human flaws as well as nonmoral aspirations, projects and 
commitments” (Flanagan 1991: 1). 
The analysis of Singer’s Principle focuses on two degrees of imperfect compliance, 
acute and chronic. Firstly, acute compliance signifies that an individual performs at least 
one action of moral importance in line with Singer’s Principle. An example of acute 
compliance can be found in the sheltering of a prosecuted stranger or the sharing of a 
crust of bread in a time of need. The philosophical definition of acute compliance is 
linked to Zimbardo’s (2007) empirical definition of ‘acute heroism’ in Chapter 5. 
Secondly, chronic compliance means that an individual mostly acts in line with Singer’s 
Principle. In Chapter 5, the philosophical definition of chronic compliance will be 
linked to Colby and Damon’s (1992) empirical definition of ‘moral exemplars’. 
This distinction between acute and chronic compliance pays tribute to the large array 
of forms of human behaviour. It highlights the difference between single instances of 
moral action (which may occur spontaneously) and forms of sustained commitment. 
Thereby, a nuanced analysis of the relation between personal characteristics and forms 
of moral behaviour is made possible. Furthermore, the distinction fits well with 
different strands of the psychological literature on moral heroism (Oliner and Oliner 
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1988; Colby and Damon 1992; Zimbardo 2007). 
Up until now, this section examined the motive, agency and degree of compliance. 
The full definition of the research question will be outlined in the conclusion of this 
Chapter. Before going on to that, however, it is necessary to consider briefly the 
applicability of the OIC criterion.  
Various philosophers are sceptical about the applicability of the OIC criterion, 
specifically the chances of justifying possibility evaluations in light of empirical research 
(Griffin 1992; Elster 2007). Note, however, that these philosophers hardly refer to 
scientific literature to justify this scepticism. A first example for a sceptical position is 
given by Elster, who claims that “[w]hen an agent fails to act out of a lack of motivation, 
we have no certain indication of whether the failure to act was due to the impossibility 
of the action, for that agent at that time, or simply difficult (in which case it could have 
been done, had the agent tried harder)” (2007: 73). Since we cannot distinguish between 
impossible and very difficult actions, Elster concludes that we are confronted with an 
‘epistemic problem’ – one of application – if we want to apply the OIC criterion:  
The upshot of this discussion is that, even if the foundational argument from 
motivational impossibility is valid in principle, we do not always know, in a given 
case, if the argument applies. The decision to apply the foundational argument 
from motivational impossibility or the pragmatic argument from difficulty can only 
be made on pragmatic or normative grounds, simply because epistemic grounds 
are unavailable. 
ibid 
For the upcoming analysis, we can retain Elster’s claim that ‘epistemic grounds are 
unavailable’. It remains to be seen whether we are really unable to justify possibility 
evaluations in light of empirical research insights. 
A second example for a sceptical position relates to Griffin, who claims that: 
Another piece of information permanently beyond us is where the limits of the will 
are. We can rule out some implausible views on the subject, but here, too, there is 
a wide range of views that we cannot even rank probabilistically. Since there will be 
no morality at all until we take a view on the subject, we simply adopt one. The 
view we adopt is bound to be arbitrary to some degree, and our moral norms will 
share in this arbitrariness. For instance, we adopt (fairly arbitrarily) a view about 
how much a typical moral agent can deprive his own children to help distant 
strangers; having done so, we can work out a policy (which will inherit the 
arbitrariness) on giving to charity. When our knowledge runs out, contingency and 
arbitrariness enter to fix what we morally ought to do.  
1992: 128-129 
Griffin states that our view on the limits of the will ‘is bound to be arbitrary to some 
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degree’; this leads us to view him as less pessimistic than Elster as regards justifying 
possibility evaluations on empirical grounds.75 
How do these scholars deal with the application problem? While Griffin states that 
we have to live with the arbitrariness of possibility evaluations, Elster maintains that the 
decision to apply the OIC criterion should depend on ‘pragmatic or normative grounds’. 
Elster thus suggests that we should either consider all controversial cases as being 
impossible or as possible. The choice between the two options should depend on the 
expected efficiency of both solutions, deciding “which of these solutions will actually be 
more efficient in promoting the performance of moral duties” (Elster 2007: 73).  
In sum, Griffin’s and Elster’s statements point to the double task of the empirical 
evaluations; the first task consists in the minimisation of the ‘arbitrariness’ of possibility 
evaluations that have to be based on empirical research results. The second task refers 
to handling controversial cases, when possibility evaluations are considered to be 
uncertain. Chapter 4 will argue that the device of a burden of proof should be 
established in order to limit the effects of false possibility evaluations. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this Chapter has been to offer an analysis of the metaethical OIC 
criterion. To begin with, this section highlighted the OIC criterion as justified by a 
conceptual rationale based on Kant’s claim that the idea of duty presupposes the 
possibility of compliance. In contemporary literature, this position is defended by 
Singer’s claim that it would be ‘absurd’ to demand what cannot be done. The rationale 
plays an important role in the application of the OIC criterion; if possibility evaluations 
are uncertain, the rationale matters with respect to the assignment of the burden of 
                                                 
75 Furthermore, Huber evaluates the possibility of applying the OIC criterion as follows: 
“The moral obligation is interconnected with the ability; the ability is, however, often times not 
a yes/no affair but is instead considered a gliding principle. One thinks about addicts who, often 
as not, have their addiction under control. Accordingly, one would, more or less, allocate guilt or 
allow excuses.” (“Die moralische Verpflichtung ist an das Können gekoppelt, das Können ist aber oftmals 
keine Ja/Nein Angelegenheit sondern gleitend zu beurteilen. Man denke an Süchtige, die oftmals ihre Sucht 
mehr oder weniger im Griff haben. Entsprechend wird man ihnen mehr oder weniger Schuld zuweisen oder 
Entschuldigung zubilligen”) (2008: 5). But while the assignment of guilt or blame may have degrees 
(e.g. in legal trials), the OIC criterion requires a dichotomous evaluation. Therefore, Huber’s 
argument that the possibility of an action should be made in a ‘gliding’ way (i.e. in degrees) is 
unsatisfactory. Despite the difficulty to realise possibility evaluations, which is acknowledged by 
Huber, we need to come to a clear result: an agent either has the obligation to act or not. 
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proof – we need to know why it is important that obligations can be realised. Finally, as 
Griffin has pointed out, the OIC criterion is ‘at least implicitly’ endorsed by most 
contemporary philosophers. 
This Chapter then goes on to offer a precise definition of the research question of 
the OIC criterion, that being: Can ordinary persons chronically, or at least once, comply with 
Singer’s Principle? A brief summary of the four underlying parameters of this question is 
helpful here. (i) The evaluative standard stipulates that compliance must be possible in 
the strict sense and not sufficiently likely; the chance that an agent will comply in a given 
situation over a certain period of time must be unequal to zero. Further, the OIC 
criterion applies to all cases, independently of whether an individual is already motivated 
to comply. The question is thus whether individuals can form the deontic judgment that 
they should comply, be motivated to comply and possess the necessary follow-through 
skills. (ii) No restrictions with regard to the motive of compliance are made; compliance 
may take place for moral or non-moral reasons. (iii) Regarding the agency of 
compliance, the analysis will examine Singer’s ‘ordinary persons’ thesis, arguing that all 
healthy individuals can comply with Singer’s Principle. (iv) The analysis will be 
differentiated by the degree of compliance (acute and chronic). 
Having discussed the OIC criterion in this Chapter, the next task is to apply the said 
criterion to Singer’s Principle. To prepare the ground, the conceptual framework of 
scientific predictions and the device of the burden of proof will be discussed in Chapter 
4. Chapter 5 goes on to detail the application of the OIC criterion, beginning with an 
assessment of the empirical arguments advanced in the philosophical literature (Miller’s 
2002). Subsequently, an empirical analysis of the determinants of acute and chronic 
heroism will be offered. Thereafter, the possibility predictions of social psychologists 
will be outlined and compared with the possibility evaluations realised by philosophers. 
If the standard of possibility predictions corresponds to the standard of the OIC 
criterion, empirical possibility predictions can be used to answer the research question 
of the OIC criterion. 
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Chapter 4: Predictions, Uncertainty and the Burden of Proof 
In the social and natural sciences, statements regarding the probability of a specific 
event coming to pass are called predictions (Knight 1933: 17; Walonick 1993: 1). While 
philosophers do not make predictions in the scientific sense, they instead make 
judgments about the possibility of the future state of affairs; these are called possibility 
and feasibility evaluations (Räikkä 1998). It can equally be said that philosophers make 
assumptions about the ‘can’, i.e. whether compliance with an obligation is possible or 
whether a moral ideal is accomplishable. Keeping in mind the methodological 
framework of scientific predictions, this Chapter prepares the ground for the empirical 
application of the OIC and feasibility criterion (Chapter 5 to 7).76 
The broad themes of this Chapter are the opposition between the objectivity and 
subjectivity of predictions, and the related distinction between certain and uncertain 
predictions (Knight 1933). Additionally, this Chapter will explore the extent to which 
scientific frameworks and methods of prediction can be used to justify possibility 
evaluations in light of empirical arguments. Within this context, it is also of fundamental 
importance to discuss the role of the burden of proof that can be used to limit the 
negative effects of false possibility evaluations under conditions of uncertainty. 
This Chapter begins with Section 4.1 providing a conceptual distinction between 
objective and subjective predictions and introduces the concept of the degree of 
certainty (Knight 1933). It then goes on in Section 4.2 to explore how the burden of 
proof can be used to limit negative consequences of false evaluations (Walton 1988; 
Hahn and Oaksford 2007). I will also explore how the burden of proof is assigned in the 
philosophical literature (Kant 1991; Räikkä 1998; Miller 1995; Caney 2005). Critically, 
Section 4.3 builds on these discussions to define the three conditions used to assess the 
possibility evaluations offered by philosophers. Finally, this Chapter concludes by 
considering the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC) Report, Global Trends 2025 (2008), 
in which the methods of trend extrapolation and scenarios are used to inform 
                                                 
76 In this Chapter, the term ‘possibility evaluation’ will sometimes be used to refer both to 
the application of the OIC criterion and the feasibility criterion. Moreover, judgments about 
whether an event is possible are either called ‘possibility predictions’ (if made by scientists) or 
‘possibility evaluations’ (if made by philosophers). Also note that the arguments offered by 




4.1 Predictions and the degree of uncertainty 
The focus of this section lies in the distinction between objective and subjective 
predictions and explores the related concept of the degree of certainty. As mentioned 
above, a prediction is a statement about the expected probability that a given state of 
affairs will occur in the future. We can predict the level of economic growth, the 
probability of rain or that a football team will win a match. Predictions like these are of 
practical relevance, since they inform our decisions of whether to invest money in a 
company, to take an umbrella or to make a bet in sports.  
To classify the examples, we can distinguish between confidence interval predictions 
and binominal predictions. Confidence interval predictions estimate the probability that 
a variable will be within a defined limit. A prediction may state that a 30 percent chance 
exists that the economy will grow between 2 and 2.5 percent. A further example is the 
prediction of the Stern Review (2006: iii), which finds that there is a 77 percent 
probability that temperatures will rise more than 2° C over the next century. In the case 
of a binominal prediction, by contrast, only two outcomes are possible: temperatures 
may rise or not rise. Possibility evaluations fall under the class of binominal predictions 
where the two options present are that a moral ideal will come to pass or not. If the 
chance that it will come to pass is unequal to zero, the moral ideal is said to be possible. 
Keeping this in mind, we can build upon this understanding by turning to the 
empirical justification and reliability of predictions. Knight (1933: 233) distinguishes 
between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ predictions and the associated concepts of ‘risk’ and 
‘uncertainty’. First, objective (or statistical) predictions occur if a high number of similar 
instances can be observed. Take, for example, the production process of a bottle factory 
where the owner, having observed the distribution of broken bottles over several years, 
can adequately predict how many bottles are likely to be broken on a specific day 
(Knight 1933: 213). Even if the owner of the bottle factory is unaware of the causes of 
the broken bottles, the number of broken bottles can be predicted in light of statistical 
distributions. Many noteworthy scientific research results are also based on the 
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observation of a large number of cases.77 In this case, the insights gained about the 
causal relationship between variables can be used to predict future events. 
 The expected probability that a statistical prediction is adequate is described by the 
‘level of confidence’ (Knight 1933: 227; Stern 2006: iii). Drawing on statistical evidence, 
a fire insurance company, for instance, may be able predict that there is a 90 percent 
chance that no more than one hundred houses will burn down during the coming year 
in a certain city. The advantage of statistical predictions is their accuracy, which 
increases with the understanding of the causal mechanisms and the number of 
observations. If reliable knowledge about the probability of future events exists, Knight 
(1933: 233) argues that we are confronted with a situation of manageable risk.78 
Decisions under conditions of risk can be handled by calculating the expected utility of 
various courses of action. This is possible since the probability of events can be 
predicted with a high level of confidence. 
Second, Knight speaks of subjective (or qualitative) predictions if the dissimilarity of 
instances makes it impossible to justify prediction on statistical grounds. Stressing the 
variety of circumstances, Knight infers that the nature of most practical predictions is 
subjective: 
The ordinary decisions of life are made on the basis of ‘estimates’ of a crude and 
superficial character. In general the future situation in relation to which we act 
depends upon the behavior of an indefinitely large number of objects, and is 
influenced by so many factors that no real effort is made to take account of the all, 
much less estimate and summate their separate significance. It is only by very 
special and crucial cases that anything like a mathematical (exhaustive and 
quantitative) study can be made.  
ibid: 210-211 
Despite the vagueness of subjective predictions, Knight maintains that agents 
nonetheless make two kinds of probability judgments. (i) The estimate or prediction 
                                                 
77 Most economic studies are indeed based on statistical methods requiring a large number of 
observations; examples are Lee, Pilavin and Call’s (1999) and Yen’s (2002) econometric analyses 
about the determinants of donations. In social psychology, the method of study depends on the 
depths of the information required. While Oliner and Oliner’s (1988) study about the rescue of 
Jews is based on a quantitative analysis of the personality factors of over 500 individuals, Colby 
and Damon’s (1992) in-depth study of sustained commitment includes 23 individuals. 
78 Knight summarises the distinction between risk and uncertainty as follows: “The practical 
difference between the two categories, risk and uncertainty, is that in the former the distribution 
of the outcome in a group of instances is known (either through calculation a priori or from 
statistics of past experience), while in the case of uncertainty this is not true, the reason being in 
general that it is impossible to form a group of instances, because the situation dealt with is in a 
high degree unique” (1933: 233). 
70  
itself represents a probability value that a certain event will take place; (ii) an agent forms 
a judgment about the reliability of her prediction. This is the “‘degree’ of certainty” or 
“subjective feeling of confidence” which the agent has with regard to the adequacy of 
her prediction (ibid: 227, 229). 
Knight argues that the degree of certainty is of the greatest practical significance with 
respect to the formation of decisions. In fact, the prevalent form of behaviour is “action 
according to opinion, of greater or less foundation and value, neither entire ignorance, 
neither complete and perfect information, but partial knowledge” (ibid: 199). Practically, 
this means that “[w]e must simply fall back upon a ‘capacity’ in the intelligent animal to 
form more or less correct judgments about things, an intuitive sense of values” (ibid: 
227). Accordingly, the principal question for the upcoming analysis is to what extent 
possibility evaluations can be justified by empirical arguments or rely on each 
philosopher’s ‘sense of possibility’ (Musil 1968: 16). 
This helps show how the methodological concepts outlined above relate to the 
application of the OIC and feasibility criterion to theories of global justice. First, it is 
evident that the feasibility evaluation of global egalitarianism has to be regarded as a 
subjective prediction; if statistical observations existed, the feasibility of the moral ideal 
in question would be easily visible. It remains to be seen, however, whether the 
application of the OIC criterion can be supported by statistical predictions. Second, the 
degree of (un)certainty can be used to describe the subjective feeling of a philosopher 
about the adequacy of her possibility evaluation. In light of the difficulty to realise 
possibility evaluation – remember Elster’s (2007: 73) statement that an epistemic 
problem exists with regard to the application of the OIC criterion – we can expect 
possibility evaluations to be at least partly subjective and uncertain. It will thus be 
argued that the burden of proof should establish support for decision-making under 
conditions of uncertainty. 
4.2 The burden of proof 
Walton defines the burden of proof “as an allocation made in reasoned dialogue 
which sets a strength (weight) of argument required by one side to reasonably persuade 
the other side” (1988: 233). The concept of burden of proof must thus be understood 
“in relation to a concept of argument as a balance, with weights on each side” (ibid: 239). 
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In other words, if one has the burden of proof on their side, it becomes their 
responsibility to provide evidence and support for their argument; this, then, relieves the 
other side, lightening the evidence required for their rebuttal. It is thus the purpose of 
the burden of proof to end ongoing theoretical debates or to reach practical decisions 
despite the lack of ‘conclusive evidence’ (Räikkä 2004b: 173).  
In the social and natural sciences, the classic role of the burden of proof relates to 
the introduction of new knowledge into the existing body of scientific knowledge 
(Hansson 2008). The usual procedure is to form a hypothesis containing the positive 
statement that a phenomenon or causal effect exists. In doing so, two kinds of errors 
frequently occur. An error of type I (false positive) occurs if one concludes that the 
phenomenon exists when, in reality, the phenomenon does not exist. An error of type II 
(false negative) occurs if one concludes that a certain phenomenon does not exist when 
it does indeed exist. In comparing the relative importance of false judgments, an error 
of type I is usually held to be more dangerous than an error of type II; it is better to 
reject a true hypothesis then to adopt a false one. The burden of proof is thus assigned 
to those who want to enlarge the existing body of scientific knowledge.79 
With respect to individual and political decisions of practical importance, the burden 
of proof can be assigned if the correct decision depends on the realisation of an 
uncertain event. In criminal trials, for example, the burden of proof is assigned to the 
prosecutor who has to prove guilt ‘beyond reasonable doubt’; the rationale is that it is a 
‘greater injustice’ to convict an innocent person then to let a guilty person go free 
(Walton 1988: 244). In general, the American legal system works with three different 
strengths of the burden: ‘by preponderance of the evidence’, ‘by clear and convincing 
evidence’, and ‘beyond reasonable doubt.’ (ibid: 245). The larger the difference between 
the costs of false judgments, the stronger the burden of proof.80 
Another example is global warming, where the negative consequences are uncertain 
but potentially devastating. In this respect, Hahn and Oaksford maintain that 
                                                 
79 For an overview of the role of the burden of proof with regard to different kinds of 
argumentation, see Räikkä (1998), Walton (1988) and Hahn and Oaksfort (2007). 
80 The California Standard of ‘reasonable doubt’ is defined as follows: “Reasonable doubt is 
defined as follows: It is not mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, 
depending on moral evidence, is open to possible doubt. It is that state of the case which, after 
the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the mind of the jurors in that 
condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the 
charge” (quoted in Evans, Osthus and Spurrier 2006: 14). 
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“governments and individuals must set some threshold for action as a function of their 
degree of belief regarding global warming, whereby they decide that beyond this 
threshold they are convinced enough to act” (2007:43). Summarising the general assignment 
procedure, Hahn and Oaksford state that the threshold “is simply the point where, 
given those perceived costs and benefits, the combination of subjective degree of belief 
(expressed as a probability) associated with action outweighs that associated with 
inaction”: consequently, it can be set “anywhere along the continuum from ‘absolutely 
convinced that not’ to absolute certainty with regard to the relevant beliefs” (ibid: 44-45). 
In sum, the burden of proof functions as a device that maximises the expected outcome 
or limits the negative effects of false evaluations under conditions of uncertainty. 
The application of the OIC and feasibility criterion and the burden of proof 
Since possibility evaluations of moral principles are likely to be uncertain, we can 
now ascertain to which side the burden of proof should be assigned. With regard to the 
feasibility of a world republic, for instance, Kant argues that it 
is quite irrelevant whether any empirical evidence suggests that these plans, which 
are founded only on hope, may be unsuccessful. For the idea of something which 
has hitherto been unsuccessful will therefore never be successful does not justify 
anyone in abandoning even a pragmatic or technical aim (for example, that of 
flights with aerostatic balloons). This applies even more to moral aims, which, so 
long as it is not demonstrably impossible to fulfil them, amount to duties.  
1991: 89 
This view is taken up by Räikkä, who maintains that the usual answers “echo Kant’s 
view, according to which a ‘plan’ is feasible until it is ‘demonstrably impossible’ to fulfil 
it” (1998: 32). But there are three problems. First, the weight of Kant’s burden is too 
heavy; it is highly unlikely that the impossibility of an individual action or a moral ideal 
can be demonstrated. Instead of dealing with objective knowledge that can be 
demonstrated, the burden of proof relates to cases where conclusive evidence is 
unavailable. Second, Kant does not offer an extensive justification for the assignment of 
the burden of proof. Kant’s principal argument is that since humanity has culturally and 
technically progressed, it should be assumed that the same is possible with regard to 
moral affairs.81 Standing alone, Kant’s argument does not appear to be particularly 
                                                 
81 Kant defends his view as follows: “I may thus be permitted to assume that, since the 
human race is constantly progressing in cultural matters (in keeping with its natural purpose), it 
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convincing; in any case, it is interesting that Räikkä hardly examines the rationale of 
Kant’s assignment.82 Third, it is not true, as Räikkä claims (1998: 32), that Kant’s view is 
widely adopted in the literature (as I will show in the following). 
In fact, no agreement exists about the side to which the burden of proof should be 
assigned with regard to feasibility evaluations of theories of global justice studied for the 
purpose of this project. For instance, disagreeing with Kant, Miller claims that the onus 
of proof “is on the universalist to show that, in widening the scope of ethical ties to 
encompass equally the whole of the human species, he does not also drain them of their 
binding force” (1995: 80). In a similar way, Boswell claims that a moral theory is 
“deficient” if it is “unable to show how people are or could be motivated to respect its 
requirements” (2005: 27). On the other hand, attempting to defend the view that those 
who challenge the feasibility of a moral ideal have the burden of proof, Caney (2005: 
133) advances the ad hominem argument that Miller has to show why social justice and 
basic global justice are feasible while global egalitarian justice is not (see Section 7.4). 
Apart from the fact that no agreement exists, it is important to see that Miller, Boswell 
and Räikkä rarely, if at all, outline or defend the rationale of their assignment of the 
burden of proof. 
To assign the burden of proof, however, it matters that a general argument about the 
factors of this is given. The present work argues that the costs of false evaluations 
should form the basis for the assignment of the burden of proof.83 To do so, we have to 
consider possibility evaluations to be of practical importance; however, since the 
behaviour of individuals and collectives is affected by the moral obligations and ideals 
propagated by philosophers, this assumption is plausible (Räikkä 1998; Singer 2004; 
Elster 2007). 
To assign the burden of proof, the costs of type I and type II errors have to be 
                                                                                                                                          
 
is also engaged in progressive improvement in relation to the moral end of its existence. This 
progress may at times be interrupted but never broken off. I do not need to prove this 
assumption; it is up to the adversary to prove this case” (1991: 88). 
82 Räikkä only speculates that the content of a moral ideal might matter: “Perhaps those who 
suspect the feasibility of good ideals have a burden of proof, but those who suspect the feasibility 
of bad ideals don’t” (1998: 32). Apart from the open question of what a ‘bad’ ideal is, this 
speculation is generally unconvincing. 
83 This view takes up Elster’s claim (2007: 73) that the costs of false evaluations should be 
considered if possibility evaluations are controversial. Elster does not, however, relate this claim 
to the device of the burden of proof. 
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compared. The costs of both kinds of error depend on the moral principle or ideal in 
question. With regard to Singer’s Principle, for example, the costs of obliging an agent 
to do what is impossible (type I error) must be compared with the costs of exempting 
an individual despite compliance being possible (type II error). If the costs of the type I 
error are regarded as more important than the costs of the type II error, then the 
probability that the individual can comply must at least be considered to be higher than 
50 percent to affirm the view that the agent has the obligation to comply. 
Chapters 5 and 7 will analyse to what extent possibility and feasibility evaluations are 
uncertain, to what extent the costs of false possibility evaluations can be estimated and 
to which side the burden of proof should assigned. 
4.3 Methods of prediction 
Explanations play a fundamental role for predictions; an understanding of 
psychological mechanisms, social behaviour and social institutions is a requirement for 
purposeful statements about future states of affairs (Knight 1933: 17). While the 
empirical sciences are primarily concerned with the explanation of social phenomena, 
empirical results perform the role of assumptions in normative theories. The change 
from the term ‘explanation’ to ‘assumption’ thus describes the borderline between the 
empirical sciences and philosophy. 
For this project, empirical assumptions are relevant as regards the justification of 
possibility evaluations. Based on the premise that the adequacy of explanations 
positively affects the adequacy of predictions, scrutinising the empirical assumptions 
endorsed by philosophers is an indirect way to assess the adequacy of their possibility 
evaluations. The advantage of this strategy is that empirical assumptions can be verified 
or falsified by the scientific method. If a philosopher offers a predictive argument based 
on an overly rationalistic account of moral motivation, for example, this counts as an 
argument against the adequacy of her possibility evaluation.84 The first condition for 
predictions is, therefore, that the underlying empirical assumptions are correct. 
Apart from the correctness of empirical assumptions, the selection of empirical 
                                                 
84 The question about adequate understanding of moral motivation will be discussed with 
regard to Rawls’ (1999a) feasibility argument about domestic egalitarian justice in Chapter 6, and 
with respect to the debate between Miller (1999a), Caney (2004) and Singer (2004) about the 
relationship between nationality and kinds of motivation in Chapter 7. 
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theories serving as the basis for possibility evaluations is highly important. The variety 
of potentially relevant empirical theories increases with the complexity of the 
phenomenon in question; while there may only be few factors that explain a chemical 
reaction, compliance with moral principles can be explained by a large array of 
psychological and social theories. In Chapters 5 to 7, I will examine whether the 
predictive arguments offered by philosophers are based on (the most) relevant empirical 
theories.85 Thus, the selection of relevant empirical theories is the second condition 
allowing us to assess predictive arguments. 
The third condition is that predictions are justified by convincing predictive 
arguments. Although it is debatable how the convincingness of predictive arguments 
can be assessed, there are three aspects that can be considered. Firstly, possibility 
evaluations must be justified by empirical arguments; ‘genius forecasting’ is thus ruled 
out.86 Secondly, a clear dissociation between the ‘is’ and the ‘can’ must be achieved; this 
is violated if a philosopher closely associates existing behaviour with possible behaviour 
without offering an explicit defence for this view. In such cases, the argument is unduly 
‘realistic’, by which it fails to acknowledge the difference between what is and what can 
be.87 Thirdly, the use of methods of prediction (such as trends or scenarios) can improve 
the convincingness of predictive arguments.  
Overall, the three conditions for predictions (correct empirical assumptions, relevant 
explanatory theories and convincing predictive arguments) represent a good basis for 
the assessment of possibility evaluations. However, they will not necessarily lead to a 
clear result, but should rather be seen as a framework within which predictive arguments 
and possibility evaluations can be assessed. 
                                                 
85 In Chapter 5, for example, the relevance of empirical research results about the conditions 
of altruism consulted by Miller (2002) will be compared to the relevance of explanatory theories 
of ‘moral heroism’ (Colby and Damon 1992; Zimbardo 2007). 
86 The term ‘genius forecasting’ describes a situation where it is not obvious how a person 
comes to her prediction (Walonick 1993: 1). Examples are the predictions of psychics or 
prophets. Even in present times, some individuals have a surprisingly large capacity to make 
predictions, based on a “combination of intuition, insight and luck” (ibid). But since the 
methodological basis of such forecasts cannot be discussed, the adequacy of such predictions 
cannot be assessed until the prediction has come to pass. For this reason, empirically unjustified 
possibility evaluations should be regarded as unconvincing. 
87 One explanation for an unclear dissociation between the ‘is’ and the ‘can’ relates to 
imprecise definitions of the feasibility criterion; Elster, for instance, claims, “a theory of justice is 
not valid if it requires people to have motives which they do not or cannot have” (2007: 50). 
The term ‘do not’ have is misleading as the feasibility criterion is not concerned with present 
motives but with what might happen in the future. 
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Trend extrapolation and the NIC Report Global Trends 2025 
Among the variety of predictive methods, there are two that especially suit informing 
long-term possibility evaluations: trend extrapolation and scenarios. Analysing the NIC 
Report (2008) allows us to study how trends and scenarios are used in practice. 
Moreover, considering the NIC Report gives us the opportunity to compare the form of 
scientific predictions and possibility evaluations.88 
A trend is an observable development of a variable following a certain pattern 
(Walonick 1993: 1). Trends can be linked to small and large phenomena such as the 
friendliness of one’s neighbours as well as the belligerent tendencies of an enemy state. 
In addition, trends relate to different time frames and to specific areas like international 
power relations, technology innovations or the environment. The basic idea of trend 
extrapolation is to “examine trends and cycles in historical data, and then use 
mathematical techniques to extrapolate to the future”, the underlying assumption being 
that “the forces responsible for creating the past, will continue to operate in the future” 
(ibid). Trend extrapolation is used, for example, with regard to demographic 
developments or global warming (Stern Review 2006). The basic problem with this 
technique is, however, that it cannot incorporate the emergence of new ideas. It is, 
therefore, often combined with other methods of prediction. 
Trend extrapolations can either relate to factor or dependent variable trends. On one 
hand, factor trends refer to the development of the independent variables influencing 
the variable to be predicted. If prosocial behaviour is influenced by the level of 
education, for instance, we can look at the past and expected future changes of 
education levels to predict future prosocial behaviour. On the other hand, we can 
directly look at the development of the variable to be predicted. It can be asked, for 
example, how the level of prosocial behaviour has developed over the past and what the 
result is if we extrapolate this trend. This latter option has the advantage that it can also 
                                                 
88 It might be suggested that consensus decision-making methods like the Delphi technique 
could be used for the justification of possibility evaluations. The advantage of consensus 
decision-making methods is their capacity to integrate opinions from various fields and that they 
lead, at the end of the process, to a single prediction. If current political decisions depended on 
long-term feasibility evaluations, the Delphi technique would be a reasonable choice to use in 
order to come to a conclusion, despite diverging expert opinions. However, since the 
importance of feasibility evaluations is, in the present, largely limited to academic debates, the 
plurality of contrasting opinions has to be accepted. For a description of the Delphi technique 
and overview of further methods of prediction, see Walonick (1993). 
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be used if only scarce knowledge about the determinants of the dependent variable 
exists.89 
We can now turn to the role of trends in the NIC Report (2008), Global Trends 2025. 
The aim of the NIC Report is “to stimulate strategic thinking about the future by 
identifying key trends, the factors that drive them, where they seem to be headed, and 
how they might interact” (2008: foreword). Thereby,  
[t]he study as a whole is more a description of factors likely to shape events than a 
prediction of what will actually happen. By examining a small number of variables 
that we judge probably will have a disproportionate influence on future events and 
possibilities, the study seeks to help readers to recognize signposts indicating 
where events are headed and identify opportunities for policy intervention to 
change or lock in the trajectories of specific developments.  
ibid: foreword 
The NIC Report proceeds in two steps: first, various trends are analysed (economic 
growth, energy and resource supply, climate change, demographic change, the 
international system and conflicts). Some developments are considered to be relatively 
predictable; in these cases, the NIC Report speaks of ‘relative certainties’. An example is 
the development of the international system, where “[a] global multipolar system is 
emerging with the rise of China, India, and others” (ibid: iv). Alternatively, the NIC 
Report refers to ‘key uncertainties’ if developments are less predictable. In relation to 
the example above, it is a key uncertainty whether, by 2025, “global powers work with 
multilateral institutions to adapt their structure and performance to the transformed 
geopolitical landscape” (ibid: v).90 This example shows how the predictions of the NIC 
Report are differentiated according to the degree of uncertainty.  
                                                 
89 Considering the development of global poverty, the NIC Report states that “[w]e are 
witnessing an unprecedented moment of human history: never before have so many been lifted 
out of extreme poverty as is happening today. A stunning 135 million people escaped dire 
poverty between 1999 and 2004 alone…By 2025-2030, the portion of the world considered 
poor will shrink by about 23 percent, but the world’s poor – still 63 percent of the globe’s 
population – stand to become relatively poorer, according to the World Bank” (2008: 8). Trends 
like these could be used to assess the feasibility of the moral principle that nobody should live in 
absolute poverty. 
90 In addition to trends, the NIC Report also considers discontinuities. The occurrence of 
some discontinuities is only ‘a matter of timing’ (NIC 2008: xii). The energy transition is an 
example; the only question is when and how abruptly or smoothly it will occur. Other 
discontinuities are even less predictable. Examples are a nuclear weapons use, a pandemic or 
whether China and Russia become democracies. The NIC Report pays more attention to 
discontinuities than previous studies: “In the 20th century, experts forecasting the next 20 
years…often missed major geopolitical events, basing their predictions largely on linear 
projections without exploring possibilities that could cause discontinuities” (ibid: 5). 
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In a second step, the question is how trends (independent variables) will interact, 
thereby creating a future state of affairs. The likely ‘impacts’ of each trend thus represent 
a partial prediction of the future state of the world that should, in order to reach an 
encompassing picture, be complemented by new developments resulting from the 
interaction of trends. Overall the NIC Report expects fundamental changes to take 
place within the decades to come: 
[t]he international system – as constructed following the Second World War – will 
be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers, a 
globalizing economy, an historic transfer of wealth and economic power from 
West to East, and the growing influence of nonstate actors. 
ibid: 98 
In this thesis, the method of trend extrapolation plays an important role with regard 
to the feasibility evaluation of global egalitarianism (Section 7.6). While the method of 
trend extrapolation relates to broad developments that are relatively predictable, 
scenarios, as the following analysis will show, are used to evaluate the possibility of 
extremely positive or negative developments. 
The ‘Politics Is Not Always Local’ scenario 
Scenarios are fictional descriptions (i.e. narratives) of future states of affairs and how 
they were brought about. While the NIC Report uses trends to predict what is most 
likely to happen, scenarios highlight the challenges and opportunities of extreme 
changes that are considered to be possible, even though they are generally considered as 
highly unlikely to occur. Walonick summarises the functioning and purposes of 
scenarios. 
Scenarios consider events such as new technology, population shifts and changing 
consumer preferences. Scenarios are written as long-term predictions of the future. 
A most likely scenario is usually written, along with at least one optimistic and one 
pessimistic scenario. The primary purpose of a scenario is to provoke thinking of 
decision makers who can then posture themselves for the fulfilment of the 
scenario(s). The three scenarios force decision makers to ask: 1) Can we survive 
the pessimistic scenario, 2) Are we happy with the most likely scenario, and 3) Are 
we ready to take advantage of the optimistic scenario? 
1993: 3-4 
In the NIC Report, scenarios are used “to illustrate some of the many ways in which 
the drivers examined in the study (e.g. globalization, demography, the rise of new 
powers, the decay of international institutions, climate change, and the geopolitics of 
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energy) may interact to generate challenges and opportunities for future 
decisionmakers” (2008: foreword). While scenarios cover only some of the possible 
futures, their characteristic is that they are all ‘potential game-changers’: they describe 
very different ‘worlds’ and the ways how these worlds may come about (ibid: xii; 4).91 
The NIC Report offers an optimistic possible future in the ‘Politics Is Not Always 
Local’ scenario describing the agreement on a new climate change treaty (ibid: 90). The 
scenario is presented as a fictional article published in the Financial Times in 2024. The 
fictional author writes that “[i]n a sense, we have reached the Promised Land in which 
global cooperation is more than a ‘conspiracy’ among elites but bubbles up from the 
grassroots across historical national and cultural divides” (ibid: 90). This international 
cooperation became possible through a rise of the middle classes in Russia, India and 
China and their growing concern for the environment, which was ‘tailor-made’ to foster 
international cooperation because of “the widespread commonality of interest in 
avoiding Armageddon” (ibid: 91). Since governments remained inactive, the global civil 
society organised itself and was assigned 20 seats in the reformed United Nations 
General Assembly. Its latest success is the support of the new climate change treaty.92 
Empirically, the possibility of the ‘Politics Is Not Always Local’ is premised on three 
important preconditions. First, globalisation leads to a decrease of the power of national 
governments; second, politicised groups seek to acquire power and establish 
relationships with states; and thirdly, that recent strives in communication technology 
allows penetrated integration into identity networks (ibid: 89). Apart from leading an 
extensive debate about whether the three preconditions are realistic, a more intuitive 
approach is to simply read the fictional article of the Financial Times in its entire length 
                                                 
91 Note that the NIC Report does not offer a mathematical definition the possibility 
standard. It is unclear whether, for a scenario to count as possible, its probability must be 
unequal to zero (in which case, ‘possible’ would be defined in the strict sense) or whether the 
chances have to be significantly different from zero (e.g. a few percent). Moreover, it is not 
obvious how the distinction between a possibility and a ‘theoretical possibility’ should be 
understood (NIC 2008: 83). 
92 The NIC Report assumes that actors are likely to act for a variety of motives. It is 
suggested, for example, that global networks, whose importance is likely to increase, “will 
operate to pursue convergent goals and interests, including genuine intent to solve problems, 
business and self-interest, moral grounds, and the desire of international organizations and 
NGOs to be relevant to the problems facing a changing world” (2008: 84-85). Furthermore, 
note that a strong similarity between the ‘Politics Is Not Always Local’ scenario and Beck’s 
(2006: 23) argument about the ‘world risk society’ – which is held to support the emergence of a 
global institutions – exists (cf. Section 7.5). 
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and reflect on its plausibility. If this leads to an intuitive possibility judgment, the 
fictional scenario has fulfilled one of its tasks.  
Overall, the point of the NIC Report is to alert people that change is more likely than 
continuity – the subtitle A Transformed World summarises this conclusion. Regarding the 
kind of change to be expected, the NIC Report is less clear, as it suggests that 
predictions “contain more contingencies than certainties” (ibid: 98). The fact that a high 
degree of change is expected within fifteen to twenty years supports the idea that it is 
reasonable to imagine much more change to happen within fifty, one hundred or several 
hundred years. If the international system is said to be ‘almost unrecognizable’ by 2025, 
how will it look by 2525? Should global egalitarianism be regarded as a possible 
‘optimistic scenario’? 
Self-fulfilling prophecies and the neutrality of predictions 
Finally, the role of self-fulfilling prophecies and the neutrality of predictions should 
be examined. First, considering the role of self-fulfilling prophecies, Walonick remarks 
that “[i]f a forecast results in an adaptive change, then the accuracy of the forecast might 
be modified by that change” (1993: 6). This may happen, for example, with regard to the 
value of stock-market shares; if a public prediction is made that the value of shares will 
increase by 10 percent, the prediction itself could motivate people to buy shares, which 
may again lead to a higher increase in the value of shares as initially predicted.  
We can now consider Räikkä’s (2004) argument about self-fulfilling prophecies and 
global poverty. Räikkä questions the argument that Western selfishness is the main 
reason for the persistence of global poverty; instead, he maintains that inaction can be 
explained by the fact that “most Western people believe that for one reason or another 
it is practically impossible to eradicate poverty” (ibid: 193). Eight arguments why people 
may think that global poverty cannot be eradicated are discussed, ranging from the 
population-growth argument, the efficiency of aid argument to an argument that 
multinational corporations are not interested in reducing poverty (ibid: 194-195). What is 
common to all these arguments is that they are regarded as controversial in public 
debates, despite the fact that “most of them are plainly false” (ibid: 195) when assessed 
by scientific standards. What matters, however, is that these arguments may lead to 
inaction independent of their truth value.  
On the one hand, Räikkä’s argument is well-suited to show how predictions can 
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influence the future. On the other, we have to carefully distinguish Räikkä’s argument 
from long-term feasibility evaluations. In this respect, Räikkä’s argument would only 
hold if it were impossible for individuals to change their beliefs about the possibility of 
eradicating global poverty. Since this latter claim is unconvincing, the self-fulfilling 
prophecies argument does not justify a negative feasibility evaluation. This shows that 
feasibility evaluations must critically include both the adaptive change caused by 
predictions and the fact that predictions will be adapted in light of new insights. 
Second, we can consider the neutrality of predictions in the form of the relationship 
between the preferences of predictors and the content of predictions. Walonick 
observes that many futurists “have expressed the idea that the way we contemplate the 
future is an expression of our desire to create that future” (1993: 4). Accordingly, there 
is a risk that such desires subconsciously influence the neutrality of predictions. For 
instance, a philosopher who considers global egalitarianism to be desirable may have an 
unconscious tendency to give more weight to arguments supportive of positive 
feasibility evaluations. If the task of realising feasibility evaluations was assigned to 
empirical scientists with no strong opinion about the desirability of global egalitarianism, 
the importance of this bias could be reduced.  
4.4 Conclusion 
Preparing the ground for the empirical analyses to follow, this Chapter has 
considered how the predictive framework of the social sciences can be used to inform 
possibility and feasibility evaluations. Given the uniqueness of cases, it has been argued 
that possibility and feasibility evaluations are likely to be at least partly subjective 
because they cannot entirely be justified by specific causal mechanisms or statistical 
distributions. Since the reliability of evaluations tends to decrease with their subjectivity, 
the concept of the degree of uncertainty has been introduced to describe a philosopher’s 
feeling about the correctness of her judgment (Knight 1933). 
With regard to the empirical analyses to come in Chapters 5 to 7, the main question 
is how, and if so to what extent, possibility and feasibility evaluations can be justified in 
light of empirical arguments. To assess the arguments advanced in the philosophical 
literature, the three conditions for predictive arguments can serve as a point of 
departure (correct empirical assumptions, selection of relevant empirical theories, 
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provision of convincing arguments). In addition to this, methods of prediction can be 
used to inform evaluations; for example, Chapter 7 will examine how various long-term 
trends of globalisation should influence the conditional feasibility evaluation of global 
egalitarianism. 
If possibility and feasibility evaluations should remain uncertain, this Chapter has 
argued that the device of burden of proof should be used to limit the costs of false 
evaluations. In Chapter 5 and 7, I will go on to analyse to what extent the costs of false 
possibility and feasibility evaluations can be assessed to which side the burden should be 
assigned. In this respect, the issue of how possibility and feasibility evaluations might 
partially create the future by affecting the behaviour of individuals will also be 
considered (Oliner and Oliner 1988; Colby and Damon 1992; Zimbardo 2007). 
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Chapter 5: Singer’s Principle and the Empirical Study of Moral 
Heroism 
I was not a messiah, but an ordinary man who had become a leader 
because of extraordinary circumstances. 
Nelson Mandela 
 
The potential of individual development and behaviour stands at the centre of this 
Chapter. Who can we become? Can ordinary persons chronically, or at least once, 
comply with the obligations of Singer’s Principle? Having defined the OIC criterion in 
Chapter 3 and having discussed the framework of scientific predictions in Chapter 4, the 
challenge is now to answer the research question in light of empirical explanations of 
moral heroism. Therefore, the first task is to explore the determinants of moral heroism. 
Based on these insights, the second task is to evaluate whether ordinary persons can 
comply with the obligations of Singer’s Principle. 
Regarding the explanation of moral heroism, social psychologists make a 
fundamental distinction between personal and situational factors (Batson 1991). The 
question is whether individuals have a relatively fixed personality that predisposes them 
to act in certain ways, or whether the character of human beings should be seen as 
flexible, where behaviour is largely determined by situational factors and broader 
circumstances. If certain personal factors can be identified as requirements for moral 
heroism, the possibility of compliance may be discarded for those individuals who do 
not possess these characteristics. Alternatively, if situational factors largely determine 
behaviour, it becomes more likely that each individual can perform a large array of 
actions. The key explanatory question is thus whether the nature of persons is ‘Fixed 
and Within’ or ‘Mutable and Without’ (Zimbardo 2007: 6). Nelson Mandela’s claim that 
he is an ordinary man whose development was caused by extraordinary circumstances 
supports this second view. But can it be generalised? Can each ordinary person, being 
shaped by extraordinary circumstances, become a moral hero? 
In order to look more critically at this question and our ability to answer it, this 
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Chapter begins by considering to what extent empirically informed possibility 
evaluations are offered in philosophical literature. As such justifications are extremely 
rare, Miller’s (2002) work on the relation between empirical research and extremely 
demanding principles of altruism is the primary example of analysis. The following 
section focuses on the explanation of acute heroism; here, immoral behaviour will be 
considered in order to outline the relationship between personal and situational factors 
(Milgram 1974; Zimbardo 2007). Subsequently, Oliner and Oliner’s (1988) study of the 
rescue of Jews in World War II and Zimbardo’s (2007) explanation of acute heroism 
will be explored. Section 5.3 outlines Colby and Damon’s (1992) work on the 
developmental process of moral exemplars and examines whether ordinary persons can 
chronically comply with Singer’s Principle. Section 5.4 considers the relationship 
between possibility predictions and philosophical possibility evaluations. Finally, Section 
5.5 analyses the assignment of the burden of proof and evaluates whether ordinary 
persons can chronically, or at least once, comply with the obligations of Singer’s 
Principle. 
5.1 Miller on empirical research and demanding principles of altruism 
As outlined in the Introduction, there are only very few philosophers who analyse 
the bearing of empirical research findings for moral theory. Consequently, it is not 
surprisingly that Miller is the only philosopher whose work is used in the course of this 
research to make a serious attempt at exploring the cogency of extremely demanding 
principles of altruism in light of research findings from social psychology. Miller’s 
strategy is to first look at empirical studies, changing afterwards “into normative gear”, 
asking “what, if anything, these studies can teach us about how we should behave” (2002: 
115).93 
Miller discusses a range of studies undertaken in social psychology about factors 
encouraging or discouraging altruism.94 The focus of the chosen studies is on face-to-
                                                 
93 In opposition, the strategy of this thesis is to start with a precise definition of various 
metaethical criteria and to apply an empirically informed evaluation afterwards. 
94 Miller defines altruism “as behaviour that is intended to meet the needs of others, where 
there is no immediate self-interested reason to help, and where there is no institutional 
requirement that one should” (2002: 108). The demands of altruism may be obligatory; “[t]he 
obligation reflects the seriousness of the need I am responding to: it is obligatory to save 
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face situations, since Miller considers occasions for altruism to typically arise in discrete 
settings where “altruism is a matter of a particular person taking action now to rescue a 
particular other” (ibid: 118). In certain experiments, students are asked, for example, to 
fill out a questionnaire, and suddenly one of the ‘participants’ collapses; in other 
experiments, individuals are asked to retrieve an envelope from a neighbouring building, 
and must pass an unconscious homeless person. Various factors such as the number of 
participants, the appearance of the victim and even the weather are modified to see how 
situational factors affect behaviour.  
The results of these studies are that people are more than willing to evade their 
responsibilities, that they are highly cost-sensitive, and that their behaviour is 
determined by morally arbitrary characteristics of the needy person like sex or race, or 
by the similarity to and assumed character of the victim (Miller 2002: 111-112; for 
further examples of such studies see Lantane and Darley 1970; Lerner 1980). Overall, 
Miller concludes that situational factors – as opposed to personal factors – play a 
surprisingly large role in the explanation of altruistic behaviour. Analysing how these 
findings should, if at all, affect the content of moral theory, Miller focuses on three 
different aspects relating to the desirability, institutionalisation and the motivational 
assumptions of extreme demands of altruism. 
First, considering the desirability of extreme demands of altruism, Miller argues that 
the research findings can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, one can adopt a 
critical perspective, which is close to Singer’s position. Accordingly, the studies 
represent a “catalogue of human frailty”, revealing “above all people’s moral weakness – 
the fact that they are only too ready to avoid behaving altruistically, and that therefore 
they will seize on anything – the cost of the action, some disqualifying feature of the 
recipient – that lets them off the hook” (Miller 2002: 116, 113). With regard to the 
implications for normative theory, Miller argues that a critical perspective leads to the 
conclusion that “we must learn to overcome the limits to our altruism that these studies 
reveal” (ibid: 115). The task of philosophers is then to “try to transform people’s 
                                                                                                                                          
 
people’s lives or to help the badly injured; it is not obligatory to pick up people’s shopping or to 
give directions in the street, though it is good to do these things” (ibid: 109). The demands of 
altruism examined by Miller thus have a close resemblance to the positive obligations of Singer’s 
Principle (cf. Section 1.1); in some instances, Miller even directly focuses on Singer’s Principle 
(ibid: 115, 122). 
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arbitrary altruism through rational argument so as to turn them into simple 
consequentialists” (ibid: 122).  
On the other hand, Miller maintains that one may adopt an ‘Emersonian’ 
perspective95, holding that 
[p]eople are being selective in their altruism because they are willing to help their 
own poor but not everyone’s else. Admittedly they are using somewhat arbitrary 
criteria to decide who their own poor are, but the underlying impulse is that of 
wanting to do one’s fair share, but no more than that, of the world’s altruistic 
work.  
ibid: 113 
The Emersonian perspective is linked to a desirability defence of limited demands of 
altruism. Indeed, Miller claims that “limited altruism is morally justified”, since 
“[h]elping those in need is something we are all collectively responsible for, and the 
burden this imposes should be shared as fairly as possible” (ibid: 125).96 Although it 
sometimes appears to be the case, it seems implausible that Miller seriously attempts to 
answer the normative question about the limits of altruism by looking at current 
behaviour. Doing so, Miller would be likely to commit the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ of 
deriving the ‘ought’ from the ‘is’. Consequently, the first result of Miller’s analysis is the 
simple observation that people’s behaviour is rather in line with limited demands of 
altruism. 
The second aspect relates to the institutionalisation of demands of altruism. Miller 
maintains that “the problem of altruism in a world of strangers is the relative absence of 
mechanisms that tell us who is responsibility for meeting the needs of particular others” 
(ibid: 124). Consequently, Miller infers that demands of altruism should, if possible, be 
institutionalised. Additionally, he argues that we should promulgate “norms that link 
salient helpers to needy recipients” (ibid: 124). What Miller has in mind is to build on 
“psychological connections that form spontaneously in people’s mind”; an example for 
such a connection is ‘physical similarity’ (ibid: 123). These forward-looking suggestions 
are, however, distinct from the debate about the limits of altruism. As Murphy (2000: 
                                                 
95 Miller (2002: 107) selects this name in relation to Ralph Waldo Emerson, the author of the 
question ‘Are they my poor?’ (1901), which serves as a starting point for Miller’s investigation of 
altruism. 
96 Miller adds that there may be emergency situations where individuals should be willing to 
do more than their share. The main problem is, however, that there is no convincing way to 
define just how much each individual should do: “we all ought to do our bit, but none of us can 
tell what that bit amounts to” (Miller 2002: 119). 
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13) points out, the claim that obligations of altruism should be institutionalised is of 
little relevance with regard to the evaluation of non-ideal obligations of altruism, in 
other words under circumstances where avoidable suffering is not prevented by national 
or global institutions or individual duty-bearers. So while Miller’s claim that demands of 
altruism should be institutionalised is relevant with regard to the design of legal 
obligations,97 it is irrelevant with regard to the normative evaluation of extreme demands 
of altruism. 
Miller’s third aspect concerns the motivational assumptions of principles of altruism, 
Miller’s conclusion, which he calls a ‘basic intuition’, is that “people’s altruistic capacities 
are limited” (ibid: 125). He adds that people “are willing to go to considerable lengths to 
help – think about the Jews in Nazi Europe – once they see helping P as their particular 
responsibility…but, they are quite selective about who they will take responsibility for” 
(ibid). Regarding the adequate share of the burden, Miller holds that perhaps each 
individual’s share should reflect “each person’s capacity for altruistic behaviour”, a 
solution that would be “in line with the famous formula ‘From each according to his 
abilities, to each according to his needs’” (ibid: 116). The problem with this formula is 
that it only restates the demand of the OIC criterion but does not clarify where the 
limits of people’s abilities are. In a similar way, the basic premise that people are limited 
in their altruism does not tell us where this limit is, or which agents, if any, can comply 
with the extremely demanding obligations of altruism. 
Let us now evaluate Miller’s findings about the bearing of empirical research results 
with regard to extreme demands of altruism. Two general points can be made. (i) It is 
problematic that, throughout his entire analysis, Miller has not explained which 
metaethical criterion he attempts to apply, or, in other words, in which relation of facts 
and principles he is interested in.98 While looking at empirical studies may have given us 
                                                 
97 Miller’s (2002: 120) argument points, for example, to the institutionalisation of duties of 
rescue via ‘Bad Samaritan’ laws; such laws require individuals to aid other individuals under 
certain specified circumstances. For a discussion of good and bad Samaritanism, see Fabre 
(2004). 
98 Note that Miller’s analysis has hardly been concerned with the effectiveness of moral 
principles. In this respect, Miller only remarks that even if extreme demands “gave a correct 
account of one’s private moral obligations to the needy, it is not a view that could reliably serve 
as the basis for a shared public morality” (2002: 117). The reason is that some people would free 
ride on the efforts of those complying with extreme demands. First, it is important to see that 
this claim does not lead to a general rejection of extreme demands of altruism; the argument 
only holds that the latter should not be publicly propagated. Second, the claim rests on the 
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some food for thought, no rigorous criticism of extreme demands of altruism has been 
offered. Methodologically, it seems more appropriate to start with a clearly defined 
metaethical criterion; a precise research question is needed to make sense of empirical 
results.99 
(ii) Given Miller’s reference to the capacities of individuals, we can ask whether 
Miller has been concerned with the application of the OIC criterion. In this case, 
however, the claim that “people’s altruistic capacities are limited” (Miller 202: 125) is too 
imprecise to be of much use. First, the term ‘people’ is not a precise definition of the 
agency of compliance. Second, the statement that demands of altruism should reflect 
‘each person’s capacity for altruistic behaviour’ is a different way to formulate the OIC 
criterion; what we are more interested in, by contrast, is the extent of this capacity. 
Third, Miller’s selection of empirical theories is problematic. Many of the studies 
consulted by Miller deal with experiments where the cost of helping is relatively low and 
where physical risks of helping are largely absent. In opposition, the determinants of 
extreme acts of altruism or of lifelong moral behaviour are not considered. Accordingly, 
a misfit between the moral principle to be evaluated and the focus of empirical studies 
exists (cf. selection of relevant empirical theories in Section 4.3).100 Finally, Miller does 
not evaluate to what extent people’s capacities might change in the future. What is 
offered is only a description of some determinants of moral behaviour. 
In light of the present findings and given that no other empirically informed analyses 
of extreme demands of altruism exists, it can be concluded that the philosophical 
literature does not offer a convincing application of the OIC criterion with regard to 
Singer’s Principle. Consequently, the analysis of this thesis must start afresh. To avoid 
the problems encountered in Miller’s work, the following analysis will be based on the 
definition of the OIC criterion presented in Chapter 3, select empirical studies that are 
adequate to explain extreme forms of moral behaviour and will make a clear distinction 
between the explanation of moral behaviour and possibility evaluations.  
                                                                                                                                          
 
doubtful assumptions that compliance of some individuals could solve the problem of absolute 
poverty (if they didn’t solve the problem, free-riding would hardly be possible). 
99 In a similar way, the problem of Gross’ (1997) study of the ethics of activism has been the 
absence of a clear definition of the effectiveness criterion found in Section 2.3. 
100 Additionally, the consulted studies only focus on face-to-face instances of altruism, 
neglecting cases of global altruism so important to Singer’s Principle. 
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5.2 Acute heroism and the ‘banality of heroism’ thesis 
In order to best answer the research question of whether acute or chronic 
compliance with Singer’s Principle is possible for ordinary persons, this thesis will 
discuss empirical results of the determinants of acute heroism and chronic heroism. 
Focusing on acute heroism, this section compares the philosophical definition of 
compliance with Singer’s Principle and the empirical definition of acute heroism. If it 
can be shown that acts of acute heroism are in line with the requirements of Singer’s 
Principle, findings about the possibility of acute heroism for ordinary people allow us to 
draw analogous conclusions with regard to Singer’s Principle.  
Before turning to extremely moral forms of behaviour, research results about the 
opposite case of extremely immoral forms of behaviour will be presented (Milgram 
1974; Arendt 1994; Zimbardo 2007). The purpose is to explore the respective 
importance of personal and situational factors and whether we can rule out the 
possibility that certain individuals will commit extremely immoral acts.101 Turning to 
empirical studies of acute heroism (Oliner and Oliner 1988; Zimbardo 2007), the two 
key questions relate to the relative importance of personal and situational factors: Are 
there any personal factors that are a requirement for acute heroism? Can situational 
factors transform ordinary persons into moral heroes? Based on the explanations of 
acute heroism, this section will also explore whether social psychologists make 
predictions about the potential of ordinary persons, and if so, how these predictions are 
justified. 
The scientific definition of acute heroism 
At the time this research is being undertaken, no scientific research exists that 
compares the possibility of compliance with the Singer Principle. We thus have to relate 
the philosophical definition of acute compliance with Singer’s Principle to the scientific 
definition of acute heroism. If the two definitions are sufficiently similar, the scientific 
                                                 
101 Personal factors refer to the socio-economic characteristics of individuals (education, sex, 
age etc) and to their dispositions. Examples for dispositions are: “anomie, authoritarianism, 
autonomy, deference, intelligence, Machiavellianism, nurturance, religiosity, self-esteem, social 
desirability, social responsibility, submissiveness, and succorance” (Batson 1993: 284). Examples 
for situational factors are: “ambiguity of need, severity of need, physical appearance of victim, 
similarity to victim, friendship, number of bystanders, location (urban versus rural), cost of 
helping” (ibid). 
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research results about acute heroism can be used to evaluate the possibility of acute 
compliance with Singer’s Principle.  
In the social sciences, the explanation of extreme forms of moral behaviour is 
subsumed under the heading of ‘moral heroism’. Zimbardo defines moral heroism as 
having four features: 
(a) it must be engaged in voluntarily; (b) it must involve a risk or potential sacrifice, 
such as the threat of death, an immediate threat to physical integrity, a long-term 
threat to health, or the potential for serious degradation of one’s quality of life; (c) 
it must be conducted in service to one or more other people or the community as 
a whole; and (d) it must be without secondary, extrinsic gain anticipated at the time 
of the act. 
2007: 466 
Conditions (a) and (c) correspond to the interactional, non-institutional status and 
the other-directed, moral motive of Singer’s Principle. Next, condition (b) holds that 
heroism requires a ‘risk or potential sacrifice’ to the agent’s health, quality of life, etc. 
Combined with condition (d) that secondary gains may exist, a picture emerges that 
does not state a fixed relationship between heroism and the well-being of the agent; 
heroism may lead to self-sacrifice or to greater well-being. The result depends on 
whether anticipated potential sacrifices and non-anticipated potential gains will be 
realised. In fact, Zimbardo makes no outright claim regarding the average consequence 
of moral heroism on the well-being of an individual. 
The variety of heroic acts can be distinguished by four dimensions (Zimbardo 2007: 
480-481): (i) Risk Type/Sacrifice: The main distinction is between military and further 
types of heroism involving physical risk or peril and civil heroism involving potential 
other sacrifices such as social status or the quality of life.102 (ii) Engagement Style: 
Individuals can be active (participating in political activism) or passive (refraining from 
committing immoral acts where external pressures are very strong). (iii) Quest: A 
continuum exists between people acting out of concern for moral principles and 
humanitarian reasons, reflecting the variety of moral motives for which an individual 
may act. (iv) Chronicity: As mentioned in Section 3.3, a distinction between ‘acute’ 
                                                 
102 Comparing the potential costs of these forms of heroism, Zimbardo notes, “it might be 
argued that some forms of civil heroism are more heroic than physical risk forms of heroism. 
People such as Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Dr. Albert Schweitzer willingly 
and knowingly submitted to the trials of heroic civil activity day after day for much of their adult 
lives” (2008: 466). 
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heroism and ‘chronic’ heroism is made. 
The definitions of acute compliance with Singer’s Principle and acute heroism show 
strong similarities: actions must be voluntary, motivated by a moral motive and involve 
a potential risk or sacrifice. One difference is that social psychologists do not attempt to 
measure the magnitude of an individual’s potential sacrifice; nonetheless, I find the two 
definitions sufficiently similar. The predictive results about the possibility of acute 
heroism will thus allow us to draw analogous conclusions regarding the possibility of 
acute compliance with Singer’s Principle. 
The ‘banality of evil’ 
Before turning to question whether an ordinary person can act in extremely moral 
ways, we must consider research results regarding an ordinary person’s capacity to act in 
extremely immoral ways. Traditionally, social and psychological theories regarded 
personal factors like dispositions, genetic makeup and free will as the primary 
determinants of behaviour. Thus, people were classified as good and bad, righteous and 
evil. This binary logic freed ‘good people’ from considering their role in creating the 
circumstances leading to immoral behaviour. In addition, it allowed people to believe 
that they were not susceptible to commit evil acts themselves (Zimbardo 2007: 6). Since 
the Second World War, the traditional paradigm has been challenged by a range of 
studies showing the importance of situational factors in the causation of evil behaviour, 
both in real-world settings and in laboratories (Milgram 1974; Browning 1993; Arendt 
1994). The so-called ‘situational turn’ of social psychology, shifting the attention from 
personal to situational factors, took place (Zimbardo 2007). 
Studying the crimes committed during World War II, one of the most surprising 
results was how ordinary people, who were often caring friends, husbands and fathers, 
were able to kill Jews and other political opponents. One of the best-known studies is 
Hannah Arendt’s (1994) Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Arendt 
maintains that Eichmann, who organised the deportation of millions of Jews, was 
indeed a highly ordinary person, indistinguishable by dispositional factors from other 
ordinary persons. Arendt concludes that we have to be aware of the pervasiveness and 
danger of such people living among ourselves in all societies. A similar view has been 
defended by Christopher Browning (1993), who undertook a detailed character study of 
the Reserve Police Battalion 101, which carried out mass killings in occupied Poland. 
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Browning concludes that the members of Battalion 101 were normal people, who even 
considered the killing hundreds of people normal activity after some time.  
In addition to real-world studies, social scientists also attempted to demonstrate the 
influence of situational factors in laboratory experiments. The core idea has been to 
identify ordinary people via personality measures and to expose them to new and 
unfamiliar settings. As regards the Second World War, the question was whether 
circumstances could be created which led good people to perform acts of cruelty, or 
whether some personal qualities could be found protecting individuals from the risk of 
committing evil acts. In this respect, Stanley Milgram’s (1974) work on obedience to 
authority was a pioneering study. Ordinary people where asked to assist in what was 
described as a study about learning techniques. They were told that they should 
administer electricity shocks of increasing intensity if the learner, who was sitting in 
another room, made errors. In truth, however, no electric shocks were exercised; the 
‘learners’ were a part of the study and had been asked to imitate the effects of the 
punishment. The result was that many participants administered painful and even mortal 
electric shocks, obeying the orders of the controller. Even the painful cries of learners 
did not have significant effects on the behaviour of certain participants. 
A further study about the influence of situational factors has been the Stanford 
Prison Experiment undertaken by Zimbardo in 1971. A series of holding cells had been 
established in the basement of Stanford University, and 23 students selected for their 
average dispositions103 were assigned the roles of guards and prisoners. The situational 
setting was designed to create an extreme emotional distance and difference of power 
between the two groups. Thereby, “[g]ood dispositions where pitted against a bad 
situation”, the question was whether the latter would override the former (Zimbardo 
2007: 195). After a few days, the guards started to harass the prisoners. Zimbardo makes 
no mention of a ‘guard’ attempting to stop the behaviour of their fellows, nor did any in 
the guard group ask the experiment to be ended. After the collapse of three prisoners, 
the experiment had to be ended prematurely. The Stanford Prison Experiment 
                                                 
103 Psychologists classify individuals via several personality measures. In the experiment, the 
sample of individuals “did not deviate from the normal ranges of the general educated 
population” on the dimensions that had been premeasured; moreover, “[n]either group had any 
history of crime, emotional or physical disability, or even intellectual or social disadvantage that 
might typically differentiate prisoners from guards and prisoners from the rest of the society” 
(Zimbardo 2007: 196). 
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demonstrated how a set of situational forces, i.e. “the roles, rules, norms, anonymity of 
the person and place, dehumanizing processes, conformity pressures, group identity”, 
can lead ordinary people to behave in socially pathological ways (ibid: 197). 
The larger implications of the studies by Milgram, Zimbardo and further social 
psychologists are that ordinary people have, under the influences of specific situational 
circumstances, the capacity to commit highly immoral acts. Consequently, Zimbardo 
(2007: 195) infers that the boundary between good and evil, seen as fixed by the 
traditional approach, should be regarded as ‘quite permeable’: 
Any deed that any human being has ever committed, however horrible, is possible 
for any of us – under the right or wrong situation circumstances. That knowledge 
does not excuse evil; rather, it democratizes it, sharing its blame among ordinary 
actors rather than declaring it the province only of deviants and despots – of Them 
but not Us.  
ibid: 211 
Arendt’s ‘banality of evil’ thesis is used by Zimbardo (2007: 486) to summarise the 
fundamental insight that it is ‘possible for any of us’ to commit extremely immoral acts; 
no personal qualities represent full protection against this risk of committing evil acts. 
Consequently, scientific predictions cannot rule out the possibility that a specific 
individual will act in a highly immoral way; it is only possible to predict, based on a 
personality assessment, that some people are more likely than others to commit evil 
acts. 
The empirical study of acute heroism 
As outlined at the beginning of this section, the traditional approach to the 
explanation of behaviour considers heroes to be ‘exceptional people’ (Zimbardo 2007: 
483). But is this view correct? Or should we, in analogy to the ‘banality of evil’, also 
speak about the ‘banality of heroism’: Is it possible for any of us to commit extremely 
moral acts? Can ordinary people, finding themselves in an unusual situation, be lead to 
act heroically?  
The study of heroism is more difficult than the study of evil. Apart from the various 
forms of heroic behaviour and the related problem of finding a clear definition, a lack of 
data about positive human activities exists. While societies collect extensive data about 
the ‘ills of human existence’ (like homicide and crime rates or poverty levels), they 
“don’t keep records of how many acts of charity, kindness, or compassion occur in a 
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community in the course of a year” (Zimbardo 2007: 460). Therefore, an encompassing 
and systematic study of heroism has never been carried out in the behavioural sciences 
(ibid). 
Most of our knowledge about heroism originates from the observation of real-world 
behaviour. One of the best-known studies is Oliner and Oliner’s (1988) The Altruistic 
Personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe. The key purpose of this study was to explore 
whether an ‘altruistic personality’, i.e. a relatively enduring predisposition to act morally, 
could be identified as a major explanation for the rescue of Jews. To explore whether 
rescue behaviour was rather a matter of personal attributes or of external circumstances, 
Oliner and Oliner (1988: 6) compared the characteristics of 406 rescuers and 126 
nonrescuers. Rescuers were defined as individuals who sheltered persecuted Jews and 
fulfilled the three criteria of being motivated by humanitarian considerations only, risked 
their lives and received no monetary remuneration. In total, the number of non-Jewish 
rescuers is estimated to lie somewhere between 50,000 to 500,000 individuals (ibid: 1). 
Even if the highest estimate should be true, this means that less than a 0.25 percent of 
the total population under Nazi control took a considerable risk to protect persecuted 
Jews (ibid). Accordingly, an enormous gap between the moral principle to assist 
innocents and the practice of rescue can be identified. 
Oliner and Oliner’s findings lend support to the altruistic personality thesis, since 
rescuers and nonrescuers could be differentiated in light of their ‘extensive’ or 
‘constricted’ personality. As Oliner and Oliner put it,  
[w]hat distinguished rescuers was not their lack of concern with the self, external 
approval, or achievement, but rather their capacity for extensive relationships – 
their stronger sense of attachment to others and their feeling of responsibility for 
the welfare of others, including those outside their immediate familial or 
communal circle. 
1988: 249 
The motives of rescuers ranged from empathy, internalised norms to loyalty, to 
overriding autonomous principles rooted in justice and to caring. Considering the 
developmental roots of personal development, Oliner and Oliner (ibid: 250) showed that 
close family relationships, the modelling behaviour of parents, the communication of 
caring values as well as the support of a sense of potency in affecting external events 
were the primary factors leading to the development of extensive personalities. Overall, 
respective personality orientations explained an important part of the behaviour of the 
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two groups; in 70 percent of the cases, the personality orientation could be used to 
predict whether an individual was a rescuer or not.104 
This being the result, Oliner and Oliner note that the distinction between personality 
orientations is “less than absolute” since “neither all rescuers nor all nonrescuers 
reflected one or the other pattern. Some nonrescuers did not act, despite a generally 
extensive orientation, whereas some rescuers acted despite a constricted one” (1988: 
253). Consequently, personal factors cannot be used to rule out the possibility of moral 
behaviour or to guarantee that a given individual will act. We can call this the ‘negative 
finding’ that no personal factors necessary for moral behaviour can be identified. The 
negative finding signifies that no immediate link between the explanation of moral 
behaviour and possibility evaluations can be established, as the latter require additional 
judgment. 
In opposition to the study of extremely immoral behaviour, no laboratory 
experiments have so far been undertaken with regard to moral heroism. Zimbardo 
(2007: 449) explains this fact by the financial costs and ethical problems related to 
experiments dealing with extreme behavioural transformations (the harmful 
consequences for the participants of Milgram’s obedience to authority experiment and 
Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment serve as a warning).105 The question is whether 
a situational context could be created that led ordinary people to perform extremely 
moral acts. 
In analogy to the slow descent towards cruelty related to the original Milgram 
experiment, Zimbardo speculates that a ‘Reverse-Milgram’ authority experiment could 
bring about a “slow ascent into goodness” (ibid: 449). Participants would first be asked 
to write a thank-you note to friend, to give advice to a troubled child and to babysit for 
a few hours a week, thereby establishing a step-by-step commitment to give increasingly 
more time to ever more worthy causes could be created. In addition, such an 
                                                 
104 In opposition to the explanatory power of personality characteristics, Oliner and Oliner 
(1988: 8) conclude that demographic evidence is at best ‘fragmentary’; furthermore, Oliner and 
Oliner’s study is often cited with respect to the possibility of unselfish behaviour; the 
circumstances of rescue lend support to the thesis that individuals can act for moral reasons and 
thus reject psychological egoism. However, the study is also criticised for neglecting to question 
why only very few of the millions of individuals with extensive personalities performed acts of 
rescue (Colby and Damon 1992: 7). 
105 Lerner (2003) also observes that the experimental study of altruism tends to focus on 
issues of little moral importance (like picking up dropped paper-clips) for practical and financial 
reasons and argues that the justice motive is thereby neglected. 
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experiment could conceivably use social models encouraging “obedience to virtuous 
authority” and further tactics like identity labelling (ibid). Ideally, the experiment “would 
end when the person was doing something that he or she could never have imagined 
doing before” (ibid). If ordinary people could indeed be led to perform extremely moral 
acts, the possibility of acute heroism for ordinary people would be demonstrated. 
Possibility predictions in social psychology 
The analysis of moral heroism has led to the negative finding that no personal factors 
necessary for moral heroism can be identified and to the positive finding that situational 
factors play an important role. It is now time to explore whether social psychologists 
only focus on the explanation of behaviour or discover if they also make possibility 
predictions. 
It is a surprising fact that both Oliner and Oliner and Zimbardo make predictions 
about the potential of ordinary persons that are closely connected to the to the research 
question of the OIC criterion. To begin with, Oliner and Oliner conclude that rescuers 
were ordinary people and “not heroes cast in larger-than-life moulds” (1988: 260). 
Furthermore, they maintain the courage shown by rescuers “is not only the province of 
the independent and the intellectually superior thinkers but that it is available to all 
through the virtues of connectedness, commitment, and the quality of relationships 
developed in ordinary human interaction” (ibid: 261). Unambiguously, this statement is a 
positive possibility prediction; heroic behaviour is ‘available to all’. 
A similar view is defended and further developed by Zimbardo, who concludes that  
[t]he banality of evil shares much with the banality of heroism. Neither attribute is 
the direct consequence of unique dispositional tendencies; there are no special 
inner attributes of either pathology or goodness residing within the human psyche 
or the human genome. Both conditions emerge in particular situations at particular 
times when situational forces play a compelling role in moving particular 
individuals across a decisional line from inaction to action. 
2007: 485 
Zimbardo’s ‘banality of heroism’ thesis, closely associated to the situational turn in 
social psychology, can be used to summarise the view that each individual can act 
heroically. Zimbardo justifies this thesis by the negative finding that moral heroism is 
not a ‘direct consequence of unique disposition tendencies’ and the positive finding that 
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situational factors strongly influence moral behaviour.106 Furthermore, Zimbardo argues 
that the ‘banality of heroism’ thesis can be used to increase the probability of heroic 
behaviour. For this to happen, we should try to foster a ‘heroic imagination’ among 
people by “conveying the message that every person is a hero in waiting who will be 
counted upon to do the right thing when the moment of decision comes” (ibid: 486). 
Heroism should become an “egalitarian attribute of human nature rather than a feature 
of the elected few” (ibid: 448). 
The ‘banality of heroism’ seems to support Singer’s claim that each individual is 
capable of complying at least once with the obligations of his Principle. I will interpret 
and discuss the consequences of the ‘banality of heroism’ thesis in Section 5.4. Before 
moving on to that, however, let us consider two of the broader consequences of the 
‘situational turn’ in social psychology and the associated ‘banality of evil’ and ‘banality of 
heroism’ theses. First, the importance of personal differences in the explanation and 
prediction of behaviour decreases. Behavioural scientists are better able to predict how 
the majority of people will react in light of given situational factors, knowing nothing 
about the individual members of the group, than to predict individual differences of 
behaviour based on character assessments.107 Additionally, while personality assessments 
can to be used for predictions about how people behave in standard situations, they fail 
to be reliable in the case of atypical situations eliciting acts of heroism (Zimbardo 2007: 
485). 
Second, we are led to critically examine the systemic forces that tend to bring about 
situations where individuals are likely to commit evil or extremely moral acts. We should 
thus partly reduce the assignment of blame and praise to specific individuals and focus 
our attention on those responsible for the overall system. Furthermore, in attempting to 
shape future behaviour, we should concentrate on avoiding situations that are likely to 
lead to evil behaviour.108 This emphasis can be distinguished from the attempt to avoid 
                                                 
106 The ‘banality of heroism’ thesis is equally supported by the self-reports of individuals who 
have committed heroic acts: the latter mostly insist, “that what they did was not special, was 
really what everybody should have done in the situation” (Zimbardo 2007: 457). It also fits well 
with Nelson Mandela’s self-evaluation (outlined at the beginning of this Chapter). 
107 Given a car accident, for example, scientists are more apt to predict how situational 
variables will affect helping behaviour than to predict the influence of personality attributes of 
potential helpers. 
108 A present example is the design of prisons. In the military trial about the torture in Abu 
Ghraib, Zimbardo (2008: 380), as an expert witness, highlighted how the prison system created 
situational forces conducive to the abuse of power by the guards. Zimbardo’s claim was that 
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evil behaviour through educational efforts concerned with the dispositions and attitudes 
of individuals. 
5.3 Chronic heroism and the ‘developmental continuities’ thesis 
Having concluded that social psychologists consider acute heroism to be possible for 
all individuals, we can now ask whether the same conclusion holds regarding chronic 
heroism. To answer this question, it first has to be shown that Colby and Damon’s 
(1992) definition of chronic heroism is sufficiently similar to the philosophical definition 
of compliance with Singer’s Principle.109 Second, we have to examine Colby and 
Damon’s research results about the determinants of chronic heroism. Third, we need to 
consider Colby and Damon predictions about the possibility that ordinary persons can 
become moral exemplars. The comparison between Colby and Damon’s possibility 
predictions and philosophical possibility evaluations with respect to Singer’s Principle 
will be realised in the next section. 
The scientific definition of moral exemplars 
In the following, the philosophical definition of chronic compliance (Section 3.3) and 
Colby and Damon’s (1992) scientific definition of moral exemplars will be compared. 
According to Colby and Damon, individuals have to satisfy the following five criteria110 
to qualify for the title ‘moral exemplar’: 
1. a sustained commitment to moral ideals or principles that include a generalized 
                                                                                                                                          
 
mitigating circumstances should lessen the punishment for the guards and that, additionally, 
those responsible for the design of the military prison system in Iraq should be put on trial. The 
ruling of the military court, however, rejected this considerations and proclaimed harsh 
sentences for the accused guards. This judgment represented the attitude that a few 
(dispositionally) ‘bad apples’, and not the ‘bad barrels’ or the makers of the apple barrels were 
responsible for the crimes (ibid: 206). 
109 While Zimbardo (2008: 481) uses the concept of ‘chronic heroism’, Colby and Damon 
(1992: 30) speak of ‘moral exemplars’ to refer to individuals showing sustained moral 
commitment. 
110 To develop the definition of moral exemplars, Colby and Damon (1992: 28) discussed the 
five criteria with a group of 22 ‘expert nominators’ from various ethical backgrounds. Despite 
the large diversity of the group, all expert nominators agreed on the final definition of the five 
criteria. The expert nominators where also asked to suggest living moral exemplars for Colby 
and Damon’s empirical study. 
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respect for humanity; or a sustained evidence of moral virtue 
2. a disposition to act in accord with one’s moral ideals or principles, implying a 
consistency between one’s actions and intentions and between the means and ends 
of one’s actions 
3. a willingness to risk one’s self-interest for the sake of one’s moral values 
4. a tendency to be inspiring to others and thereby to move them to moral action 
5. a sense of realistic humility about one’s own importance relative to the world at 
large, implying a relative lack of concern for one’s ego. 
1992: 30 
Colby and Damon (1992: 32) note that this set of criteria “does not exactly constitute 
a scientific ‘operational definition’”, but are rather somehow indeterminate guidelines 
for choice.111 
As was argued in Section 1.1, chronic compliance with Singer’s Principle requires 
that individuals attempt to maximise their social impact, giving equal weight to their 
own well-being. Whether compliance leads to a high or a low level of well-being 
depends on personal characteristics and circumstances. The lives of most moral 
exemplars addressed by Colby and Damon’s study can be categorised as benefit cases; 
most stated that they were at least satisfied (if not highly satisfied) with their lives and 
none of them lived in dire poverty. It is worth noting that Colby and Damon’s criteria 
only require moral exemplars to show ‘sustained moral commitment’ and not to 
maximise their social impact; thus, Colby and Damon’s definition of chronic heroism is 
less demanding than the definition of chronic compliance. 
While the behaviour of some moral exemplars also qualifies for the label of chronic 
compliance with Singer’s Principle, others do not give up their private wealth or might 
even consume luxury goods from time to time. To reach a sufficiently close connection 
between the definition of moral exemplars and the philosophical definition of chronic 
compliance, the latter concept must be interpreted in a very lax manner. Accordingly, 
individuals count as compliers even if they perform various actions not in line with 
Singer’s Principle. 
For those who reject a lax definition of chronic compliance, a further option is to 
take the ‘moderate’ version of Singer’s Principle as the object of investigation. Singer 
evokes the moderate version in light of the harsh reactions to original version of his 
Principle, although he maintains that the latter is more adequate from a normative 
                                                 
111 The fourth and fifth criteria that moral exemplars must be inspiring and humble about 
their own contribution are entirely absent from the philosophical definition of chronic 
compliance. 
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perspective. The moderate version holds that “if it is in our power to prevent something 
very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we 
ought, morally, to do it” (Singer 2004: 231). 
The first difference to the original definition is that obligations only exist if 
something ‘very bad’ can be prevented. Since absolute poverty is pervasive in today’s 
world, this difference does not affect the demandingness of the principle. The second 
difference is that agents are not required to sacrifice anything ‘morally significant’. What 
is meant by this term? Singer himself has intentionally “left the notion of moral 
significance unexamined in order to show that the argument does not depend on any 
specific values or ethical principles” (ibid: 231). Consequently, the demandingness of the 
moderate version is determined by what each individual considers “to be of comparable 
moral significance to the poverty we could prevent” (ibid: 231-32).112 
The remainder of this analysis proceeds using the original version of Singer’s 
Principle in a very lax manner. Accordingly, Colby and Damon’s research findings can 
also be used to evaluate whether ordinary persons can chronically comply with Singer’s 
Principle. For those who reject a very lax interpretation, the research findings can be 
used to evaluate whether chronic compliance with the moderate version of Singer’s 
Principle is possible for ordinary persons.113 
Colby and Damon’s empirical study of moral exemplars 
We can now turn to Colby and Damon’s research design and explanations of 
sustained moral commitment. Based on the five criteria outlined above, the nominating 
experts consulted by Colby and Damon suggested 84 potential moral exemplars; 23 
individuals agreed to participate in the study. Colby and Damon relied on the 
nominators’ judgments about the dominant motives for which the suggested individuals 
had acted throughout their life. The method of investigation consisted in an open 
interview arranged around a list of standard questions (Colby and Damon 1992: 28). 
Thus, the moral exemplars were seen as co-investigators whose interpretations were 
                                                 
112 A clear example for activities falling outside the category of moral significance is to wear 
designer clothing or to consume other luxury goods. It is questionable, by contrast, whether 
spending money on visiting a friend who studies overseas is morally significant. 
113 A further option is to argue that it would equally be possible for the moral exemplars to 
avoid the consumption of luxury goods. In this case, the findings could be used to evaluate the 
possibility of compliance with a non-lax interpretation of the original version of Singer’s 
Principle. 
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considered of primary importance. To avoid cultural misunderstandings, the group 
contained only moral exemplars who had worked most of their lives in the United 
States. 
The final group of moral exemplars represented a large variety of educational degrees 
from the completion of eighth grade to accomplished Ph.Ds, a large variance of 
religious adherences, professionals such as businessmen, lawyers, journalists, leaders of 
social movements and charity workers and, lastly, stages three through five of the 
Kohlbergian stages of moral development (Kohlberg 1981). Several moral exemplars 
worked on civil rights, while the largest number was involved in the fight against 
poverty focusing on food, housing, health etc. in the USA and, in one case, Mexico. The 
group contained thirteen women and ten men and was racially mixed. Most of the moral 
exemplars were in their late sixties; thus, it was possible to consider many years of moral 
or immoral decisions. To illustrate the life of a moral exemplar, consider the example of 
Suzie Valadez. Suzie’s life had changed 28 years before the study, when she decided that 
she was called to missionary work and crossed the Rio Grande to help Mexican 
children. 
In all, Suzie will put in a fourteen-hour day. This is no different from the day 
before or the day after. At the age of sixty-six, she shows not a trace of exhaustion 
at the fast-paced life she leads. Nor does she express any irritation at her material 
discomforts or humble surroundings; nor any worry about the obvious hazards of 
her trips through the squalor of urban Juarez up to the desolate socosema hills. 
Through it all, she shows only a love of life, a love of God, and a tangibly shining 
presence. 
ibid: 41 
Next, we can consider the theoretical framework for the study of moral heroism. 
Overall, Colby and Damon maintain that studies about the psychological origins of 
moral development have produced little agreement. Although Kohlberg’s (1981) work 
has influenced many theoretical contributions about moral psychology, decades of 
research have not been able to demonstrate a clear connection between abstract 
reasoning and everyday social conduct. This being the case, Colby and Damon (1992: 6) 
are cautious to strictly separate theoretical reflection about real or hypothetical dilemmas 
from actual behaviour. Moreover, Colby and Damon criticise most laboratory 
experiments for representing altruism in ‘disembodied and trivial ways’ like picking up 
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dropped paper clips.114 Colby and Damon claim that, ultimately, “social behaviour 
created for an experiment cannot replicate the complexity, depth, longevity, or vital 
spirit of human morality in the world at large” (ibid: 7). 
Colby and Damon also maintain that studying real world behaviour in a more or less 
superficial way is unlikely to identify roots of moral commitment. Commenting on 
Oliner and Oliner’s (1988) work on the altruistic personality, they remark that “[m]any 
people share these fortuitous life conditions and personality attributes, yet not many 
extend themselves in the noble and courageous manner of the Holocaust rescuers” 
(Colby and Damon 1992: 7). Overall, Colby and Damon are thus “sceptical about 
analyses that reduce extraordinary moral commitment either to social factors such as 
family background or to personal ones such as a tendency to have close relationships” 
(ibid: 8).  
As an alternative, Colby and Damon’s study is meant to go beyond Kohlberg’s 
theory of moral development, laboratory experiments and superficial studies of real-
world behaviour; according to Colby and Damon, what is needed is an understanding of 
“the person’s life and how the person makes sense of it” (1992: 8). To meet this 
challenge, Colby and Damon undertook in-depth interviews with moral exemplars. To 
fulfil their analysis, Colby and Damon (ibid: 168) adopt goal theory as their theoretical 
framework. Individual development is described through goal transformation resulting 
from social interaction; transformed goals represent new perspectives on life and new 
forms of behaviour. As Colby and Damon emphasise, “[v]irtually all the exemplars 
spoke of peers who prodded them, provoked them, taught them, challenged them, 
provided them with feedback, and otherwise inspired, supported, and sustained them 
through the midlife years” (ibid: 183). Consequently, moral exemplars engaged in a 
continuous process of goal transformation towards ever more moral goals.115 
Colby and Damon’s analysis focuses on the (i) sacrifices and benefits of sustained 
moral commitment, (ii) the interaction between personal and moral goals, (iii) the 
                                                 
114 Cf. the discussion of Miller’s selection of studies in Section 5.1 and Lerner’s (2003) 
criticism about the neglect of the justice motive in psychological research. 
115 Apart from the influence of peer groups, abrupt changes play an important role at the 
beginning of moral development. One of the moral exemplars, Suzie Valadez, saw a vision that 
told her to move to the Mexican border to work with the poor. Other moral exemplars dropped 
out from careers, joined monasteries or were confronted with new moral questions after 
changing their workplace. In most of the cases studies, “the original act of commitment was an 
intensely moral experience” (Colby and Damon 1992: 296). 
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decision-making of moral exemplars and (iv) the psychological mechanisms allowing 
moral exemplars to pursue their goals even in the face of adversity. 
(i) What is commonly given up by moral exemplars are jobs, affluence and a certain 
social status, financial security, leisure and family time. Most importantly, moral 
exemplars turn away from self-protection and self-promotion. The risks and potential 
sacrifices also depend on the kind of activity in which moral exemplars engage; conflicts 
over justice, for example, often lead to denunciations, threats and violence. Charity 
work, by contrast, is more likely to affect the material status of the moral exemplar. In 
general, there was no bemoaning the risks to which the moral exemplars had exposed 
themselves or a sense of sacrifice about forgone opportunities. On the contrary, “many 
spoke of the hazards to which they would have exposed themselves had they not 
pursued their moral aims” (ibid: 75). These hazards included guilt, self-doubt and loss of 
personal integrity. 
(ii) Statements like these point to a close interaction between personal interests and 
moral goals. In fact, most moral exemplars considered their personal interests and moral 
goals as synonymous (Colby and Damon 1992: 292-295). Thereby, the self is not denied 
but defined with a moral centre: the fulfilment of personal goals and moral aspirations 
becomes one and the same.116 As a result, most moral exemplars felt little temptation to 
deviate from moral goals. This picture of unity between the self and morality stands in 
opposition to the grim picture of sustained moral commitments associated with self-
denial and suffering. The problem with this grim picture, however, is that it only 
considers external aspects of individual’s life, while the inner experience that truly 
determines the quality of life is neglected. Colby and Damon point out that it is rather 
the absence of meaningful activities that are the greatest risks for depressions and other 
psychological disharmonies.117 
(iii) Turning to the decision-making of moral exemplars, the most surprising 
characteristic is an immense inner certainty. In fact, moral choices do not result from 
                                                 
116 Note that the level of integration between morality and the self cannot be assessed by a 
person’s stage of moral development, since the latter does not represent which role morality 
plays in a person’s life. 
117 The view that inner experience determines happiness is also endorsed by 
Csikszentmihalyi, who maintains that happiness “does not depend on outside events, but, 
rather, on how we interpret them. Happiness, in fact, is a condition that must be prepared for, 
cultivated, and defended privately by each person. People who learn to control inner experience 
will be able to determine the quality of their lives” (2002: 2). For a discussion of the general 
relation between moral behaviour and well-being, see Frankl (1964) and Summer (1998). 
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inner battles or in-term weighing of the pros and cons of a certain decision. Instead, 
moral exemplars show “an unhesitating will to act, a disavowal for fear and doubt, and a 
simplicity of response”, the most striking fact being the “lack of attention to the risks 
and sacrifices that accompany their moral actions” (Colby and Damon 1992: 70). 
Abstract and highly rationalistic processes of decision-making, often evoked in the 
psychological (Kohlberg 1981) and philosophical literature (Unger 1996; Mele 2003), are 
thus replaced by a ‘sense of great certainty’ and ‘feelings of moral necessity’ (Colby and 
Damon 1992: 68-69). In addition, a gap between the individual’s moral judgment and 
practical decisions rarely arose; thus, convictions directly translated into action. The 
right course of action was clearly defined and the moral exemplar felt a compulsion to 
act accordingly. 
(iv) Those moral exemplars fighting against social ills on an enormous scale are those 
most likely to be confronted with ongoing challenges and emotionally troubling 
experiences. To continue their struggle, it is crucial for them to develop a love or 
passion for their activities; they must experience their work as a creative act through 
which they can realise their personal qualities and aspirations. Additionally, a ‘stubborn 
positivity’ helps to keep the inner balance in difficult times (ibid: 271). Moral exemplars 
use a variety of psychological mechanisms to maintain such a positive attitude towards 
life and their present challenges. Mental discipline is also useful to rule out feelings of 
fear, to ignore material consequences and to single-mindedly focus on a given activity 
where the individual has a significant degree of control. If an individual succeeds to do 
so, a ‘flow’ experience may occur even under the most adverse conditions.118 Moreover, 
a positive attitude towards live is often linked to hope, love and a sense of purpose (ibid: 
291). Such feelings, for example, allowed Nelson Mandela to keep a high spirit during 
his time in prison, and thereby even to partially transform the attitudes of his jailors 
(Mandela 1994). 
Overall, the present study about the lives of moral exemplars stands in opposition to 
a range of stereotypes and the ‘grim’ picture of moral heroism referred to in Section 1.1, 
                                                 
118 Csikszentmihalyi (2002) terms situations of optimal psychological functioning as ‘flow’ 
experiences. Flow feelings are typical for artistic and creative experiences in which the individual 
loses consciousness of the self, being immersed in an endeavour greater than the self. Many of 
the moral exemplar reported experiences strongly resembling Csikszentmihalyi’s 
characterisation. Colby and Damon argue that the phenomenology of optimal experience “is 
pretty much the same in the moral realm as elsewhere” (1992: 82). 
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namely that “moral exemplar endlessly reflect on what is right or wrong, that they 
constantly struggle with temptation, fear, and doubt; that they lead grim, joyless, or 
dreary lives; that they fight many of their battles in splendid isolation” (ibid: 4-5). The 
alternative picture “places moral exemplar far closer to the centre of a collaborative 
support group. It is a picture of striking joy, great certainty, and unremitting faith” (ibid: 
5). 
The ‘developmental continuities’ thesis 
Having examined the development and characteristics of moral exemplars, we can 
now turn to the prediction of behaviour. Do moral exemplars belong to a specific kind 
of individual? Or is chronic heroism possible for any of us? Colby and Damon claim 
that moral exemplars are not a “qualitatively unique psychological type” and thus reject 
the “common view that highly moral people are independent spirits who stand apart 
from, and indeed in front of, the rest of humankind” (1992: 295). In the end, it is the 
“unity between the self and morality” that makes moral exemplars exceptional (ibid: 
301). This exceptionality is, however, one of degree rather than of kind. “It is an 
extreme version of a developmental process that accounts for self-formation and moral 
growth in every normal individual” (ibid). Accordingly, striking similarities exist between 
forms of ordinary moral behaviour and the extraordinary actions of moral exemplars. 
“The exemplars’ expansive moral concerns, and their steadfast moral commitments, are 
extensions in scope, intensity, and breadth of normal moral experiences” (ibid: 303). 
In light of the ‘developmental continuities’ between everyday acts of morality and 
sustained moral commitment, Colby and Damon maintain that, “[e]nduring moral 
commitment is available for all to acquire” (ibid: 4). This means that the exploration of 
the “developmental roots of moral excellence reveals its true connections to the 
possibilities of growth inherent in everyone”, which is a “message of hope for 
individuals and society alike” (ibid: 4-5).119 The view that each individual can become a 
moral exemplar is a clear possibility prediction; I will refer to this result as the 
‘developmental continuities’ thesis throughout the remainder of this project. 
                                                 
119 The hope for individuals is that each has the potential to become a moral exemplar, while 
“[i]t is the ultimate hope of humanity that this process will slowly transform our moral affairs 
for the better, just as it has moved us forward in science, the arts, medicine, and so on. From 
this hope is born the realistic expectation that there will be moral innovation and progress in 
each generation as well as new solutions to enduring social ills” (Colby and Damon 1992: 23). 
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Flanagan’s work dovetails nicely in support of the developmental continuities thesis: 
The important point is that to the degree that the rest of us possess capacities and 
traits similar to those of the saint, are embedded in similar circumstances, and 
understand something of how to bring about character growth and transformation 
– either by working on our own character directly or by structuring social 
institutions in ways that are more conducive to the emergence of the relevant 
qualities – we too can realistically hope to attain the saint’s kind of goodness. 
1991: 5 
This basic idea of this position is also reflected in Ghandi’s statement that “[w]hatever is 
possible for me is possible for every child” (quoted in Flanagan 1991: 4). 
Thus, considering Colby and Damon’s empirical study of moral exemplars has led to 
a strikingly clear result: the ‘developmental continuities’ thesis holds that each individual 
can become a moral exemplar. In the next section, I will explore how the 
‘developmental continuities’ thesis should be interpreted. Does Colby and Damon’s 
possibility prediction allow us to come to the possibility evaluation that chronic 
compliance is possible for ordinary persons? 
5.4 Scientific possibility predictions and the OIC criterion 
The findings of Zimbardo (2007), Oliner and Oliner (1988) and Colby and Damon 
(1992) have two commonalities. Firstly, the negative finding is that no personal factors 
necessary for moral heroism can be identified. Consequently, no distinction between 
exceptional, heroic individuals and ordinary, non-heroic persons can be drawn in a 
clear-cut manner. Secondly, the positive finding is that situational factors strongly 
influence the occurrence of moral heroism. Bearing these findings in mind, we can turn 
to an interpretation of (i) the ‘banality of heroism’ and (ii) the ‘developmental 
continuities’ thesis. 
(i) Regarding the possibility of acute heroism for ordinary persons, Zimbardo’s 
‘banality of heroism’ thesis holds that each individual has the potential to act heroically; 
whether an individual will indeed act heroically, however, depends on the interaction 
between the dispositions of the individual and situational factors. Since there is a chance 
for each individual to act heroically under the influence of strong situational factors, a 
certain probability that each individual will act heroically exists. 
The ‘banality of heroism’ thesis demands two interpretations. First, from an 
empirical perspective, we have to be aware that the ‘banality of heroism’ thesis is a 
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generalisation; research findings only show that we cannot differentiate between 
exceptional and ordinary persons, and that it is likely that most individuals will act in 
extreme ways in extreme situations. In contrast, research cannot demonstrate in a 
positive manner whether or not each individual has the potential to act heroically. It 
may be that evil or heroic acts are indeed impossible for some individuals, but it is 
simply beyond the means of current scientific ability to rule out this option. 
Consequently, a clear distinction between Zimbardo’s empirical research findings and 
the ‘banality of heroism’ thesis has to be made.  
Second, from a methodological perspective, Zimbardo’s (2007: 211) claim that it is 
‘possible’ for each of us to commit evil acts or to act heroically differs from the standard 
OIC criterion where the term ‘possible’ is used in a different way. In Zimbardo’s work, 
‘possible’ signifies that the chances that a certain event (a heroic action by a specific 
individual) will occur are unequal to zero. The OIC criterion, by contrast, requires that 
an individual ‘can’ comply with a moral obligation at any point of time, independent of 
situational factors (cf. Section 3.2). Thus, while the ‘banality of heroism’ thesis refers to 
the possibility of a heroic act taking place at some point of an individual’s life, the OIC 
criterion relates to the capacity of an individual to decide to act heroically in any given 
situation. In light of this difference, the ‘banality of heroism’ thesis does not allow us to 
claim that a specific person can act heroically in a given situation. 
For the assignment of duties, it follows that the ‘banality of heroism’ thesis cannot be 
used to distinguish between situations where compliance with Singer’s Principle is 
possible and where it is not. Situational factors cannot be assessed in an unambiguous 
way; in addition, it is unclear how situational factors interact with a specific individual. 
So while Zimbardo’s work significantly increases our explanatory understanding of 
moral heroism, the ‘banality of heroism’ thesis is insufficient to evaluate whether 
compliance with Singer’s Principle is possible for a specific person at a specific point of 
time or over a certain period. Zimbardo’s possibility prediction thus needs to be 
carefully distinguished from philosophical possibility evaluations.120 
(ii) With this in mind, we can now interpret Colby and Damon’s ‘developmental 
continuities’ thesis which finds that each individual has the developmental capacity to 
become a moral exemplar. They base this argument on the negative finding that moral 
                                                 
120 Elster (2007: 73) also indicates that the possibility of compliance with a moral principle 
may depend both on the dispositions of an individual and situational factors (cf. Section 3.3) 
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exemplars cannot be characterised by dispositions that are, in comparison to ordinary 
persons, of a qualitatively different type. What distinguishes ordinary individuals and 
moral exemplars relates to the unity between the self and morality. Since each individual 
has the potential to achieve a unity between the self and morality through processes of 
moral development, Colby and Damon conclude that each individual can become a 
moral exemplar.  
Let us interpret this thesis. First, from an empirical perspective, we are dealing with a 
similar situation as the case of the ‘banality of heroism’ thesis: the ‘developmental 
continuities’ thesis is a generalisation from explanatory findings. Colby and Damon 
cannot demonstrate in a positive manner that each individual has the capacity to 
become a moral exemplar. Consequently, the ‘developmental continuities’ thesis is an 
uncertain subjective prediction, as it is not exclusively based on objective research 
results. Second, methodologically, the key statement of the ‘developmental continuities’ 
thesis is that enduring moral commitment is available for all to acquire. Again, this 
evaluation has to be distinguished from the standard of the OIC criterion, which 
requires that, for the individual to have the obligation to comply with Singer’s Principle, 
the individual must be able to chronically comply during the entire period to which the 
obligation refers. We may thus be confronted with a case where present compliance is 
impossible, though it may be possible for the individual to comply at some point in the 
future.121 
Based on the ‘developmental continuities’ thesis, the following assignment of moral 
duties can be accomplished. First, the mature individual, for whom compliance is 
possible since she has reached a unity between the self and morality, has the obligation 
to comply in a chronic manner with Singer’s Principle. Second, the immature individual, 
for whom compliance is not yet possible, is excused from the obligations of Singer’s 
Principle. In this case, it seems reasonable that the immature individual has an obligation 
to reduce as much suffering as possible at each point in life. In addition, the immature 
individual should have the obligation to attempt to develop morally, and thus attempt to 
reach a higher unity between the self and morality. The reason is that Singer’s Principle 
                                                 
121 While Colby and Damon (1992: 296) stress the fact the development of moral exemplars 
is often coined by specific experiences, the ‘developmental continuities’ thesis is not explicitly 
premised on the existence of situational factors conducive to moral behaviour. Consequently, 
the problem that the possibility prediction of moral heroism may depend on situational factors – 
which we encountered regarding Zimbardo’s work – is less prominent in this case. 
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should not only be seen as referring to an individual’s present capacities, but also to the 
individual’s responsibility to maintain or increase their capacity to reduce suffering in 
the future (Singer 1972: 238).122 
The problem, however, is that it is extremely difficult to evaluate when an individual 
can comply with Singer’s Principle. In addition, it is unclear how we should evaluate 
whether the individual makes the attempt to achieve unity between the self and morality. 
In light of these problems, the ‘developmental continuities’ thesis does not offer a 
satisfactory answer to the question of whether chronic compliance with Singer’s 
Principle is possible for a specific person during a specific period of time. 
Having discussed the bearing of the ‘banality of heroism’ and the ‘developmental 
continuities’ thesis with regard to philosophical possibility evaluations, we can draw the 
first two general conclusions of this Chapter. The first conclusion is that the possibility 
predictions made by social psychologists are generalisations from empirical findings. 
Possibility predictions are therefore partly subjective and uncertain. As regards the status 
of possibility predictions, two remarks have to be made. To begin with, each of the 
social psychologists considered in this Chapter (Oliner and Oliner 1988; Colby and 
Damon 1992; Zimbardo 2007) spend little time on the justification of possibility 
predictions; rather they present amendments added after the major body of scientific 
work is finished. Next, the same social psychologists do not discuss the subjectivity or 
uncertainty of their possibility predictions. Consequently, possibility predictions should 
be seen as a political message that accompanies the scientific results of social 
psychologists. 
The second conclusion is that the form of scientific possibility predictions 
significantly differs from the standard of the OIC criterion. Neither the ‘banality of 
heroism’ thesis nor the ‘developmental continuities’ thesis allow for the evaluation of 
whether ordinary persons can act heroically in a given situation (acute compliance) or 
during a specific period of time (chronic compliance). As a consequence, scientific 
predictions do not offer a direct answer of the research question of the OIC criterion. 
Before we close the analysis of scientific possibility predictions, a final question needs 
to be asked. Why do social psychologists fervently propagate the claim that moral 
                                                 
122 In an analogous way, Elster’s (2007: 78) ‘principle of future obligations’ stipulates that 
individuals are not permitted to willingly reduce their capacity to act morally in the future (cf. 
Section 3.1) 
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heroism is possible for each individual without mentioning the subjectivity and 
uncertainty of this prediction? The answer relates to the expected positive consequences 
of positive possibility predictions. As mentioned before, Colby and Damon argue that 
the ‘developmental continuities’ thesis represents a ‘message of hope for individuals’ 
(1992: 4). Each individual may become a much better human being and potentially a 
moral hero; this view may positively affect the self-respect of each individual. Moreover, 
regarding the ‘banality of heroism’ thesis, Zimbardo argues that “conveying the message 
that every person is a hero in waiting who will be counted upon to do the right thing 
when the moment of decision comes” is likely to foster heroic behaviour (2007: 486). 
Finally, Oliner and Oliner maintain that different interpretations of past behaviour, as 
well as evaluations of what individuals can do, shape the future: “If we persist in 
defining ourselves as doomed, human nature as beyond redemption, and social 
institutions as beyond reform, then we shall create a future that will inexorably proceed 
in confirming this view” (1988: 260). The importance of the political message of hope 
will become evident with regard to the assignment of the burden of proof. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Since possibility predictions of social psychologists are insufficient to justify whether 
ordinary persons can comply with Singer’s Principle, philosophers have to generate their 
own possibility evaluations. In doing so, philosophers draw on the empirical 
explanations of moral heroism and the possibility predictions offered by social 
psychologists.  
Depending on the perceived degree of uncertainty of evaluations, three cases may 
occur. (i) If a philosopher is certain that all individuals can chronically comply, the 
assignment of obligations does not pose a problem: no individual is excused from the 
obligations of Singer’s Principle. Alternatively, if a philosopher is uncertain whether all 
individuals can chronically comply, two further options exist. (ii) A philosopher can, 
depending on the characteristics of specific persons, offer different possibility 
evaluations. The problem with this strategy is, however, that it is very difficult to justify 
such evaluations by empirical arguments. (iii) This being the case, a more practical 
option is to perform a general evaluation and assume that ordinary persons can or 
cannot comply and should be exempt from the obligations of Singer’s Principle. The 
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advantage of this option can be realised by a single possibility evaluation; we do not 
need to further differentiate between individuals in light of personal factors.123 
Since differentiated and general evaluations are uncertain, I argue that a burden of 
proof should be established limiting the negative effects of false evaluations (cf. Section 
4.2). To assign the burden of proof, the costs of the possibility-error and the 
impossibility-error have to be compared: the higher the relative costs of the former 
error are, the more certain a philosopher must be that compliance is possible in the 
majority of cases in order to come to a positive possibility evaluation. To justify the 
assignment of the burden of proof, the costs of both kinds of error have to be analysed 
and compared. 
The possibility-error leads to the following costs: (i) Considering the Kantian 
conceptual rationale of the OIC criterion, the propagation of impossible moral 
obligations would question the very idea that the concept of duty presupposes the 
possibility of compliance. Additionally, as discussed in Section 3.1, Singer (1993: 242) 
argues that it would be ‘absurd’ to demand the impossible. (ii) Demanding the 
impossible is unfair towards individuals. Individuals may try to comply with duty, fail 
and hence suffer in light of a bad conscience.124 (iii) In addition, demanding the 
impossible may demotivate moral behaviour (see Elster 2007: 72-73). 
Alternatively, the costs of the impossibility-error (exempting an individual despite 
compliance being possible) are as follows. (i) The most obvious cost relates to 
unfulfilled obligations; an agent is unlikely act if she believes that there is no moral 
obligation to act. The costs of unfulfilled obligations can be assessed from a 
consequentialist perspective where they equal the suffering occurring in light of 
unfulfilled obligations. This consideration gains weight from the emphasis of many 
social psychologists’ work on the expected positive effects of the ‘banality of heroism’ 
and ‘developmental continuities’ theses. (ii) A further cost is that an agent may feel 
disrespected by being considered too ordinary or weak to comply with Singer’s 
Principle. 
                                                 
123 As shown in Section 3.3, general evaluations resemble Elster’s (2007: 73) suggestion that, 
in the case of controversial evaluations, compliance may either be considered to be possible or 
impossible for all individuals. 
124 It is unclear whether this case should be classified as a conceptual cost that violates the 
requirement that morality treats individuals in a fair way, or whether it should be classified as a 
consequential cost related to the suffering of the disappointed duty-bearer. 
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Comparing relative costs is a highly complex endeavour. From a normative 
perspective, it is unclear how various costs should be weighed. It is especially difficult to 
compare conceptual costs as they relate to the OIC criterion, considerations of fairness 
and the costs related to unfulfilled obligations as evaluated from a consequentialist 
perspective. Comparing these costs, we have to be especially aware that the OIC 
criterion is justified by a conceptual rationale and not with regard to consequentialist 
considerations as seen in Chapter 3. 
Unfortunately, neither the burden of proof nor the question of how the costs of false 
evaluations should be weighed is discussed at length in the philosophical literature used 
in my research. The only exception is Elster (2007), who offers some reflections as to 
how we should act in light of the difficulties in applying the OIC criterion. When 
considering the classification of all uncertain cases as being possible or impossible, 
Elster simply asks, “which of these solutions will actually be more efficient in promoting 
the performance or moral duties” (2007: 73)?125 But the mere allusion to the efficiency 
of duties is problematic in light of the variety of normative considerations that should 
be taken into account when comparing the cost of false evaluations. Moreover, Elster 
does not compare the costs of false evaluations and, thus, does not calculate the 
efficiency of the two solutions. 
Apart from the normative difficulties of comparing the costs, the empirical 
calculation of each expected cost is an equally challenging task. Each of the costs is 
likely to vary with respect to different people, situations, cultures and time periods. 
Some individuals may be motivated by the outlook that they could become moral 
heroes; for others, being confronted with such potential may lead to anxiety and 
demotivating pressures. An overall assessment, however, has to offer a comparative 
assessment of all costs.  
While the foundation of this research project is based on empirically informed 
possibility evaluations, it is beyond the focus of this thesis to offer an encompassing 
normative argument regarding how the various costs of errors should be compared or 
                                                 
125 While Elster refers to the benefits and costs of false evaluations, this thesis only considers 
the costs of false evaluations and sets the benefits of correct evaluations equal to zero as this 
strategy is often used with respect to the burden of proof (Hahn and Oaksford 2007: 44). In the 
case of unfulfilled obligations, for example, the overall result is the same independent of 
whether fulfilled obligations are seen as a benefit or whether unfulfilled obligations are regarded 
as a cost. 
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how they could be empirically assessed. Given the complexity of this question, whether 
a plausible answer can ever be offered is in question. My own suggestion is that the 
burden of proof should be assigned to those who challenge the view that compliance is 
possible for ordinary persons. The first reason for this assignment is that, given the 
extent of suffering from absolute poverty in the world today, the costs of unfulfilled 
obligations should be considered to be very high.126 The second reason relates to 
Zimbardo’s (2007) and Colby and Damon’s (1992) claim that positive possibility 
predictions are likely to have positive motivational effects. Moreover, the present 
analysis points to the need of including a discussion regarding the burden of proof in 
the literature on the OIC criterion. This must include an examination of how, and to 
what extent, the relative costs of errors can be empirically compared.  
As the empirical literature does not offer a clear answer to whether ordinary persons 
can comply with Singer’s Principle, my own evaluation is largely subjective. My own 
analysis, based on the literature and arguments presented here, finds that compliance 
with Singer’s Principle should be regarded as possible for most individuals. Moreover, 
the probability that compliance is possible should be seen to increase with certain 
personal factors like an individual’s ‘altruistic personality’ (Oliner and Oliner 1988). 
Since I am also inclined to think that the relative costs of the impossibility-error are 
higher, I support the general evaluation that ordinary persons should not be exempted 
from the obligations of Singer’s Principle. 
Let me finish the analysis of the OIC criterion and Singer’s Principle by several 
concluding remarks about the definition of the OIC criterion, the empirical application 
and the practical relevance of the findings. Overall, the definition of the OIC criterion 
offered in Chapter 3 serve as an adequate basis for the empirical application. First, a 
precise definition of the standard was necessary for establishing a clear connection 
between the OIC criterion and possibility predictions in social psychology; as I have 
shown, the scientific question of whether there is a possibility that an individual will act 
heroically has to be distinguished from the philosophical question whether an individual 
can act heroically at a specific point of time. In addition, applying the OIC criterion to 
all cases – and not only to cases where individuals are already motivated to act (cf. 
                                                 
126 In a similar way, considering the question about the causal responsibility of poverty, 
Barry’s ‘vulnerability presumption principle’ holds that we should show “a willingness to err in 
favour of the acutely deprived subjects” (2005: 221). This claim is based on the idea that the 
interest of the individual matters more the worse-off they are. 
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Section 3.2) – fits well with the focus of empirical studies. Second, regarding the 
definition of agency, starting with the ‘ordinary persons’ thesis has been a helpful 
strategy since the possibility predictions of social psychologists equally relate to the 
capacities of ordinary persons. In sum, the definition of the OIC criterion allows for a 
clear understanding of the similarities and differences between the philosophical and 
empirical perspectives on moral heroism. 
The empirical application of the OIC criterion led to a mixed result. On the one 
hand, it has been possible to identify scientific definitions of forms of moral behaviour 
fulfilling the moral demands of Singer’s Principle. Moreover, research findings about the 
role of personal factors and about the strong influence of situational factors significantly 
increased our understanding of the conditions of moral heroism. Furthermore, the 
possibility predictions that each individual has the potential to act heroically as 
expressed by the ‘banality of heroism’ and ‘developmental continuities’ theses has been 
a positive finding and seems, at first glance, to offer a good answer to the research 
question. 
On the other hand, a striking difference remains: the scientific focus on whether an 
event may happen at all differs from the philosophical question regarding whether an 
individual can decide to act at a specific point of time. This difference represents the 
two underlying emphases of two varied and sometimes divergent disciplines. While 
social psychologists are interested in the effects of dispositional and situation factors 
“moving particular individuals across a decisional line from inaction to action” 
(Zimbardo 2007: 485), the philosophical interest lies on the potential and limits of 
individuals as autonomous decision-makers. 
In conclusion, it has been shown that empirical research results can and should be 
used to justify possibility evaluations – but it is also clear that possibility evaluations 
cannot entirely fulfil the premise of the research question. Since empirical research 
results are inconclusive, possibility evaluations ultimately have to be informed by each 
philosopher’s sense of possibility. Consequently, an important degree of subjectivity and 
uncertainty cannot be avoided. 
What practical relevance are possibility evaluations likely to have? Singer’s Principle is 
a very popular principle: it is discussed in many university courses and in the current 
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media.127 In these debates, as well as in the philosophical literature, the desirability of the 
Singer’s Principle is usually the focus of attention. Meanwhile, the question of whether 
ordinary persons can comply with Singer’s Principle is often mentioned but rarely 
discussed in detail. Since many social psychologists assign an important place to the 
message of hope that accompanies the ‘banality of heroism’ and ‘developmental 
continuities’ theses, a positive possibility evaluation may have a significantly positive 
effect. Pointing out why compliance is likely to be possible for each individual may 
convince people that they can significantly increase their contribution to the reduction 
of preventable suffering. Combining this belief with the research findings that most 
moral exemplars live a happy life may have a further positive impact on the behaviour 
of individuals. Whether a positive possibility evaluation is true, however, can only be 
proven in practice. 
                                                 
127 See Singer’s ‘What Should a Billionaire Give – and What Should You?’ (2006). 
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Chapter 6: The Feasibility Criterion and Domestic Egalitarian 
Justice 
A man is not born, but becomes one.  
    Erasmus (quoted in Margolin 1993: 343) 
 
But man’s capacities have never been measured; nor are we to judge of 
what he can do by any precedents, so little has been tried. 
 Henry David Thoreau (1997: 11) 
 
The third analytical chapter of this thesis consists of the conditional feasibility of 
Pogge’s theory of global egalitarian justice outlined in the Introduction. The two parts 
of the analysis are the definition of the feasibility criterion (Chapter 6) and its 
application to Pogge’s theory of global egalitarian justice (Chapter 7).  
This Chapter defines the feasibility criterion and, in addition, evaluates the feasibility 
debate about domestic egalitarian justice. Given the complexity of the latter debate and 
this thesis’ focus on global justice, this Chapter analyses the structure of the debate but 
refrains from giving a conclusive answer. As a consequence, the feasibility evaluation of 
Pogge’s theory will be ‘conditional’, based on the assumption that domestic egalitarian 
justice is feasible.128  
The role of the feasibility criterion is to ensure that the ideals propagated by moral 
theories can be implemented. While the OIC criterion relates to individual capacities, 
the criterion of feasibility focuses on the collective capacities of groups, nations and 
even humanity at large. The common rationale is that neither individuals nor collectives 
should be obliged to pursue moral ideals beyond their capacities (Räikkä 1998; O’Neill 
2004; Elster 2007). Similar to the definition of the OIC criterion in Chapter 3, the first 
                                                 
128 The question is, then, whether the difference of scope between the domestic and global 
realm justifies diverging feasibility evaluations. See Section 1.2 for a discussion of the rationale 
of the conditional feasibility evaluation. 
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aim of this Chapter is to offer a philosophically convincing and empirically applicable 
definition of the feasibility criterion. This requires specification of agency and motive of 
compliance, the evaluative standard, time frame and legitimacy constraint. 
The second aim of this Chapter is to analyse the feasibility debate about Rawls’ 
(1999a) theory of domestic egalitarian justice.129 Which empirical theories are adduced to 
justify feasibility evaluations? Are any methods of prediction (like trend extrapolation or 
scenarios) used to justify feasibility evaluations? What are the forms of feasibility 
evaluations? Is the subjectivity and uncertainty of feasibility evaluations theorised? 
Keeping in mind that only a few philosophers offer extensive arguments about the 
feasibility of domestic egalitarian justice, the present Chapter focuses on the positions 
defended by Rawls (1999a) and Nagel (1991). 
This Chapter proceeds in a similar manner as the previous two Chapters; it begins 
with Section 6.1, which examines the definition of the feasibility criterion via the 
parameters agency, motive, standard, time frame and legitimacy. Section 6.2 analyses 
Rawls’ (1999a) and Nagel’s (1991) arguments regarding the feasibility of domestic 
egalitarian justice. Building on this, Section 6.3 goes on to offer a preliminary conclusion 
about the applicability of the feasibility criterion and the contribution of empirical 
research results as well as the subjectivity and uncertainty of feasibility evaluations. 
6.1 The criterion of feasibility 
The fundamental difference between the analysis of individual and collective 
capacities relates to the time frame and thereby also to the evaluative standard; while the 
OIC criterion asks whether an individual can comply with a moral obligation at a 
specific point of time, the question of the feasibility criterion is whether a moral ideal 
can be accomplished within a certain time frame. Accordingly, the feasibility criterion 
does not refer to the present capacities of a collective, or what could the collective do 
now, but to its future capacities, or to what potential the collective has. In order to offer 
a full definition of the feasibility criterion, this section examines how to best define both 
the agency and motive of compliance and the legitimacy constraint. 
                                                 
129 The terms ‘domestic egalitarian justice’ and ‘domestic egalitarianism’ are meant to 
exclusively refer to Rawls’ (1999a) theory of domestic justice. In a similar way, the terms ‘global 
egalitarian justice’ and ‘global egalitarianism’ refer to Pogge’s (1989) theory of global justice. 
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Agency and motive of compliance 
The functioning of a system requires the coordination of behaviour; the individual 
willingness to act must be translated in effective collective action (Rawls 1999a: 5). It 
must also be possible to install mechanisms of enforcement giving additional incentives 
to comply and to punish instances of non-compliance. Dealing with collective 
compliance, coordination and enforcement, the question of institutional feasibility is 
more complex than the application of the OIC criterion to interactional principles like 
Singer’s Principle.130 
Noting this complexity, it is vital that we consider the various conditions under 
which a moral ideal should be considered accomplished. With respect to the agency of 
compliance, it seems reasonable to work with the concept of ‘broad compliance’, i.e. to 
demand that a large majority of a given collective must comply with a moral theory for 
the theory to be considered feasible. This view is adopted by Rawls, who maintains that 
for a system to be stable, compliance must take place “more or less regularly” (1999a: 6). 
A more exact definition, by contrast, might require that c percent of the population must 
always or almost always comply. Since it is difficult to define an exact level of 
compliance required for the functioning of a specific institution, working with the 
concept of broad compliance is adequate for the present analysis. 
Turning to the motive of compliance, the question is whether compliance should be 
required to take place for moral motives or whether no restriction should be made.131 
Rawls observes that enforcement is likely to be always necessary since “even under 
reasonably ideal conditions, it is hard to imagine, for example, an income tax scheme on 
a voluntary basis” (1999a: 211). In a similar way, Miller refers to “trust backed up by 
compulsion” (1999a: 19) as one of the conditions of social justice. Taking Rawls and 
Miller as examples, my research does not require that compliance take place for a 
specific set of motives. Instead, what ultimately matters for most moral theories is the 
realisation of desirable states of affairs in which interests or rights are protected (Griffin 
                                                 
130 In general, obligations of justice are less demanding than interactional principles like 
Singer’s; social burdens are distributed among the entire population and compliance may be 
enforced, thus making compliance easier from a motivational perspective. Therefore, the 
principal concern of feasibility evaluations is not whether each individual has the capacity to 
comply but whether it is possible that a sufficiently large part of the population will comply with 
the obligations of justice at the same time. 
131 With respect to Singer’s interactional Principle, the question is whether compliance can 
take place in the absence of strong external rewards or enforcement (see Section 3.3). 
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1992), and not the intrinsic value of the motive of people’s behaviour. Second, it is very 
hard to identify which motives stand behind a given action (Oliner and Oliner 1988: 5); 
a motive of constraint would severely complicate feasibility evaluations. Therefore, a 
moral ideal should be considered realised if broad compliance takes place and no 
restrictions on the motive of compliance should be made. 
Standard 
The standard of the feasibility criterion defines the conditions under which a moral 
ideal should be classified as ‘feasible’. According to Räikkä, the “feasibility of a theory of 
justice should be evaluated by judging whether it is possible to bring about the ideal 
world recommended by the theory” (1998: 31). In this respect, ‘possible’ signifies that 
the chances of the moral ideal being implemented are unequal to zero. Choosing this 
interpretation is in line with the predictive framework of the social sciences.132 
Therefore, as will be discussed in greater depth below, it is important to consider that 
empirical predictions and feasibility evaluations require precise time frame definitions. 
Furthermore, the standard endorsed by Räikkä signifies that the form of feasibility 
evaluations is dichotomous: “a theory is or is not feasible; it is not more or less feasible” 
(1998: 32).133 
In the literature of global justice, the concepts ‘feasible’ and ‘possible’ are often used 
in a similar way (Miller 1999a; Boswell 2005). Additionally, many other expressions are 
advanced to evaluate whether a moral ideal satisfies the feasibility criterion. Boswell, for 
example, maintains that cosmopolitan principles are “unrealistic”, “unfeasible”, 
“unattainable”, “hopelessly unfeasible”, “patently unfeasible” or “at best utopian” 
(2005: 2, 4, 6, 50). This proliferation of concepts is, however, a hindrance to a precise 
                                                 
132 In this, it is important to bear in mind the claim of the ‘banality of heroism’ thesis that 
each individual has the capacity to act heroically, i.e. that the chances of such behaviour are 
unequal to zero (see Section 5.2). Moreover, the question of the NIC Report is whether an 
optimistic scenario is possible (see Section 4.3). Accordingly, the term ‘possible’ is used in a 
similar way in all three cases. As Section 5.4 has shown, by contrast, this use differs from the 
standard of the OIC criterion. 
133 Similarly, Elster (2007: 47) claims that possibility evaluations have “no variation in 
degree”. In opposition, Boswell (2005: 2) indicates that some moral theories can be “more 
ethically feasible” than others. Since Boswell does not explicitly define the criterion and standard 
of feasibility, it remains unclear what is meant. I assume that Boswell indeed refers to an 
effectiveness criterion comparing the probability that moral theories will be implemented (cf. 
discussion on the effectiveness criterion in Chapter 2). 
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definition of the feasibility criterion and is often unclear as to which metaethical 
criterion terms like these refer.  
Thus, clarity is key: the terms ‘feasible’ and ‘possible’ should not be treated 
synonymously. As Räikkä (1998: 37) argues, ‘feasible’ means that a moral ideal can be 
realised by legitimate means; the term ‘feasible’ thus incorporates a legitimacy constraint 
(see below for further discussion). So while each feasible moral ideal is also possible, 
each possible moral ideal is not feasible. 
To avoid any confusion, my work will only use the term ‘feasible’ and ‘possible’ for 
the evaluation of moral ideals. It will explicitly be highlighted if the meanings of the two 
terms differ because of legitimacy considerations.134 
The feasibility standard outlined above has to be distinguished from Rawls’ concern 
with the relative stability of moral theories. To understand this issue, the Rawlsian 
distinction between the realisability and stability of moral theories needs to be 
introduced. While realisability deals with the question whether a social system can be 
brought about at all, stability relates to the question whether individuals growing up 
under just institutions will acquire the “corresponding sense of justice and desire to do 
their part in maintaining them”, and whether stabilising forces exist if infractions should 
occur” (Rawls 1999a: 398).135 Rawls’ focus here is on the stability criterion, as it fulfils 
two functions. The first is to ensure that the parties of the original position “are rational 
in that they will not enter into agreements they know they cannot keep, or can do so 
only with great difficulty” (ibid: 125-126). Accordingly, the stability criterion makes the 
absolute requirement that moral theories must be ‘feasible’ or ‘stable enough’ (ibid: 441). 
As a second function, Rawls’ criterion of stability evaluates the relative stability of 
different conceptions of justice: “other things being equal, the preferred conception of 
justice is the most stable one” (ibid: 436). 
This relative function clearly differs from Räikkä’s definition of the feasibility 
standard as its only absolute requirement is that the realisation of a moral ideal is 
possible. Most other philosophers also consider the feasibility standard to function as an 
                                                 
134 This task is not easy since most philosophers use these terms synonymously or without an 
explicit definition. 
135 If an individual possesses the required ‘sense of justice’ (Rawls 1999a: 125), this simply 
means that she is motivated to comply with the obligations of justice. The Rawlsian meaning of 
the ‘sense of justice’ should thus be distinguished from the concept of a moral sense or moral 
intuition on which an individual’s moral judgment can be based. 
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absolute requirement (Miller 1999a; Caney 2005; Boswell 2005; Elster 2007).136 This 
thesis will equally focus on the absolute feasibility of global egalitarianism as this has the 
advantage of reaching a clear separation between the feasibility criterion and other 
metaethical criteria related to motivation.137 
In the literature of global justice, however, such a clear distinction is often not 
achieved. Nagel, for example, claims that “political theory must take into account the 
individual conduct it demands of people in the creation and operation of political 
institutions,” that political theory must not “put too much pressure on individual 
motives” and that “[i]f real people find it psychologically very difficult or impossible to 
live as the theory requires, or to adopt the relevant institutions, that should carry some 
weight against the ideal” (Nagel 1991: 26, 24, 21). It is important to separate these 
claims about the psychological difficulty of compliance from the feasibility standard. 
After this distinction is made, these claims need to be defended by a metaethical 
criterion other than the feasibility criterion.138  
To summarise, the standard of the feasibility criterion requires that the chances of a 
moral ideal being brought about by legitimate means are unequal to zero. This definition 
implies that the feasibility criterion functions as an absolute criterion. Moreover, the 
form of feasibility evaluations is dichotomous; a moral ideal should be considered to be 
feasible or not. 
Time frame and legitimacy 
To complete the definition of the feasibility criterion, the parameters of time frame 
and legitimacy need to be discussed. The time frame defines the period of feasibility 
                                                 
136 It is worth emphasising that the analytical distinction between the realisability and stability 
of an ideal only plays a minor role in most feasibility evaluations. Most philosophers combine 
their discussion of the realisability of moral ideals with their discussion on the stability of moral 
ideals (cf. Räikkä 1998; Miller 1999a; Caney 2005). Moreover, the Rawlsian distinction between 
realisability and stability is often mentioned in the literature but not discussed to any further 
extent (cf. Laegaard 2006: 406). As a consequence, the fact that Rawls’ criterion of stability also 
has a relative component is mostly neglected. 
137 Moreover, if we are interested in establishing ties between the OIC criterion and the 
feasibility criterion, the latter may not incorporate concerns for the relative stability of moral 
ideals. 
138 A further problem is that the additional requirements are imprecise: what exactly does 
‘too much pressure’ or ‘psychologically very difficult mean’? If Nagel wants to argue that the 
probability of compliance should be higher than a certain threshold, this claim must be 
defended with respect to the effectiveness criterion analysed in Chapter 2. 
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evaluations. Until when must a moral ideal be realisable to count as feasible? A 
distinction can be made between three time frames (the short-, middle- and long-term), 
where each time frame leads to a different kind of feasibility analysis. First, if the time 
frame is categorised as short term, we are dealing with questions of political feasibility. 
An example is Pogge’s (1994) argument for a ‘global resources tax’ (GRT), which 
demands the introduction of a global tax on natural resources to benefit the globally 
worst-off. Pogge maintains that the GRT is a “reasonably clear and specific institutional 
proposal”, that is “instantly feasible” (1994: 199, 205). To count as politically feasible, a 
proposal or policy must have a sufficiently high chance of success; therefore, ‘feasible’ 
no longer signifies that the chances of success are unequal to zero. A new health policy, 
for example, will usually only be adopted if the chances of success are sufficiently 
high.139 
Next, let us distinguish middle-term feasibility evaluations from the evaluation of 
moral ideals. As Carens (1996) has argued, the ‘realistic approach’ to morality searches 
for moral principles to guide behaviour given the existence of certain constraints (cf. 
Section 3.2). A middle-term feasibility question is, for example, whether proposals for 
stronger international institutions are feasible within the next few decades. In middle-
term analyses, as in the case of political feasibility, the meaning of ‘feasible’ is that the 
chances of success are sufficiently high.140 
Third and finally, we are only concerned with the feasibility of moral ideals if the 
time frame is a long-term time frame. This view is widely supported in the literature 
(Nagel 1991; Räikkä 1998; Caney 2005) and can be summarised by Rawls’ contention 
that “[t]he politician looks to the next election, the statesman to the next generation, and 
philosophy to the indefinite future” (quoted in Pogge 1994: 224). Nevertheless, this 
does not clarify how expressions like the ‘long term’ or the ‘indefinite future’ should be 
operationalised. For scientific predictions and feasibility evaluations, the difference 
between a time frame of five hundred, a thousand or two thousand years is highly 
                                                 
139 For a discussion about the relation between issues of political feasibility and the feasibility 
criterion in moral theory, see Räikkä (1998: 28-31). Räikkä also highlights that “in ordinary 
language ‘cannot’ does not often express absolute (metaphysical) impossibility. Instead, actions 
are frequently called ‘impossible’ when it is simply meant that performing them would not be 
reasonable, given the costs, effort and other possible weak constraints” (ibid: 37). 
140 A further middle-term feasibility issue is whether absolute poverty can be eradicated in 
decades to come. For a positive answer to this question, see Sachs’ (2005) The End of Poverty. The 
view that absolute poverty can be ended is also defended by the MakePovertyHistory Campaign 
presented in Chapter 1. 
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important.141  
The fact that philosophers do not specify the time frame by a range of years signifies 
that the research question of the feasibility criterion remains imprecise.142 To proceed, 
this thesis will adopt a working definition that takes the long term to refer to a period 
between five hundred and a thousand years. This period seems to capture what most 
philosophers have in mind when they make feasibility evaluations. Finally, it is worth 
emphasising that the likelihood of positive feasibility evaluations, as well as the degree 
of uncertainty, will increase with the length of the time frame. In Chapter 7, the 
definition of time frame will play a crucial role with regard to the debate between Miller 
(1999a) and Caney (2005). 
Legitimacy is the final parameter that needs to be considered for a full definition of 
the feasibility criterion. Legitimacy and the legitimacy constraint relate to the means by 
which a just society can be brought about; as indicated above, a moral ideal may be 
‘possible’ but not ‘feasible’ if the realisation of the latter requires the use of illegitimate 
means such as brainwashing or military conquest.143 Räikkä also speaks of “moral costs 
of changeover” to describe the expected negative consequences related to a transition to 
a moral ideal (1998: 33). Since the assessment of these costs depends on the conception 
of an endorsed morality, “it becomes partly a normative matter to decide which 
institutional arrangements are feasible and which are not” (ibid: 37).  
It is, however, extremely difficult to formulate a legitimacy constraint in a general 
way; the evaluation of the moral costs of changeover and the value of institutional 
reform strongly depends on the moral theory and circumstances in question. In the 
literature of global justice, most philosophers endorse a least a moderate legitimacy 
                                                 
141 Although Rawls does not precisely define what is meant by the term ‘infinite future’, this 
term should be distinguished from ‘infinity’. Imagining what may happen within tens of 
thousands of years is so distant from the world as we presently experience it that it makes little 
sense to include such changes in the present analysis. 
142 To understand the unusual nature of this situation, think about an interdisciplinary 
working group having to evaluate the long-term feasibility of a world government. The empirical 
scientists of the group would certainly be confused if, during the initial discussion about the 
theoretical framework, the participating philosophers refused to define the time frame of the 
prediction in a manner that was in no way precise. So while the non-definition of the time frame 
is common in philosophy, a precise definition of the latter is the starting point for most, if not 
all, empirical predictions.  
143 The legitimacy constraint only concerns the realisability of a moral ideal; stability is not 
affected since the definition of a just society within the liberal tradition implies that the 
government uses only legitimate means of education and enforcement. 
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constraint ruling out the enforced imposition of values (Pogge 1989; Nagel 1991). A 
moderate legitimacy constraint may thus serve as a background assumption for the 
analysis to come.144 
Having discussed the five parameters of the feasibility criterion, we can now turn to 
the final definition of feasibility criterion. The research question is: Are the chances that the 
social ideal recommended by a moral theory will be brought about – by legitimate means and within the 
time frame T – unequal to zero? The question is based on the following background 
assumptions: first, a social ideal counts as realised if broad compliance takes place; 
second, no requirements regarding the motive of compliance exist; third, a moderate 
legitimacy constraint is endorsed. With respect to my own conditional feasibility 
evaluation of global egalitarianism, I take the time frame to be somewhere between five 
hundred and a thousand years. 
A final issue to be considered is the weight of the feasibility criterion. If the feasibility 
criterion is considered to be of absolute weight, a moral theory should be ruled out if it 
is unfeasible. In this case, the feasibility criterion functions as an absolute constraint. If 
the weight is relative, an unfeasible moral theory is only considered to be defective. In 
the literature of global justice, the weight of the feasibility criterion is defined in a variety 
of ways (Nagel 1991; Räikkä 1998; Rawls 1999a; Caney 2005; Boswell 2005). Since the 
definition of the weight does not affect the application of the feasibility criterion, I will 
return to this issue after having discussed the feasibility analysis of global egalitarianism. 
This strategy allows us to combine the discussion of the weight and applicability of the 
feasibility criterion. 
Objections 
Most contemporary literature endorses the criterion of feasibility (Nagel 1991; Miller 
1999a; Rawls 1999a; Boswell 2005; Caney 2005). As in the case of the OIC criterion, the 
principal rationale is that it would be conceptually mistaken to propagate a moral ideal 
that cannot be realised. In addition, some philosophers also mention that it would be 
ineffective to demand the impossible (Mackie 1990: 132). In general, however, the 
                                                 
144 I will explicitly point out if the feasibility evaluations of a given philosopher are influenced 
by a particularly strong or lax legitimacy constraint (cf. the discussion of Nagel’s (1991) 
argument in Section 7.3). For an extensive discussion of the legitimacy constraint, see Elster’s 
(2007) Transforming Moral Motivation. 
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rationale of the feasibility criterion is hardly further specified or defended.145 
Pogge (1989) and Cohen (2008) are two of the few contemporary philosophers who 
reject the criterion of feasibility.146 Pogge’s argument questions the practical relevance of 
long term feasibility evaluations: “All we may ask is that a conception of justice provide 
a criterion for assessing our global order that allows us to choose from among the 
feasible and morally accessible avenues of institutional change and thus specifies our 
moral task gradually to improve the justice of this order” (1989: 260). While the ultimate 
goal of such reforms is a fully just global institutional scheme, Pogge adds that 
[o]ur responsibility, however, in no way depends on whether such a fully just 
scheme is practicable or realistically attainable. Yes, Rawls’s criterion can be used 
to design a blueprint of ideal institutions that would be perfectly just. But much 
more important for now is its role in the comparative assessment of alternative 
feasible institutional schemes. Perhaps we will never reach a scheme whose worst 
social position is optimal. But we don’t need the assurance that such a scheme is 
reachable in order to recognize that we ought to support institutional reforms that 
improve the worst social position, just as one does not need the assurance that one 
can reach perfection for undertaking to become a better human being.  
ibid: 12 
If a conception of justice can specify how individuals should act in practice, the 
‘ultimate import’ of offering guidance to individuals is met. Practically, Pogge’s position 
implies that we should abandon the task of long-term feasibility evaluations and 
concentrate on the short-term feasibility assessment of institutional reform that would 
morally improve the state of the world.147 148 
Since this thesis focuses on the definition and application of the feasibility criterion, 
the grand scale metaethical question of whether ultimate moral principles should be 
sensitive to empirical facts is beyond the scope of the present analysis. However, it will 
be interesting to return to this question on the small scale after having assessed the 
                                                 
145 The rationale behind the feasibility criterion will play an important role with respect to the 
costs of false feasibility evaluations and the burden of proof discussed in Section 7.7. 
146 As outlined in the Introduction, Cohen (2003: 241) makes a fundamental distinction 
between ‘ultimate normative principles’ and ‘principles of regulation’. While the former should 
be fact-insensitive and thus not be affected by the feasibility criterion, the latter should be 
designed with regard to the expected consequences, taking social conditions into account. 
147 In his more recent work, Pogge does focus on the short-term feasibility of institutional 
reforms related to the international borrowing and resource privileges (2002: 153-167) and to 
the global patent system in the health sector (2006). 
148 A further consequence of Pogge’s rejection of long-term feasibility evaluations is that 
Pogge himself does not offer a feasibility defence of his theory of global egalitarian justice. We 
need to explore to what extent other philosophers perform this task and what further empirical 
arguments can be adduced. 
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applicability of the feasibility criterion discussed in Section 7.7. 
6.2 The feasibility of domestic egalitarian justice 
The aim of this section is to analyse how the feasibility criterion is applied in the case 
of domestic egalitarian justice. Considering the empirical arguments advanced by Rawls 
(1999a) and Nagel (1991), we must address the puzzle of how explanatory arguments 
are used to justify feasibility evaluations. Here I will also evaluate whether the three 
conditions for predictive arguments (correct assumptions, relevant explanatory theories 
and convincing predictive arguments) are satisfied. However, given the breadth and 
complexity of the debate, no conclusive evaluation about the feasibility of domestic 
egalitarian justice will be given. Then the section will move into a methodological issue, 
relating to the practical applicability of the feasibility criterion. What role does the 
distinction between realisability and stability arguments play? What form do feasibility 
evaluations take and which weight do they have? How do Rawls and Nagel deal with the 
degree of uncertainty of evaluations in their own work? 
Rawls on the stability of domestic egalitarian justice 
Surprisingly, Rawls’ argument relates to stability but not to the realisability of his 
conception of justice. Thus, his argument does not represent a complete feasibility 
evaluation. Focusing on the stability of a just society, Rawls is mainly interested in “the 
development of the sense of justice as it presumably would take place once institutions 
are firmly established and recognized to be just” (1999a: 397). Discussing the 
development of the sense of justice, Rawls draws both on empathy-based social learning 
theories and on Kohlberg’s (1981) cognitive theory of moral development. Summarising 
the six stages of moral development offered by Kohlberg, Rawls (1999a: 405-420) 
defines three stages of moral development relating to the ‘morality of authority’, the 
‘morality of association’ and ‘morality of principles’. Rawls’ claim is that in each stage of 
moral development, individuals will have good reasons to comply with the obligations 
of justice; moreover, as individuals grow up under just institutions, it is likely that 
individuals will eventually reach the third stage (morality of principles) and comply for 
principled reasons.  
Furthermore, Rawls maintains that individuals are also likely to comply for broadly 
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self-interested reasons, since justice as fairness is both in line with people’s sense of 
justice and their conception of the good (1999a: 491). In the end, Rawls does not 
conclude that justice as fairness is the most stable conception of justice; instead, the aim 
has simply been to check justice as fairness is “not so unstable that some other choice 
might be better” (ibid: 441).  
Overall, Rawls’ argument relies heavily on the power of education, modelling 
behaviour of parents and institutions and rational conviction. This justification is in line 
with Mill’s claim that the human mind is, through the power of education and social 
institutions, susceptible “of being cultivated in almost any direction: so that there is 
hardly anything so absurd or so mischievous that it may not, by means of these 
influences, be made to act on the human mind with all the authority of conscience” 
(1962: 283-84). 
Evaluating Rawls’s argument, the first problem relates to the neglect of the 
realisability question; it is bizarre to start with the stability question, presuming that just 
institutions are already firmly established and recognized to be just. It is simply more 
advantageous to start with a realisability analysis. If one should come to a negative 
realisability evaluation, a stability evaluation would even be superfluous.  
Next, Rawls’ argument can be evaluated in light of the three conditions for 
convincing predictive arguments outlined in Chapter 4. To begin with, Rawls cannot be 
criticised for drawing on flawed empirical assumptions; Rawls does not advance 
contentious explanatory theories, nor does he assign special weight to specific empirical 
findings. The fact that he draws on the general insights of a variety of explanatory 
theories reflects Rawls’ view that the parties of the original position are able to evaluate 
the stability of a conception of justice in light of the “general facts of moral psychology” 
which are known to them (1999a: 405). Next, the question about the feasibility of 
domestic egalitarian justice is so broad that we cannot judge which empirical theories 
represent the most adequate basis for feasibility evaluations. Drawing on the major 
strands of social and moral development theories, Rawls cannot be criticised for an 
inadequate selection of empirical theories. Finally, depicting the development of 
individuals’ sense of justice under the influence of just institutions, Rawls offers a 
positive argument why justice as fairness should be considered feasible. Thus, the 
formal conditions for convincing predictions are satisfied. 
Overall, it would be difficult to challenge the general explanations of moral 
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behaviour offered by Rawls. Rather, the crucial issue is whether the motivational 
tendencies adduced by Rawls are strong enough to motivate broad compliance with the 
obligations of justice. Conceding that individuals growing up under just institutions are 
more likely to become principled reasoners, for example, it can nonetheless be argued 
that it is unlikely for a large share of the population to become principled reasoners and 
to act upon their rational convictions. As regards the relationship between abstract 
moral judgments and moral action, Rawls pays little attention to the fact that there is 
scarce empirical evidence about the relationship between stages of moral development 
and moral action (Colby and Damon 1992: 7). A final criticism could be that Rawls does 
not discuss empirical theories focusing on the perpetuality of narrowly egoistic motives 
like the desire for material wealth and power. 
In sum, the brief presentation of Rawls’ argument on the stability of domestic 
egalitarianism shows the enormous complexity of the task ahead. Since nearly all areas 
of social life are important in relation to the stability of a just system, the choice of 
explanatory theories is extremely difficult – one might even question whether anything 
like the most relevant explanatory theory can be identified. It will be interesting to 
consider how Nagel (1991) engages with Rawls’ empirical arguments about the stability 
of justice as fairness and whether he challenges or defends the realisability of justice as 
fairness. 
Nagel on the feasibility of domestic egalitarian justice 
In Equality and Partiality (1991), Nagel not only deals with how the impartial and 
personal standpoint can be combined, but also whether different combinations are 
motivationally feasible. In opposition to Rawls’ focus on the stability criterion, Nagel is 
mostly concerned with the realisability of domestic egalitarianism; starting with the 
status quo, he seeks to ascertain which attitudinal changes would have to take place for 
individuals to affirm egalitarian institutions and whether it is possible to do so.149 
As a background requirement for a change towards an egalitarian society, individuals 
would have to abandon the idea “that there is a morally fundamental distinction, in 
                                                 
149 Regarding the distribution of economic advantages, for example, most beneficiaries 
currently occupy an anti-egalitarian position, feeling “on the whole entitled to count themselves 
fortunate in the natural abilities and social and educational opportunities which, suitably 
employed, have resulted in competitive advantage, and consequent rewards. Others are less 
lucky, but that’s life” (Nagel 1991: 97). 
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regard to the socioeconomic framework which controls people’s life prospects, between 
what the state does and what it merely allows” (Nagel 1991: 99). People would have to 
accept that they are, via the agent of the state, responsible for the outcome of 
institutional rules; the idea that certain aspects of social life are ‘natural’ and do not need 
to be justified had to be abandoned. 
This being the case, Nagel discusses three major obstacles to egalitarian justice: 
discrimination, class, and talent.150 He begins with intentional discrimination according 
to race, gender, etc., which stands in opposition to the negative equality of opportunity. 
Given the historical and recent successes in the fight against discrimination (e.g. the 
improved standing of women and minorities in some parts of the world), Nagel (ibid: 
110) maintains that discrimination is one of the causes of economic inequality that is 
most likely to be overcome.  
Second, class summarises the hereditary and economic advantages related to 
qualifications and possessions standing in the way of egalitarian justice. With regard to 
the interest of parents to pass on special qualifications to their children, Nagel claims 
that “[t]here is no possibility of abolishing this interest” (ibid: 109) as long as social life is 
basically familial. Alternatively, measures related to positive equality of opportunity can 
only lead to a partial limitation of the effects of class. Regarding the inheritance of 
possessions, Nagel is more optimistic, maintaining that “[i]t would not be unrealistic to 
hope for a change in attitude toward the inheritance of wealth, so that the privilege of 
endowing one’s children with independent means was no longer regarded as the kind of 
expression of family feeling with which the state should not interfere” (ibid: 112). He 
adds that “[i]t might even be possible to design a system of estate and gift taxes without 
the loopholes that usually plague such efforts” (ibid). 
Nagel’s concluding point is talent, which refers to the current practice of rewarding 
morally arbitrary skills. To begin with, Nagel supports Rawls’ justification of the 
difference principle, holding that economic incentives should be used to maximise the 
well-being of the worst off. To argue against the difference principle, one would have to 
imagine a system “in which the aims of economic life would be largely unchanged but 
the incentives leading to the most effective achievement of those aims were not 
economic” (Nagel 1991: 94). But Nagel is sceptical whether or not a ‘purely psychic 
                                                 
150 The distinction between discrimination, class and talent has been introduced by Rawls 
(1999a: 73-78) 
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income’ could fulfil this role, as he concludes that such an “ideal social order is beyond 
my imagination, at any rate” (ibid: 95). Unfortunately, Nagel does not offer a clear 
evaluation whether it is possible that the difference principle will be adopted in the first 
place. This fact is surprising since Nagel shows a strong interest in the justification of 
the difference principle and the degree of equality that may be reached should the latter 
be institutionalised.151 
Bearing in mind that the feasibility of the difference principle is not evaluated, we can 
now turn to Nagel’s general conclusion in which he infers that the “prospects of limiting 
social inequality to the goods for which their possessors are responsible seem remote” 
(ibid: 119). Moreover, he maintains that the existence of a strongly egalitarian society is 
“difficult to imagine” (ibid: 128). 
How should we evaluate Nagel’s position on the feasibility of egalitarian justice? Let 
me make four remarks. (i) The most striking feature is that, apart from agreeing with 
Rawls about the justification of the difference principle, Nagel hardly engages with the 
stability arguments offered by Rawls or other philosophers. This fact is only partly due 
to Nagel’s focus on the realisability of domestic egalitarian justice, since Nagel also 
considers the socialising effects of institutions. As a consequence, we cannot really 
speak of a debate that takes place regarding the feasibility of domestic egalitarian justice. 
(ii) Nagel does not draw on specific empirical theories to justify his predictive 
arguments, nor does he make any controversial empirical assumptions about things such 
as the psychological nature of moral motivation that might be refuted by empirical 
research results. The argument is based instead on a general understanding of human 
motivation and the functioning of institutional rules. It is, therefore, difficult to criticise 
Nagel’s argument in light of specific empirical research results.152 Considering the three 
conditions for predictive arguments, Nagel’s general explanations are broadly in line 
with empirical explanations of moral behaviour. In addition, Nagel is eager to offer a 
range of predictive arguments justifying his feasibility evaluations (see the earlier 
                                                 
151 In this case, for a change towards a more egalitarian society, individuals would have to 
want more goods for themselves as a necessary incentive for productivity. On the other hand, 
they would have to feel uneasy about wanting more, leading them to partly reject incentives 
leading to inequalities. 
152 A positive feature of Nagel’s feasibility analysis is that the arguments offered are close to 
scientific language, understandable even for those who are not fully acquainted with the endless 
range of philosophical definitions. In opposition, I find Rawls’ argument about the stability of 
justice as fairness far less accessible; this may explain why it receives restricted attention in 
philosophical literature. 
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discussion of discrimination, class and talent in this Chapter). 
(iii) One of the most interesting points relates to the form of feasibility evaluations. 
In fact, the statements that the prospects of a strongly egalitarian society ‘seem remote’, 
or that the existence of a strongly egalitarian society is ‘difficult to imagine’ do not 
represent dichotomous evaluations.153 Moreover, it remains unclear whether these 
statements support or reject the feasibility of the difference principle. Instead of 
offering a dichotomous feasibility evaluation and an additional statement about the 
accompanying degree of uncertainty, a vague mixture of both kinds of information is 
offered. In Section 7.7, the effects and potential causes of unclear evaluations will be 
reconsidered. (iv) A possible consequence of the unclear form of feasibility evaluations 
is Nagel’s reluctance to discuss the effects of his evaluations. It is unclear whether, and 
if so to what extent, theories of domestic egalitarian justice should be considered to be 
defective in light of Nagel’s feasibility evaluations. While Nagel (1991: 24) mentions the 
‘dangers of utopianism’ at an early stage in his work, he does not refer back to this issue 
once the evaluation has been accomplished. Hence, no systematic analysis of the costs 
of false feasibility evaluations about egalitarian domestic justice is given. 
6.3 Conclusion 
It has been the primary aim of this Chapter to define the feasibility criterion. 
Although the feasibility criterion is widely endorsed, the preceding discussion has shown 
that no standard definition exists and that the theoretical literature on the feasibility 
criterion is scarce. The discussion has led to the following definition of the research 
question: Are the chances that the social ideal recommended by a moral theory will be brought about – 
by legitimate means and within the time frame T – unequal to zero?  
The underlying parameters are defined as follows. First, the feasibility standard 
requires that it is possible to realise the moral ideal – that the chances of the moral ideal 
being brought about are unequal to zero. The form of feasibility evaluation should be 
dichotomous. Second, a moral ideal counts as realised if broad compliance takes place 
(agency); no requirements regarding the motive of compliance are made. Third, a 
                                                 
153 Similarly, the claim that ‘it might even be possible’ (Nagel 1991: 112) to design a system of 
estate and gift taxes without loopholes is only tentative; the information whether we should 
consider it to be possible is not given. 
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moderate legitimacy constraint is endorsed. Fourth, the time frame is somewhere 
between five hundred and a thousand years. Furthermore, it is controversial how the 
weight of the feasibility criterion should be defined; the weight will be reconsidered 
Section 7.7 after having successfully dealt with the conditional feasibility evaluation of 
global egalitarian justice. 
The next key aim has been to analyse the debate about the feasibility of domestic 
egalitarian justice. Given the complexity of this question, the principal purpose was not 
to reach a conclusive answer but to analyse the kind of empirical arguments offered by 
philosophers and the application of the feasibility framework. (i) Considering the 
empirical arguments advanced by Rawls and Nagel, the debate shows the difficulty of 
justifying feasibility evaluations in light of empirical theories and research results. The 
first problem is that the feasibility analysis of egalitarian justice is so complex that it is 
unclear which kind of empirical theories should be consulted; almost any psychological 
or social theory can be adduced in favour of one argument or the other. Rawls, for 
example, draws on Kohlberg’s theory of moral development as well as on empathy-
based theories, arguing that individuals may be motivated both by rational motivation 
and sentiment to affirm and comply with the principles of justice. Consequently, Rawls’ 
justification cannot be refuted for relying on a simplistic account of motivation. 
Since considerations of complexity rule out the possibility to combine a large number 
of specific theories, the most promising solution is to combine the general insights of a 
variety of social disciplines. Feasibility evaluations are, therefore, rather informed by 
‘armchair’ social sciences (Flanagan 1991: 16), relying on a broad and general 
understanding of human behaviour, rather than by using the latest empirical insights of 
specific explanatory theories. Both Rawls and Nagel justify their feasibility this way. 
However, the generality of reasoning also has the consequence that feasibility debates 
are vague and potentially unlimited: the less specific the arguments are, the more 
difficult it is to speak of a concrete debate between specific authors. It is noteworthy 
that Nagel does not directly challenge or defend any of the empirical arguments 
advanced by Rawls, nor does Nagel directly engage with the feasibility evaluation 
advanced by other contemporary philosophers. 
The complexity of the debate and the generality of the arguments also signify that 
evaluations about the feasibility of domestic egalitarianism are subjective (cf. Knight’s 
distinction between statistical or ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ predictions outlined in 
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Section 4.1). No empirical models can be advanced to justify a positive or negative 
feasibility evaluation; the extent to which empirical research results can inform feasibility 
evaluation is limited. While an individual can be highly certain about a subjective 
evaluation, the problem is that the subjectivity of evaluations is unlikely to convince 
other philosophers about the adequacy of an evaluation. This problem finds its 
expression in Räikkä’s (1998: 27) claim that there is ‘little agreement’ about the feasibility 
of domestic egalitarianism. 
(ii) Considering the application of the feasibility criterion, the most important result 
has been that Nagel shies away from offering dichotomous feasibility evaluations; the 
claim that the chances of bringing about an egalitarian society ‘seem remote’ is an 
example (1991: 119). This vagueness of Nagel’s evaluations can be explained by the fact 
that Nagel is uncertain about the correct answer. The problem with vague evaluations is, 
however, that individuals do not know to what extent the moral theory in question 
should be considered defective. 
Given the subjectivity and uncertainty of feasibility evaluations, as well as the lack of 
agreement amongst philosophers, it can be said that an ‘application problem’ exists in 
regard to the application of the feasibility criterion to the case of domestic egalitarian 
justice. The application problem raises several questions: Should a burden of proof be 
introduced to limit the negative effects of false evaluations given that evaluations are 
highly uncertain? Should the high degree of uncertainty affect the weight of the 
feasibility criterion? How should we deal with evaluations that do not clearly state 
whether a moral ideal is feasible or not? Chapter 7 will consider whether a similar 
application problem exists regarding the conditional feasibility of global egalitarianism. 
Section 7.7 and Chapter 8 offer a general discussion of the application problem and 
potential consequences for the definition and application of the feasibility criterion. 
Given the inconclusiveness of the feasibility debate about domestic egalitarian justice, 
the following Chapter will proceed with a conditional evaluation of the global egalitarian 
justice. Assuming that domestic egalitarian justice is feasible, the question is whether the 
difference of scope between the domestic a global realm justifies different feasibility 
evaluations. It remains to be seen whether the empirical arguments regarding this 
question lead to a clearer answer than in the case of domestic egalitarian justice. 
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Chapter 7: The Conditional Feasibility of Global Egalitarian 
Justice 
This Chapter offers a conditional feasibility evaluation of Pogge’s theory of global 
egalitarian justice. The evaluation is conditional since it is unclear whether Rawls’ theory 
of domestic egalitarian should be considered feasible. Based on the definition of the 
feasibility criterion developed in the preceding Chapter, the conditional feasibility 
question takes the following form: Should Pogge’s theory of global egalitarian justice 
also be considered feasible, assuming that egalitarian justice is feasible at the domestic 
level?154 
While the debate about the feasibility of domestic principles of justice has focused on 
the depths of justice, the debate about global egalitarian justice focuses on the scope of 
justice. Is it possible that, in the centuries to come, people will adopt global instead of 
national identities? Can people develop the degree of solidarity and trust necessary for 
the implementation of global egalitarian principles? Could global institutions effectively 
coordinate the behaviour of political sub-units and enforce compliance? As seen in 
previous Chapters, surprisingly few philosophers engage in debates about the feasibility 
of principles of distributive global justice or egalitarian global justice. The advantage to 
this is that this Chapter can evaluate most of the empirical arguments advanced. It 
remains to be seen whether this is sufficient to provide a conclusive answer or whether 
feasibility evaluations should be seen as being largely influenced by each philosopher’s 
sense of possibility. 
This Chapter begins with a brief analysis of the kind of institutions required to 
implement principles of global egalitarian justice (Section 7.1). Thereafter Section 7.2 
outlines Miller’s (1995; 1999a) view of the relation between a shared nationality and the 
feasibility of principles of global distributive justice.155 Next, Section 7.3 compares the 
empirical arguments advanced by Nagel (1991) against the feasibility of global egalitarian 
                                                 
154 If the context is clear, ‘feasible’ will be used as an abbreviation for ‘conditionally feasible’ 
in this Chapter. For the rationale of the conditional feasibility evaluation see Section 1.2. 
155 Principles of distributive justice are less demanding than principles of egalitarian justice. 
Therefore, a feasibility argument against principles of global distributive justice as advanced by 
Miller implies the rejection of principles of global egalitarian justice. Alternatively, a feasibility 
defence of the principle of global distributive justice as offered by Caney in Section 7.4 is only 
the first step towards a defence of principles of global egalitarian justice. 
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justice. Having outlined Miller’s and Nagel’s feasibility challenges, Section 7.4 turns to 
Caney’s (2005) defence of global distributive justice. While Section 7.5 outlines Beck’s 
(2006) ‘cosmopolitan outlook’ as a basis for the evaluation of the empirical arguments 
advanced by Miller and Nagel, Section 7.6 examines an analysis of the long-term trends 
of globalisation which may inform feasibility analyses. Combining the insights of this 
Chapter, Section 7.7 offers a conditional feasibility evaluation of Pogge’s theory global 
egalitarian justice. Additionally, the subjectivity and uncertainty of feasibility evaluations 
as well as the assignment of a burden of proof will be analysed. 
7.1 Global institutions and principles of global egalitarian justice 
Which kind of global institutions are required for the implantation of principles of 
global egalitarian justice? I will firstly consider Caney’s (2005) analysis about the global 
institutions required to implement principles global distributive justice. Since principles 
of global egalitarian justice are more demanding, an even higher degree of political 
integration is likely to be required in this case. 
Adopting an instrumental approach to the design of global institutions, Caney (2005: 
159) argues that those institutions best furthering cosmopolitan ideals should be 
endorsed. In addition to ensuring compliance and to solving collective action problems, 
Caney maintains that global institutions have to fulfil the following three tasks: “the 
protection of civil and political human rights and the pursuit of cosmopolitan 
distributive principles”; “the ability of people to affirm their cultural and national 
commitments”; and “the ability of people to hold accountable the institutions and 
agents that affect the exercise of their rights” (ibid: 159, 182).156 Caney concludes that 
these functions can best be met by a “system of multi-level governance in which power 
is removed from states to both supra-state and sub-state political authorities” (ibid: 182). 
Now the question is whether such a system of ‘multi-level governance’ is equally 
adequate if the depths of justice change from distributive to egalitarian justice. The 
answer is presumably negative. This becomes evident by comparing Rawls’ (1999a) 
principles of domestic egalitarian justice and Pogge’s (1989) principles of global 
                                                 
156 Caney’s position draws on Held’s (1995) proposal for cosmopolitan institutional reforms, 
comprising of demands for a ‘cosmopolitan democratic law’, for a ‘Global Parliament’ and for a 
permanent shift of ‘coercive capability’ from states to regional and global institutions. In 
opposition to Caney, however, Held does not argue for principles of global distributive justice. 
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egalitarian justice. The domestic and global versions of the first principle differ insofar 
as the list of basic rights may be revised in light of cultural differences – at least in the 
case of some less important basic rights. Regarding the second principle, the basic idea 
of maximising the well being of the worst off remains largely unchanged (cf. Section 
1.2). In light of these minor differences, it seems reasonable to argue that globalised 
principles of justice require global institutions similar to those of the nation-state.157 
Although many political tasks may be assigned to political sub-units, a global federal 
state should thus be regarded as a requirement for the implementation of principles 
global egalitarian justice. 
But is a global federal state feasible? Surprisingly, Miller’s (1995; 1999a) and Nagel’s 
(1991) objections to the feasibility of global egalitarian justice barely touch on this issue 
but focus instead on the psychological question of whether individuals could be 
motivated to support principles of global egalitarian justice. International relations 
literature, by contrast, allows realists like Waltz (1979) to question the possibility of 
sustained global cooperation. Realists argue that in the absence of a world-government 
(which is considered to be impossible), states cannot pursue moral interests since such 
behaviour would lead to a relative loss of power and, ultimately, the risk of being 
conquered or destroyed by other states. The assumption that states only pursue self-
interested aims is, however, widely rejected by empirical research findings.158 Moreover, 
the growth of international institutions undermines the assumption that states primarily 
focus on gains of relative power. Thus, the realist objection that international 
cooperation motivated by moral reasons is impossible is unconvincing.159 
                                                 
157 Rawls defines an institution “as a public system of rules which define offices and 
positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the like. These rules specify 
certain forms of action as permissible, others as forbidden. As examples of institutions, or more 
generally social practices, we may think of games and rituals, trials and parliaments, markets and 
systems of property” (1999a: 47-48). 
158 One criticism of theories that view states as rational, unitary actors comes from liberal 
scholars who stress the role of domestic politics in shaping the international behaviour of 
governments that pursue objectives such as their re-election and popularity. Another criticism is 
raised by constructivists who argue that interests are socially constructed, rather than being 
dictated by material circumstances, and that social norms also shape behaviour. See Goldstein 
and Keohane (1993) and Wendt (1999). In addition, the fact that certain states pay development 
aid also refutes the realist assumptions that states will only act for self-interested reasons (Caney 
2005: 137). 
159 Pogge also rejects the realist objection, claiming that we should “leave behind the silly all-
or-nothing debates” which only consider the options of international anarchy and a Hobbesian 
world government with absolute power (1989: 217). The task is to depart from the present 
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Nonetheless, it remains to be discussed whether a federal world state could 
effectively coordinate the interests of humanity at large and whether global enforcement 
mechanisms could function properly. It is important to note, though, that neither Miller 
(1995; 1999a) nor Nagel (1991) fundamentally question the administrative functioning 
of a world state. As the following two sections will show, Miller and Nagel focus on the 
motivational requirements of principles of distributive and egalitarian global justice. 
7.2 Miller on the role of a shared nationality 
Miller’s (1995; 1999a) objections to the feasibility of principles of global distributive 
justice focus on the argument that a shared nationality is a requirement for the feasibility 
of distributive justice. To begin with, the form of Miller’s feasibility objection will be 
outlined, paying special interest to Miller’s definition of the time frame. Subsequently, 
Miller’s empirical account of the relation between universalistic principles, kinds of 
moral motivation and self-interest will be evaluated. 
The nationality argument 
Before turning to the role of a shared nationality, this concept has to be defined. To 
begin with, Miller argues that beliefs and not objective characteristics are of fundamental 
importance; nations should be regarded to exist “when their members recognize one 
another as compatriots, and believe that they share characteristics of the relevant kind” 
(1995: 22). Moreover, the national culture must be extended in history, active in culture, 
connected to a particular territory and possess a common public culture (ibid: 23-26). 
While Miller accepts the view that nations are ‘artificial inventions’, mainly created for 
political purposes, he argues that this should not be seen as a fatally damaging feature 
with regard to the normative significance of a shared nationality (ibid: 35). In fact, “it 
may not be rational to discard beliefs, even if they are, strictly speaking, false, when they 
                                                                                                                                          
 
‘modus vivendi’ where cooperation is largely based on prudential considerations and to “seek 
institutions that are based not upon free bargaining informed by the changeable distribution of 
power but upon some values that are genuinely shared” (Pogge 1989: 219, 227). Such shared 
values may lead to the establishment of “institutional fixed points that stand above ordinary 
negotiation and bargaining” (Pogge 1989: 228). Subsequently, the transition to a value-based 
order may, through the experience of mutual trust and cooperation, broaden the set of 
genuinely shared values. 
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can be shown to contribute significantly to the support of valuable social relations” (ibid: 
36).160 
Turning to the relation between a shared nationality and feasibility of principles of 
distributive justice, Miller argues that national communities satisfy the three 
requirements “that make the application of principle of justice feasible and fruitful” 
(1999a: 18). First, “national identities tend to create strong bonds of solidarity among 
those who share them, bonds that are strong enough to override individual differences 
of religion, ethnicity and so forth” (ibid: 18). The national community also becomes the 
natural reference group for people’s considerations about justice; people evaluate how 
they fare or are treated with respect to other members of this group. Furthermore, “the 
integrating power of national identity is sufficiently great to make the national 
community our primary universe of distribution” (ibid). People can support the idea that 
justice applies to the national community and feel a sufficiently strong sense of solidarity 
to comply with resulting obligations. 
Second, shared understandings form an “essential background” about “the basis on 
which people can make just claims to resources and about the value of the resources to 
be distributed” (ibid: 18, 18-19). Shared understandings are thus a requirement for 
meaningful debates about the content of principles of justice. Third, “trust backed up by 
compulsion” is a necessary condition for justice, a people must know that others will 
equally be willing to comply or be penalized if they are not (ibid: 19). Since a shared 
nationality can fulfil these three requirements, Miller concludes that the application of 
principle of justice within the nation-state is feasible. 
Regarding the global level, by contrast, Miller maintains that 
[t]he absence of these three features at world level means that global justice cannot 
be understood on the model of social justice, at least not in the foreseeable future. 
Here and now we must continue to think of social justice as applying within 
national political communities, and understand global justice differently. 
ibid 
Interpreting this statement, a distinction needs to be made according to the time 
frame. With regards to the middle-term ‘foreseeable future’, principles of global 
distributive justice are held to be unfeasible. Regarding the long-term Miller’s position is 
ambiguous. At one point, he maintains that it is “very difficult to imagine” that people’s 
                                                 
160 For a classic defence of the view that nations are ‘imagined communities’, see Anderson 
(1983). 
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sense of justice will be forcefully engaged with respect to unities larger than the nation-
state.161 At another place, Miller states that he does “not wish to claim either that 
national identities are a perennial feature of human life or that the functions they 
perform could never in any circumstances be served by other means” (1995: 184). This 
acknowledges the possibility that either a national identity will be replaced by a global 
identity, or that the three requirements for distributive justice could be satisfied in 
different ways.  
How should we deal with Miller’s conflicting views about the long-term feasibility of 
global distributive justice? While the phrase ‘very hard to imagine’ is rather vague, the 
second statement clearly acknowledges the feasibility of principles of global distributive 
justice. Moreover, Miller explicitly states that his focus lies on the ‘here and now’ but 
hardly discusses whether the role of nationality is likely to change in the long-term. In 
light of these considerations, it is reasonable to adopt the view that Miller’s arguments 
primarily refer to the foreseeable future and must therefore be distinguished from 
feasibility evaluations of the ultimate ideal of global distributive or egalitarian global 
justice. 
This view is also endorsed by Laegaard, who maintains that Miller’s nationalist 
argument has to be understood as a “realist argument” which “acknowledges the reliance 
on a contingent fact about motivation, and only makes a claim about what should be 
done given this fact” (2006: 413). He adds that Miller must be clear about the status he 
assigns to the motivational argument: “Considered as realist, the liberal nationalist 
argument must regard nationally limited solidarity as an unfortunate non-ideal condition 
to be transcended if possible, other things being equal, at least unless the restriction of 
scope to co-nationals is part of the ideal itself” (Laegaard 2006: 414). Should the scope 
restriction be part of the ideal itself, by contrast, “the instrumental [feasibility] argument 
is redundant in the first place”, since the ideal itself already restricts demands to co-
nationals to a large extent, except for principles of basic global justice (ibid: 414). In this 
                                                 
161 Since the exact meaning and importance of this claim is difficult to understand, the 
following passage offers the context in which the statement is made: “My claim is not that 
justice formally requires this particular scope restriction, but that the principles we use are always, 
as a matter of psychological fact, applied within bounded communities, and that the integrating 
power of national identify is sufficiently great to make the national community our primary 
universe of distribution. Sometimes our sense of justice may be more forcefully engaged by 
distribution in smaller units such as workplaces, but it is very hard to imagine this happening in 
units larger than nation-states.” (Miller 1999a: 18). 
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case, the motivational argument endangers Miller’s commitment to the ideal of the 
moral significance of nationality. 
Taking stock, the first finding of this section is that Miller’s nationality argument 
relates to the middle-term and does not, therefore, represent a feasibility evaluation of 
the ultimate ideal of global distributive justice. However, as it will be shown in Section 
7.4, this fact is often over-looked. Although Miller’ feasibility evaluation refers to the 
middle-term, it should still be asked whether the nationality argument is also convincing 
regarding the long-term. While Nagel (1991) tends to this view, Caney (2005) and Beck 
(2006) offer more critical evaluations (see Sections 7.3, 7.4, 7.5). 
Universalistic principles, kinds of motivation and self-interest 
Over the remainder of this section, two specific empirical arguments advanced by 
Miller challenging the motivational foundations of universalistic principles are evaluated 
from an empirical perspective. The first argument refers to the relationship between the 
content of moral principles and the kind of moral motivation required for compliance. 
Miller holds that universalism rests upon an “implausible account of ethical motivation” 
since individuals are “supposed to act simply out of a rational conviction” (1995: 57). 
The problem is that 
it seems unlikely that rational conviction can carry the weight required of it, except 
perhaps in the case of a small number of heroic individuals who are genuinely able 
to govern their lives by considerations of pure principle. For the mass of mankind, 
ethical life must be a social institution whose principles must accommodate natural 
sentiments towards relatives, colleagues, and so forth, and which must rely on a 
complex set of motives to get people to comply with its requirements – motives 
such as love, pride, and shame as well as purely rational conviction. 
ibid: 57-58 
This argument is problematic in two ways. To begin with, Miller’s claim that 
compliance with universalistic principles requires rational motivation is empirically 
untenable. The study of ‘heroic individuals’ (Chapter 5) has shown that most moral 
heroes are not abstract moral reasoners motivated by rational conviction; instead, they 
often act out of sympathy, love or a general respect for humanity – without being 
particularly reflective about their reasons (Oliner and Oliner 1988; Colby and Damon 
1992; Zimbardo 2007). Miller’s argument is thus based on an empirically unconvincing 
link between the content of moral principles and the kind of motivation required for 
compliance. 
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The second aspect is that Miller’s claim that domestic institutions can accommodate 
people’s ‘natural sentiments’ is biased. As Singer puts it, 
to assist our compatriots, simply because they are our compatriots, is already 
beyond the motivation of most human beings. Especially where there is ethnic 
diversity, or great disparity of wealth, it is hard to believe that the bond between 
compatriots is based on any kind of natural love and affection that makes it 
different in kind from that between members of different countries. If the 
motivational claim defeats arguments for an obligation to assist strangers in other 
countries, then, it also defeats arguments for an obligation to assist anyone other 
than one’s family, friends and some other relatives. 
2004: 27 
In sum, the simplistic view that universalistic principles require rational motivation 
while principles of domestic justice largely rely on empathetic motivation is empirically 
inadequate. It should be replaced by a nuanced picture based on something other than a 
strict relationship between moral principles and kinds of motivation. 
The second empirical argument advanced by Miller refers to relations between kinds 
of moral principles and self-interest. Miller maintains that 
to the extent that I really do identify with the group or community in question, 
there need be no sharp conflict between fulfilling my obligations and pursuing my 
own goals and purposes. The group’s interests are among the goals that I set 
myself to advance; they may of course conflict with other goals that are equally 
important to me, but we are far away from the position where an individual with 
essentially private aims and purposes has to balance these against the obligations of 
a universalist morality such as utilitarianism. In that position there would almost 
always be a simple trade-off: the more a person does what morality requires of 
him, the less scope he has to pursue his personal goals. 
1995: 66 
The problem with this statement is that compliance with a universalistic morality 
does not require sacrifices; as Colby and Damon’s (1992) research has shown, universal 
moral goals and personal goals may overlap in the same way as parochial and personal 
goals (cf. Chapter 5). In the same way, there is no reason to think that a Western 
political activist dedicating her life to the fight for trade justice will necessarily sacrifice 
her personal goals. Consequently, the claim that ‘there would always be a simple trade-
off’ is unjustified.162 In sum, Miller’s empirical argument about the relation between 
                                                 
162 Furthermore, while it is true that compliance with universalistic principles would presently 
lead to sacrifices of wellbeing for most individuals, this may change in the future. Given various 
trends related to globalisation, it is possible that an increasing number of individuals will adopt a 
global identity over the upcoming centuries. Such long-term developments are not, however, 
discussed by Miller. 
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universalistic moral principles, kinds of moral motivation and self-interest is empirically 
flawed. Accordingly, the first condition for predictive arguments outlined in Section 4.3 
is not satisfied by the two arguments considered. 
At this point, the findings of this section can be summarised. First, the nationality 
argument represents a serious challenge to the feasibility of principles of global 
distributive justice. To reject this claim, it must be argued that other forms of social 
cohesion can also fulfil the conditions for distributive justice as outlined by Miller or 
that national identities could be replaced by global identities. As it will be shown in 
Section 7.4, Caney (2005) endorses this line of argument. Second, since Miller’s 
argument relates to the middle-term, it should not be seen as negative feasibility 
evaluation about the ultimate ideal of global distributive justice. Third, Miller’s empirical 
arguments that universalist principles require rational motivation and that compliance 
will almost always lead to sacrifices of personal goals have been rejected in light of 
empirical research results. 
7.3 Nagel on the feasibility of global egalitarian justice 
In comparison to Miller, Nagel (1991) considers national identities to be a decisive 
obstacle to global egalitarianism. The crucial difference is, however, that Nagel’s 
negative evaluation about the feasibility of global egalitarianism relates to the long-term. 
This section examines Nagel’s version of the nationality argument and three further 
objections to global egalitarianism: the cultural diversity argument, the claim that 
solidarity is exclusive and the economic gap argument. The focus lies on Nagel’s 
definition of the long-term, the correctness of the underlying empirical assumptions, the 
legitimacy constraint and the form and weight of feasibility evaluations. 
First, considering the importance of national identities, Nagel maintains that most 
individuals fundamentally identify themselves with national groups and that “an 
essential part of their self-expression as individuals will be thwarted if they cannot take 
place in the political self-definition and development of the group in which their identity 
is rooted” (Nagel 1991: 177). Apart from questioning the desirability of a world 
government, this consideration leads Nagel to be pessimistic “about the capacity of 
human beings to place an impartial regard for humanity ahead of their more particular 
ethnic identities as a principle of political motivation” (ibid). Here, the importance of 
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national concerns is another instance of the personal perspective that “is not going to 
disappear” (ibid: 176). Accordingly, Nagel’s version of the nationality argument 
represents a long-term challenge to the feasibility of global egalitarian justice. 
While Nagel’s nationality objection has the right structure to challenge the feasibility 
of principles of global egalitarian justice, the problem is that few arguments are given as 
to why the option that the role of national identities will significantly decrease should be 
ruled out. Nagel’s argument rather relies on a description of the status quo instead of 
considering the form and scope of historical changes and the potential of future 
changes. We are thus confronted with a lack of positive arguments justifying the 
nationality objection; the third condition of predictive arguments is therefore scarcely 
fulfilled. As a consequence, the argument that the importance of national identities is 
not going to disappear must be regarded as a largely subjective evaluation. 
The solidarity argument, which is closely connected to the nationality argument, is 
the second objection to the feasibility of global egalitarianism. It holds that the ‘sinister 
side’ of solidarity is that it is ‘essentially exclusive’:  
Solidarity with a particular group means lack of identification with, and less 
sympathy for, those who are not members of that group, and often it means active 
hostility to outsiders; but to some extent this is inevitable, and it is such a powerful 
source of political allegiance to institutions which deal equitably with members of 
the group that it must be relied on.  
ibid: 178 
I find the solidarity argument to be problematic. Individuals can show different 
degrees of solidarity to their families and social groups while still feeling enough 
solidarity towards domestic institutions to comply with obligations of justice. Why 
should the same distribution of solidarity be impossible at the global level? Individuals 
may, for example, show more solidarity for their national football teams but still feel 
enough solidarity with humanity at large to comply with obligations of global justice. 
Overall, it is legitimate to point to the fact that solidarity is often strengthened through 
hostility to outsiders; but it is unclear why this factor should be regarded as an 
‘inevitable’ requirement for solidarity. This view is also endorsed by Beck, who 
maintains that claims like the solidarity argument relies on an unjustified “either/or 
logic” (2006: 4; see also Section 7.5). 
The cultural diversity argument is the third objection to the feasibility of global 
egalitarianism. It holds that the values of different cultural and national communities are 
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so diverse “that no conception of a legitimate political order can be constructed under 
which they could all live – a system of law backed by force that was in its basic structure 
acceptable to them all…[therefore] a legitimate government of the world is not 
possible” (Nagel 1991: 170). This statement seems to be a clear impossibility evaluation. 
But the amendment that “[s]o long as the world is divided as it is by now is, by religious 
and cultural xenophobia, the situation will not change” (ibid) renders the evaluation 
ambiguous. In fact, Nagel seems to work with various time frames: on the one hand, a 
legitimate government of the world is considered to be ‘not possible’; on the other 
hand, this may be possible if a longer time frame is endorsed. 
Moreover, the cultural diversity argument strongly relies on the legitimacy constraint 
as it only rules out the option that a ‘legitimate political order’ can be constructed. Note 
that Nagel uses the legitimacy constraint in a rather strict form, demanding that the 
political order is acceptable to all.163 Nagel concedes, for instance, that a situation where 
no legitimate order can be created “can also happen within the boundaries of a single 
state” (ibid: 170). Regarding the historical development of states, Nagel adds that “[t]he 
development of legitimacy within states has been a slow process, generally beginning 
from sovereign power exercised without much regard to legitimacy” (ibid: 175). The 
development of most nation-states, for example, should be considered as illegitimate. 
Nagel’s strict legitimacy constraint rules out various forms of development that have 
been dominant throughout history. In sum, the cogency of the cultural diversity 
argument strongly depends on the definition of the legitimacy constraint. If the 
definition is relaxed, the cultural diversity objection looses much of its force.164 
Nagel’s fourth and final objection is the economic gap argument. Considering the 
                                                 
163 For Nagel, the legitimacy question is whether ‘reasonable unanimity’ is possible. An 
answer requires each party to consider three distinct kind of reasons: “(a) egalitarian impartiality, 
(b) personal interests and commitments, and (c) consideration what can reasonably be asked of 
others” (ibid: 172). 
164 The question of legitimacy of global institutions is taken up in Nagel (2005). Considering 
various paths of development of global institutions, Nagel speculates that “[w]e are unlikely to 
see the spread of global justice in the long run unless we first create strong supranational 
institutions that do not aim at justice but that pursue common interests and reflect the 
inequalities of bargaining power among existing states” (2005: 146). The aim has to be the 
introduction of “effective but illegitimate institutions to which the standards of justice apply, 
standards by which we may hope they will eventually be transformed” (ibid: 147). Practically, it 
may then be necessary to foster the growth of global institutions, even if they are undemocratic 
and political biased. Recommending this path implies that the legitimacy constraint is less 
demanding as in the case of the cultural diversity argument. 
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economic differences between rich and poor countries, Nagel maintains that, 
“[i]nequality can be so extreme that it makes a legitimate solution unattainable, except 
possibly over a long period by gradual stages each of which lacks legitimacy, or 
(improbably) over a shorter period by a cataclysmic revolution which also lacks 
legitimacy” (1991: 170). The literature on economic growth, however, offers good 
reasons to reject this argument. Being part of neoclassical models of economic growth, 
theories of economic convergence argue that the productivity and output levels of 
countries will converge in the long run (Abramovitz 1986). The rationale is that poorer 
countries benefit from the technological advances of richer countries while having lower 
labour costs at the same time. The result is that poorer countries have relatively higher 
productivity increases, leading to a process of catching-up with rich countries. Empirical 
examples in favour of theories of economic convergence are the rapid development of 
the East Asian Tigers and the growth of countries like Germany and France after World 
War II.  
While it is unclear to what extent the theory of economic convergence is correct,165 it 
describes how paths of development can lead to economic convergence. Therefore, 
Nagel’s claim that it is impossible to legitimately bridge the economic gap between rich 
and poor countries is not convincing. As described above, it is possible that the forces 
of capitalist markets will, in a legitimate way, lead to economic convergence between 
poor and rich countries. 
Having considered the four objections advanced by Nagel, let me summarise the 
findings of this section. (i) The nationality and cultural diversity arguments represent 
serious long-term challenges to the feasibility of global egalitarian justice. It is 
problematic, however, that Nagel offers few arguments as to why the possibility that the 
importance of national identities will significantly decrease should be ruled out. 
Moreover, the cogency of the cultural diversity argument depends on the endorsement 
of a strict legitimacy constraint. (ii) The solidarity and the economic gap argument are 
                                                 
165 A first criticism of the theory of economic convergence relates to the neoclassical 
assumption that that technology is freely traded and that capital can freely flow from the richer 
to the poorer countries (Martin and Sunley 1998: 204). A second criticism, advanced by 
proponents of ‘endogenous growth theory’ is that endogenous factors like government policies and 
social capital are much more influential than exogenous factors like technological spillover or 
capital flows (ibid: 202). Up to this date, empirical analyses of theories of economic convergence 
have not led to clear results. It can be said, however, that countries like China and India (as well 
as most countries in Latin America) had higher growth rates over the past two decades than the 
traditional industrial countries (Sachs 2005: 29). 
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unconvincing. (iii) While Nagel’s feasibility evaluation refers to the long-term, the 
definition of this period remains unclear. Moreover, as in the case of domestic 
egalitarian justice, the form of Nagel’s feasibility evaluations is vague.166 Building on this 
critique, the next section explores Caney’s (2005) rejection of the nationality argument. 
7.4 Caney’s feasibility defence of global distributive justice 
This section deals with Caney’s (2005) empirical argument about the feasibility of 
global distributive justice. Considering Caney’s rejection of Miller’s nationalistic 
argument, the analysis subsequently turns to Caney’s positive defence of the feasibility 
of global distributive justice.  
Caney offers three objections to Miller’s nationalistic argument, referring to the role 
of civic identity, moral psychology and trust. First, Caney questions Miller’s contention 
that a shared nationality is a requirement for distributive justice, claiming that the 
existence of multinational states shows that “there are forms of social unity other than 
national identity” (2005: 132) on which systems of distributive justice may be based. For 
example, forms of ‘civic identity’, grounded on the idea of a common citizenship, may 
equally create the required conditions for distributive justice. Second, Caney criticises 
Miller’s “model of human motivation” for presupposing “an ahistorical and unchanging 
account of human nature, assuming that we are necessarily only willing to make 
sacrifices for fellow-nationals” (ibid: 133). He continues that 
such an account is too static and neglects the fact that people’s willingness to 
adhere to principles depends considerably on political institutions, the behaviour 
of others, and prevalent social norms. After all, in earlier periods in history the 
ideas that people would identify with and be willing to make sacrifices for a group 
of 58 million would have seem quite fantastic…[This argument thus] relies on an 
impoverished moral psychology, assuming that people are motivated solely by 
loyalties and attachments to members of their community. It thereby 
underestimates people’s ability to be motivated by their moral values.167 
ibid 
                                                 
166 Nagel’s conclusion that “the world is not a plausible candidate for a single state” (1991: 
174) is a further example. 
167 With respect to the size of historical changes, the following comparison can be made. In 
today’s world, India is a democratic country with over one billion inhabitants. To reach a world 
state, we only have to multiply the current size of India by a factor of 6 or 7. Alternatively, the 
size of an ancient city state, for example of 100,000 inhabitants, must be multiplied by a factor 
of 10,000 to reach the size of today’s India. This comparison shows that the step towards a 
federal world state is, from an historical perspective, relatively small.  
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Third and finally, Caney rejects Miller’s claim that the absence of trust renders 
distributive justice unfeasible at the global level. The assumption that people can only 
trust co-nationals is “to mistake a feature of the contemporary world as an unchanging 
feature of the world for all time”; Miller’s argument can thus be criticised for being 
“predicated on a static and unvarying concept of human nature” (Caney 2005: 175).168 
Combining these three objections, Caney concludes that, “the claim that schemes of 
distributive justice must be underpinned by a common sense of nationality is 
questionable” (ibid: 132). 
It should be stated, however, that Caney’s criticisms suffer from a serious 
methodological problem. Critically, Caney does not acknowledge that Miller’s feasibility 
evaluations relate to the middle-term and not to the long-term. Thus, when Caney 
criticises Miller’s account of human nature for being ‘unvarying’, ‘too static’ or for 
taking the importance of nationality as ‘an unchanging feature of the world for all time,’ 
he is partly missing the point. Miller only assumes that nationality is a requirement for 
distributive justice with regard to the foreseeable future – but, as outlined before, he 
does not wish to claim that ‘national identities are a perennial feature of human life’ 
(1999a: 184). 
The stringency of the debate between Caney and Miller is, therefore, reduced by the 
fact that the feasibility arguments of the two authors refer to different time frames. This 
misunderstanding can be partly attributed to Miller, whose definition of the time frame 
in which his work is applicable is unclear, and partly to Caney, who seems to have 
overlooked Miller’s focus on the foreseeable future. Overall, the consequences of this 
misunderstanding are that the debate between Miller and Caney does not yield a clear 
result, as the two authors are simply not arguing about the same empirical question. 
Leaving the question about the time frame aside, we can nonetheless evaluate 
whether Caney manages to offer a convincing feasibility defence of global distributive 
justice. It may be asked, for instance, whether Caney’s argument can be used to rebut 
Nagel’s (1991) version of the nationality argument, which relates to the long-term. In 
sum, Caney has argued that a civic identity can serve as a basis for distributive justice, 
that a dynamic picture of human motivation is more appropriate and that trust does not 
necessarily depend on a shared nationality. 
                                                 
168 A similar view is defended by Follesdal, who maintains that it is “unclear why Miller 
requires a ‘thick’ political culture in order to maintain trust in shared institutions” (2000: 509). 
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While these arguments certainly carry some weight, they are insufficiently developed 
to speak of an extensive feasibility defence. It is certainly true, for example, that civic 
identity plays an important role in the functioning of multi-national states. But this fact 
alone is insufficient to show that a global civic identity could function in the same way. 
First, one might argue that multi-national states may function when composed of 
nations or ethnic groups sharing important cultural traits, but it is also questionable 
whether this would also be true if the ethnic groups were highly different. Second, the 
claim that citizenship presently plays an important role in multi-national states does not 
imply that such unity would be possible in a global state. A development of the civic 
identity argument would have to respond to at least these two objections. 
In general, Caney mentions several avenues as to how the feasibility of distributive 
global justice can be defended. To offer a convincing feasibility defence, however, these 
arguments must be developed and complemented by further predictive arguments (e.g. 
about the dynamics of institutional change or the relevance of long-term trends). 
Moreover, an extensive feasibility defence would benefit from an analysis about the 
origins, functioning and perpetuality of nationality. Are there good reasons to believe 
that national identity can be replaced by a cosmopolitan identity within five hundred or 
a thousand years? Another issue is that classifying accounts of human nature as ‘too 
static’ or as adequately dynamic is only a subjective general evaluation as is not itself a 
predictive argument; reasons must be given what an adequate account of human nature 
should look like.169 
Finally, a different kind of charge has to be considered. Advancing an ad 
hominem argument, Caney questions the compatibility of Miller’s feasibility evaluations; 
the issue is whether Miller is justified to claim that global basic justice is feasible while 
global distributive justice is not.170 Caney maintains that Miller, if he wants to challenge 
                                                 
169 In this respect, I am doubtful whether the concept of ‘human nature’ is useful; it is highly 
difficult to summarise the likely/unlikely and possible/impossible forms of behaviour by a 
single concept. This view is also supported by Flanagan, who argues “that attention to the 
scientific literature undermines confidence that there is any such thing as a determinate human 
nature – any set of universal truths about persons which specify our proper function, purpose, 
and personality organization” (1991: 16). Alternatively, the question whether a certain moral 
principle is feasible is more precise, though in the case of global egalitarian justice, even this 
question is so broad that it can hardly be grasped. 
170 Miller (1999b: 197) defends three principles of basic global justice: the protection of basic 
rights, a principle of non-exploitation and the opportunity of autonomy for nation-states. The 
role of a principle of global basic justice is to provide universal conditions “forming a low-level 
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the feasibility of distributive justice, must “either abandon any international principle or 
he must explain why compliance with his three principles [of global basic justice] is 
possible whereas compliance with other cosmopolitan inspired programmes is not” 
(2005: 132). I find, however, that this ad hominem challenge has little force. Miller’s 
position may be defended in the same way as a less and a more demanding theory of 
domestic distributive justice may be evaluated as being feasible and unfeasible. Given 
the limited demands of Miller’s principles of global justice, it does not seem too difficult 
to argue that individuals may care about, for example, a global minimum standard but 
reject the view that any further obligations of global distributive justice exist.171 172 
In summary, Caney’s criticism of Miller’s position as being ‘too static’ has a certain 
appeal but is problematic in light of the different time frames endorsed by each theorist. 
Caney’s argument may, by contrast, be used to rebut Nagel’s version of the nationality 
argument referring to the long-term. To be convincing, however, Caney has to develop 
his empirical argument, outlining why the importance of a shared nationality may 
decrease and what an adequately ‘dynamic’ account of human nature should look like. 
7.5 Beck’s ‘cosmopolitan outlook’ 
In The Cosmopolitan Vision, Beck (2006) offers an analytical-empirical framework for 
the study of national and global identities at the beginning of the 21st century. This 
section begins by outlining Beck’s critique of the ‘national outlook’, which has 
dominated empirical research over the past few years, and presents an alternative 
‘cosmopolitan outlook’. Subsequently, the idea of a cosmopolitan outlook will be used 
to evaluate the empirical basis of the nationality argument and Nagel’s claim that 
solidarity is essentially exclusive. Finally, the extent to which Beck’s concept of the 
‘world risk society’ can inform long-term predictions about the development of the 
                                                                                                                                          
 
plateau on which fuller systems of social rights can be erected” (Miller 1999b: 198; see also 
Boswell 2005: 115-118 regarding Miller’s theory of basic rights).  
171 Rawls’ (1999b) Law of Peoples, for example, contains a feasibility defence of principles of 
basic global justice. 
172 An interesting aspect here is that Caney’s ad hominem argument attempts to shift the 
burden of proof to his opponent; this move is especially important in light of Caney’s own 
reluctance to offer an extensive argument for the feasibility of global distributive justice. Miller 
(1995: 80), by contrast, maintains that cosmopolitans have the burden of proof (cf. Section 4.2 
and 7.7). 
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international political sphere will be explored. 
Beck’s fundamental critique is that the ‘national outlook’ rests on the empirically and 
analytically flawed claim that “‘modern society’ and ‘modern politics’ can only be 
organized in the form of national states” (2006: 24). By endorsing a dichotomy between 
what is native and what is foreign, the national outlook preserves “the myth that 
defining and demarcating ourselves over against what is foreign is a precondition of 
identity, politics, society, community and democracy” (ibid: 5). Beck argues that this 
meta-theory of identity, resulting from the era of first modernity where states were 
regarded as territorial entities opposing each other, has become both empirically and 
analytically flawed (ibid: 26). 
The cosmopolitan outlook, in contrast, works with the fundamental premise that 
identities and political processes are pluralistic; the ‘both/and perspective’ views people 
as having local, national and global identities (ibid: 33). Moreover, Beck argues that 
nation-states are no longer seen as the invariant reference point of scientific research; 
whether nation-states become “fluid or fixed, denationalize, renationalize or 
transnationalize” are open question that must be analysed “within the framework of 
global interdependencies, risks and crises” (ibid). The cosmopolitan outlook thus offers 
an analytical-empirical framework for comprehending the social and political conditions 
of today’s world in which cosmopolitanism ceases to be merely a rational idea since “the 
human condition has itself become cosmopolitan” (ibid: 2). 
The cosmopolitan outlook is characterised by five interconnected constitutive 
principles: (i) ‘the experience of crisis in world society’; (ii) ‘recognition of cosmopolitan differences’; 
(iii) ‘cosmopolitan empathy and of perspective-taking’; (iv) ‘impossibility of living in a world society 
without borders’, and (v) ‘the mélange principle’ about mixed identities (ibid: 17). Overall, the 
meaning of the cosmopolitan outlook has to be understood in the following way: 
It does not herald the first rays of universal brotherly love among peoples, or the 
dawn of the world republic, or a free-floating global outlook, or compulsory 
xenophilia. Nor is cosmopolitanism a kind of supplement that is supposed to 
replace nationalism and provincialism, for the very good reason that the ideas of 
human rights and democracy need a national base. Rather, the cosmopolitan 
outlook means that, in a world of global crises and dangers produced by 
civilization, the old differentiations between internal and external, national and 
international, us and them, lose their validity and a new cosmopolitan realism 
becomes essential to survival. 
ibid: 13-14 
Since the cosmopolitan outlook does not presuppose or argue for a specific 
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institutional form, the future of nation-states and global governance structures are left 
open. In sum, Beck’s cosmopolitan outlook offers a nuanced picture that avoids 
simplifying dualisms and directly incorporates the changes brought about by 
globalisation; it may thus be used as a forward-looking empirical basis for predictions 
and feasibility evaluations. 
Taking the cosmopolitan outlook as a point of departure, we can now evaluate some 
of the empirical arguments advanced in the course of this Chapter. Regarding the 
formation of identities, Beck maintains that we should move from an ‘either/or’ logic to 
a ‘both/and’ logic of “inclusive differentiation” (ibid: 4-5). According to the ‘mélange 
principle’,173 individuals construct their identities “by dipping freely into the Lego set of 
globally available identities and building a progressively inclusive self-image” (ibid: 5). 
This view challenges Miller’s (1999a: 19) assumption that identities are, and will remain 
in the foreseeable future, largely national. It does not, however, take a stance on the 
question whether mixed identities are sufficient for the implementation of principles of 
global distributive justice. 
Next, the cosmopolitan outlook can be used to criticise Nagel’s (1991: 178) argument 
that solidarity is an ‘essentially exclusive’ phenomenon, which must be constructed in 
opposition to other groups. In fact, Beck rejects the premise of the national outlook that 
“a space defended by (mental) fences is an indispensable precondition for the formation 
of self-consciousness and social integration” (2006: 5). In addition, Beck’s theory can 
serve as a starting point for a further investigation of Caney’s (2005: 132) claim that 
forms of ‘civic identity’ may be sufficiently strong for individuals to support schemes of 
distributive justice. 
Finally, the relevance of Beck’s concept of the ‘world risk society’ should be explored 
with relevance to cosmopolitanism. Beck argues that civilisational progress has led to 
increased risk; one of the new social questions is thus how the distribution of ‘bads’, i.e. 
the effects of negative externalities and risks, should be organised. Since these 
civilisational threats are largely global in scope, the concept of a ‘world risk society’ 
should be used to describe the current situation (Beck 2006: 22).174 Considering the 
                                                 
173 The ‘mélange principle’ holds that “local, national, ethnic, religious and cosmopolitan 
cultures and traditions interpenetrate, interconnect and intermingle – cosmopolitanism without 
provincialism is empty, provincialism without cosmopolitanism is blind” (Beck 2006: 7). 
174 An effect of global risks is a strong ‘public perception of risk’, often staged by the mass 
media, which conflicts with the “compulsive pretence of control over the uncontrollable” in 
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future of the international political sphere, Beck maintains that the world risk society is 
likely to foster the emergence of a global normative consciousness, since “the question 
concerning the causes and agencies of global threats sparks new political conflicts, 
which in turn promote an institutional cosmopolitanism in struggle over definitions and 
jurisdictions” (ibid: 23). To solve global problems, coordination efforts may lead to a 
new form of global collective action analogous to national politics. 
In conclusion, Beck’s work can be used as a valuable basis that fosters an 
understanding of creation of identities, the deterriorisation of politics and the role of 
risks. It can also be partly used to criticise the empirical basis of the nationality and 
solidarity argument. Moreover, the focus on global risk opens a line of argument that is 
mostly neglected in the philosophical literature on global justice. But, given the focus on 
institutional reforms that appear politically feasible during the 21st century, Beck’s work 
cannot be directly used to evaluate the feasibility of global egalitarianism. So, the 
‘cosmopolitan vision’ is about how we should look at the world, what changes are 
happening and which of these changes might gain strength. 
7.6 Long-term trends of globalisation 
Having considered the empirical arguments offered in the philosophical literature 
and Beck’s cosmopolitan outlook, we can now explore to what extent an analysis of the 
long-term trends of globalisation can inform feasibility evaluations. The NIC Report 
(2008) Global Trends 2025 presented in Section 4.3 serves as an example for further 
analysis of these trends. The question there was whether, given the likely and possible 
developments in various areas, certain optimistic or pessimistic scenarios should be 
considered to be possible.175 Considering the long-term trends of globalisation176 in this 
section, we have to now ask how each trend is likely to affect the relative importance of 
                                                                                                                                          
 
politics, science or economics (Beck 2006: 22). 
175 The ‘Politics Is Not Always Local’ scenario has been an example for an optimistic 
scenario, depicting how environmental groups take part in a reformed General Assembly of the 
UN and how a global environment treaty is agreed upon (cf. Section 4.3). 
176 Globalisation can be broadly defined as involving “the dramatic increase in the density 
and depth of economic, ecological, and societal interdependence, with ‘density’ referring to the 
increased number, range, and scope of crossborder transactions; and ‘depth’ referring to the 
degree to which that interdependence affects, and is affected by, the ways in which societies are 
organized domestically” (Hurrell 2001: 33). 
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national and global identities. The more each trend is likely to increase the importance 
of global identities, the more likely it is that feasibility evaluations of global egalitarian 
justice will be positive. The following analysis focuses on five trends: economic 
integration, economic convergence and growth, international institutions, values and 
identities and, lastly, a global public.177 
 (i) Economic integration: Since the beginning of history, the economic interaction 
between the different parts of the world has increased (although sometimes 
discontinuously). Especially since the industrial revolution, improvements in transport, 
engineering, petrochemicals and information technology had a tremendously positive 
impact on the level of growth and global economic integration (Landes 1998). Germany, 
for example, exports about 50 percent of its manufactured products.178 In the decades 
and centuries to come, it is likely that global economic integration will be pursued; 
among the members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), tariffs are generally low 
or abolished (except in some politically relevant areas like agriculture). Alternatively, it is 
unlikely that protectionism will regain strength, especially since it has few advantages 
once a certain degree of industrialisation has been reached. Overall, economic 
integration is likely to support a global identity and decrease the importance of 
nationality.179 
(ii) Economic convergence and growth: It is likely (according to the neoclassical 
theory of economic convergence) or at least possible (if alternative explanations of 
growth are included) that the economic gap between rich and poor countries will 
strongly diminish within the centuries to come (Abramowitz 1986). The past growth 
rates of China, India and some Latin American countries already have reduced the 
economic differences between the industrial countries and large parts of the rest of the 
world (Africa excluded; Sachs 2005: 26-29). Since the reduction of economic differences 
lessens the economic burdens shouldered by richer countries, the adoption of global 
distributive schemes becomes more likely. 
Furthermore, given the constant economic growth throughout history and its 
                                                 
177 The time frame of the trends to be considered is the long-term. It then significantly 
differs from the usual discussions about the trends of globalisation referring to a much shorter 
time frame of, for example, the next 20, 50 or even 100 years. 
178 Beck observes that the “[c]onsumer society is the really existing world society” (2006: 40). 
179 Hurrell, however, makes the cautionary remark that economic integration “does not 
translate easily or automatically into a shared awareness of a common identity, a shared 
community or a shared ethos” (2001: 34). 
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acceleration during the past two hundred years (Landes 1998; Sachs 2005: 28), it is likely 
that global per capita output, and consequently the absolute living standards, will 
increase tremendously (e.g. by a factor of 5 or 10). An increase of absolute living 
standards is likely to reduce the importance of primary social goods, while increasing the 
importance of immaterial goods such as self-actualisation.180 The surge of post-material 
values over the past few decades is an indication of this. Continued economic growth is, 
thus, likely to increase the probability of global distributive schemes. 
(iii) International institutions: Hurrell points out that the world witnesses a “steady 
move towards a denser and more integrated network of shared institutions and 
practices” (2001: 39), examples being UN institutions, the WTO, World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the 
Kyoto Protocol. Given the increasing need to solve global problems, epitomized by 
Beck’s (2006) notion of the ‘world risk society’, we are likely to see a further 
globalisation of politics.181 Regarding climate change, for example, institutionalised 
global collective action seems to be the only way to secure the long-term survival of 
humanity. 
Until now, new international institutions have created a basic normative 
framework.182 Hurrell claims that normative systems, once they are established, have the 
inherent tendency “to expand and develop, and to enmesh actors within certain patterns 
of discourse, reasoning, and argumentation” (2001: 40). Weaker actors may, for 
example, use existing institutional platforms “to exploit already established patterns of 
legal argument to promote new and often far-reaching rules and institutions (as with the 
International Criminal Court)” (ibid). A further important point is that institutions may 
strongly affect the values of individuals: Pogge speaks of “value-based institutional fixed 
points” (1989: 230) that are likely to gain the support of individuals as time passes. 
The growth of global civil society must also be connected to the form of 
                                                 
180 See Maslow (1954) and Doyal (1991) on the relationship between self-actualisation and 
material living standards. 
181 Bacchus (2003), considering the development of the World Trade Organisation as a prime 
example, equally argues that the world steadily moves towards a legalisation of the international 
sphere. 
182 In opposition to earlier international treaties centred on functional benefits, Hurrell 
argues that “the post-1945 period has seen the emergence of a range of internationally agreed 
core principles – respect for fundamental human rights, prohibition of aggression, self-
determination – that may underpin some notion of a world good and some broader basis for 
evaluating specific rules” (2001: 40). 
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international governance. Over the last 50 years, a diverse array of national and 
international NGOs has gained enough strength to exercise considerable impact on 
public opinion and politics at sub-state, state and global level. As outlined in Chapter 4, 
the NIC Report (2008) even considers it possible that global NGOs will obtain 
representation in a reformed UN General Assembly by 2025. Hurrell, however, stresses 
that we “need to counter a certain romanticization of the potentialities of transnational 
civil society”, since “it is only through political institutionalization that new norms and 
rules can be sustainably and equitably implemented” (2001: 35). 
 (iv) Identities and values: Beck (2006) highlights the change from national to mixed 
identities, where individuals freely draw on various sources to construct their identity. 
We should also note that continued migration, facilitated by deregulated labour markets 
and cheaper transport, is likely to lead to a diffusion of identities. The trend of a partial 
globalisation of identities can be contrasted with a rise of nationalistic values in some 
countries like China and India. The aggressive nationalism that has dominated the 20th 
century, by contrast, is on the decline: the creation of the EU is the best example.183 
Moreover, the overall moral development of humanity has, despite incredible 
negative ruptures like World War II, been positive: the abolishment of slavery, the 
enfranchisement of women, the decline of discrimination as well as the rise of 
democracy and distributive justice in various countries are examples. We also witness a 
trend towards the globalisation of human rights (Beck 2006: 47); most countries have 
signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It could be argued, therefore, that 
the adoption of egalitarian justice at the domestic and global level is part of the natural 
path of human development. While this argument has some appeal, philosophers like 
Rawls (1999a), Miller (1995) and Nozick (1974) would reject the view that global 
egalitarianism would be a desirable development. We thus have to be aware that the 
meaning of moral development depends on the specific moral theory endorsed. In sum, 
while the spread of global moral values is likely to continue, the development of this 
trend remains uncertain. 
                                                 
183 With regard to the creation of the EU, Beck notes that “[v]iewed historically, this 
undertaking among states with different cultures can only be described as revolutionary. For the 
first time in history states have learnt that their power is not diminished but increased by 
renouncing national sovereignty. All states must submit to an internal process of self-
democratization and must protect human rights and civil liberties, with the result that a war 
between members has become unthinkable” (2006: 175). 
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 (v) Global public: Given the already dominant position of English, it is likely or at 
least possible that English will become a world language spoken fluently by a large 
majority of the world’s population. Moreover, the development of the Internet and 
possible future technological innovations are likely to further facilitate communication 
between individuals in all parts of the world (NIC 2008: 89-92). A common language 
and a shared communication platform increase the probability that a global public will 
be created. A global public can be regarded as a requisite (or at least as a supportive 
factor) for the adoption of global distributive schemes. 
A systematic consideration of trends – which has so far not been offered in the 
literature about the feasibility of principles of egalitarian global justice – may help a 
philosopher justify her own feasibility evaluation. The question is whether, given the 
interaction of these trends, the optimistic scenario of global egalitarianism seems to be 
possible. Apart from representing objective arguments about various likely 
developments, the consideration of trends encourages our imagination; while the likely 
developments outlined are still vivid in our head, we have to go one step further and ask 
whether they may lead to a scenario that does itself seem unlikely but not impossible. 
7.7 Conclusion 
Considering the arguments analysed in the course of this Chapter, it is surprising that 
only very few philosophers seriously engage in feasibility discussions. And although 
theorists such as Miller, Nagel and Caney engage in the debate, they spend little time 
justifying their feasibility evaluations. Given the small number of philosophers taking 
part in the debate, it is also a stunning fact that both Miller and Caney do not engage 
with Nagel’s work in any way, regardless of the fact that it was published before their 
own. 
Overall, the stringency of the debate is hampered by the fact that Miller, Caney and 
Nagel do not draw on unified definition of the feasibility criterion; the different 
interpretations of the time frame, the unclear form of evaluations and the debate about 
the burden of proof being the most important examples. Looking at the empirical 
arguments advanced, it turned out that none of the three authors refers to specific 
psychological or social theories to justify their evaluations. It has been possible, by 
contrast, to reject various empirical assumptions in light of empirical research results. 
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Having considered the empirical arguments offered in the philosophical literature, 
Beck’s work on global identities and the long-term trends of globalisation, it is time to 
come to a conclusion. Through the analysis coming out of this research, I personally 
consider global egalitarian justice to be conditionally feasible. There are four decisive 
reasons for this evaluation. First, scientific research cannot identify specific factors 
allowing us to rule out the feasibility of global egalitarian justice. Second, the great 
variation of past and present forms of social life from egalitarian tribes to totalitarian 
fascist states show that institutions can transform human beings into many different 
kinds of beings. Third, I question the argument that nationality will necessarily continue 
to play a dominant role in the centuries to come as the artificiality of its creation being 
an argument against its perpetuality. Fourth, the trends of globalisation point to a 
globally integrated market, abundant wealth (if the ecological crises can be mastered), 
the rise of global identities and values, a shared secondary language and the need for 
effective global collective action. For these reasons, I maintain that, if we consider 
egalitarian justice to feasible at the domestic level, the same evaluation should hold for 
the global level. 
While these arguments represent good reasons for a positive feasibility evaluation, I 
accept that my judgment is, to an important degree, subjective. As a consequence, I do 
not consider a negative feasibility evaluation to be unreasonable; a different 
interpretation of the same arguments may reasonably lead to a different conclusion. I 
acknowledge the partial subjectivity of my feasibility evaluation and, moreover, consider 
it to be uncertain.184 Before acting on my evaluation, I would therefore want to consider 
the burden of proof. If a strong burden of proof should be assigned to the side 
defending positive feasibility evaluations, it is possible that I have to revise my feasibility 
evaluation. The burden of proof, as discussed throughout this Conclusion, may lead to 
the endorsement of a negative feasibility evaluation despite the fact that it is considered 
to be more likely than not that global egalitarian is feasible. 
Overall, the discussion of this Chapter has categorised the conditional feasibility 
                                                 
184 A high degree of subjectivity also increases the likelihood that feasibility evaluations are 
influenced by wishful thinking (see the discussion on the neutrality of predictions in Section 
4.3). While the tendency to succumb to wishful thinking is in general be reduced by patterns of 
scientific or public debate, this check is less effective if judgments are partially based on 
intuitions. In my case, for example, I am aware of my inclination towards a positive feasibility 
evaluation of global egalitarian justice, as I want to be optimistic and believe in the potential of 
humanity. 
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evaluations of global egalitarianism as partly subjective, uncertain and as having no 
agreement about the correct evaluation. We are thus confronted with an application 
problem. This raises a point relating to the chances of overcoming the application 
problem by offering better empirical arguments about the feasibility of global 
egalitarianism. This will be considered to greater lengths in Chapter 8. The second point 
is whether, if the application problem is expected to persist, the definition of the 
feasibility criterion should be modified. In order to address this, I will examine how the 
philosophical literature deals with the application problem. Subsequently, I will argue 
that a burden of proof should be established to limit the negative effects of false 
feasibility evaluations under conditions of uncertainty. 
The application problem in the philosophical literature 
In the theoretical literature, the applicability of the feasibility criterion is not 
examined in a systematic way. While Räikkä acknowledges that “it may be hard to 
discover which social arrangements can never be accepted” (1998: 30), he does not 
discuss the importance of this problem, if it can be overcome and, if it can, how it can 
be overcome. Moreover, apart from Pogge’s (1989) sceptical attempt, no general 
evaluation about the applicability of the feasibility criterion is given by most 
philosophers (Nagel 1991; Rawls 1999a; Miller 1999a; Caney 2005). The applicability of 
the feasibility criterion is thus insufficiently discussed in the theoretical literature. 
Looking at the applied literature, an important issue is that the empirical debates are 
not based on a standard definition of the feasibility criterion. As a result, the application 
problem does not emerge as clearly as it should. This is especially due to three strategies 
consciously and subconsciously used by philosophers to conceal the application 
problem; the strategies refer to the time frame, the form of evaluations and the weight 
of the feasibility evaluations. The first strategy to circumvent the application problem is 
to use the middle-term as time frame. While this strategy, used by Miller (1999a) and 
partly also by Nagel (1991: 170), reduces the uncertainty of evaluations, it also has the 
highly negative effect that we are no longer dealing with feasibility evaluations of 
ultimate moral ideals (Laegaard 2006). For this reason, this strategy is unconvincing. 
The second strategy relates to the form of feasibility evaluations. Instead of making 
dichotomous feasibility evaluations, both Nagel and Miller use vague expressions, 
claiming for instance that the realisation global distributive justice is ‘very hard to 
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imagine’ (Miller 1999a: 18) or that ‘the world is not a plausible candidate’ for the 
realisation of global egalitarianism (Nagel 1991: 174). The result of unclear evaluations 
is, however, that the consequences for the cogency of principles of global distributive or 
egalitarian justice remain unclear. Therefore, I find vague feasibility evaluations to be 
unsatisfactory; statements about the feasibility of a moral theory (feasible/unfeasible) 
and about the uncertainty evaluations should be kept distinct. 
A third strategy to conceal the application problem relates to the weight of the 
feasibility criterion. Since the weight is not defined in a clear way, as the following 
examples will show, the effects of negative feasibility evaluations also remain unclear. (i) 
Räikkä (1998: 27) holds that desirability and feasibility evaluations are ‘equally 
important’. (ii) Rawls (1999a: 398-399) maintains that an insufficiently stable conception 
of justice is “seriously defective” although the criterion of stability is “not decisive”. (iii) 
Caney (2005: 175) maintains that a feasibility challenge, if successful, constitutes a 
“serious and powerful criticism” of a moral ideal.185 The first point to notice is that no 
philosopher claims that unfeasible moral theories should be ruled out (in opposition, the 
OIC criterion functions as an absolute constraint).186 In addition, we have to note that 
the definitions of weight diverge and are relatively imprecise. The practical 
consequences of feasibility evaluations thus remain unclear. 
In general, a tendency might exist to assign less weight to the feasibility criterion if 
evaluations are expected to be uncertain. The weight of the criterion would thus depend 
on its applicability and would, consequently, differ from case to case. I think, however, 
that this tendency is problematic. The weight must either be defined independently of 
the moral ideal in question, or a justification must be given why, and if so how, it should 
be influenced by the applicability of the feasibility criterion. 
In conclusion, all three strategies discussed are problematic since they rather conceal 
                                                 
185 Furthermore, Nagel holds that the unfeasibility of an ideal should “carry some weight 
against the ideal” (1991: 21). Finally, Boswell holds that the “patent unfeasibility” of liberal 
universalist theories “generates a risk that liberal universalist arguments will come to be seen as 
irrelevant to the refugee policy debate” (2005: 7); that unfeasible theories are of “little practical 
use” or even “counter-productive”; before she concludes that “[t]his is not to say that 
fundamental normative goals should be abandoned simply because they are not considered 
feasible. But it does imply that where a theory is unable to show how people are or could be 
motivated to respect its requirements, we should consider it as deficient, at least for practical 
purposes” (ibid).  
186 This should lead us away from speaking of a feasibility constraint or a ‘motivational 
condition’ (Murphy 2000: 16); these terms only make sense if the weight of the feasibility 
criterion is absolute. 
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than confront the application problem. In opposition, I find it more adequate not to 
deviate from a coherent feasibility framework. The time frame should be the long-term, 
feasibility evaluations should be dichotomous, accompanied by a statement about the 
degree of uncertainty, and weight should be clearly defined and kept constant. This 
means that we have to look for another way to deal with the application problem. 
Uncertainty and the burden of proof 
An alternative strategy, which leaves the definition of the feasibility criterion 
unchanged, is to work with a burden of proof. As outlined in Section 4.2, a burden of 
proof is used to come to decisions under conditions of uncertainty. To assign the 
burden of proof, the costs of false feasibility evaluations have to be compared. 
The costs of a false positive feasibility evaluation may be calculated by reference to 
the following four arguments.187 (i) Conceptual reasons: The rationale of the feasibility 
criterion holds that, for the concept of a moral ideal to make sense, it must be possible 
to bring about the moral ideal in question (Räikkä 1998). By propagating impossible 
ideals, the point of morality is lost. (ii) Unfairness to agents: Demanding the impossible 
is unfair to those individuals who try to bring the recommended ideal about. Compliers 
will be disappointed in light of their failure to realise the moral ideal. (iii) Negative 
consequences: The pursuit of impossible ideals will lead to negative consequences. If a 
world government is impossible, for example, the attempt to bring the latter about 
might lead to global war. (iv) Demotivating effects: Given the perceived difficulty to 
achieve a highly demanding task like global egalitarian justice, people will be 
demotivated to behave morally (cf. Mackie 1990: 132). This argument holds if the 
empirical relation between high aims and the motivation of individuals is negative. 
The costs of a false negative feasibility evaluation can be calculated by reference to 
the following arguments. (i) Unfulfilled obligations: The erroneous rejection of the most 
desirable ideal will lead to a world that is less just than it could be. Unjustified 
inequalities, for example, will withhold legitimate benefits from some individuals. (ii) 
Demotivating effects: The absence of a highly promising ideal will demotivate 
individuals. This argument holds if empirical relation between high aims and the 
                                                 
187 As explained with regard to the OIC criterion in Section 5.4, it is sufficient to consider the 
costs of false evaluations if the costs of a false positive evaluation correspond to the benefits of 
a correct negative evaluation and vice versa. 
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motivation of individuals to act is positive. 
As in the case of the OIC criterion, a comparison between of the relative costs of 
false evaluations is a highly complex endeavour. The first problem is that we have to 
compare conceptual reasons with broadly consequentialist reasons. Moreover, this 
assessment varies with the kind of moral theory endorsed. The second problem is that 
the evaluation has to include the global long-term consequences of false feasibility 
evaluations. Such an assessment would require a highly complex empirical calculation. 
Consider, for example, the period of the expected consequences, an imbalance is 
likely to occur. While it is certain that feasibility evaluations will to a certain extent affect 
the behaviour of present individuals, it is unclear to what extent present evaluations will 
indeed shape future behaviour. As time passes, it is likely that new insights will improve 
the capacity of future societies to make feasibility evaluations; it is therefore extremely 
difficult to assess the long-term consequences of false evaluations. Next, various 
conceptions of global justice currently require similar political steps like the 
establishment of just international institutions or the eradication of absolute poverty. It 
may thus be the case that feasibility evaluations are less important with respect to 
political decisions as with respect to the motivation of individuals. But if we start to 
consider the motivational effectiveness of moral theories, i.e. whether their propagation 
is likely to bring about sufficiently positive consequences, we leave the area of feasibility 
issues. 
In light of these normative and empirical challenges, this thesis can only argue that a 
burden of proof should be assigned and to outline some of the considerations to be 
included. It is beyond the scope of the present project to offer a relative comparison of 
the costs of false feasibility evaluations. Since the assignment of the burden of proof has 
to be postponed until further research has taken place, the conclusion that Pogge’s 




Chapter 8: Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to apply the effectiveness and OIC/feasibility criterion to 
Singer’s Principle and Pogge’s theory of egalitarian global justice. Each of the resulting 
three analyses focused, firstly, on the definition of the metaethical criterion in question 
and, secondly, on the empirical application. This Chapter concludes by summarising the 
findings of the three analyses, assesses social sciences’ contribution to the evaluation of 
moral theories and outlines avenues of future research. 
Findings 
While each section certainly had microconclusions of their own, the first macro 
finding present over the entirety of this work and the focus of Chapter 2 is that the 
effectiveness criticism raised against demanding theories of global justice fails. As 
enquiry has shown, no coherent definition of the effectiveness criterion is offered in the 
philosophical literature (Carens 1996, Gross 1997, Dobson 2006). Additionally, the 
applicability of the effectiveness criterion has not been demonstrated; Gross’ (1997) 
empirical application remains unconvincing. Since no convincing definition or 
application of the effectiveness criterion was identified in other literature, this thesis 
concluded that the effectiveness criticisms advanced against Singer’s Principle and 
Pogge’s theory of global egalitarian are unconvincing. 
The second finding is that acute and chronic compliance with Singer’s Principle 
should be considered possible for ordinary persons. Having defined the research 
question of the OIC criterion in Chapter 3, this thesis examined the social psychological 
literature on moral heroism in Chapter 5 (Oliner and Oliner 1988; Colby and Damon 
1992; Zimbardo 2007). The results were that situational factors play a major role in the 
determination of behaviour and that there were no identifiable personal factors 
necessary for moral heroism. Furthermore, social psychologists also offered their own 
possibility predictions; Zimbardo’s ‘banality of heroism’ and Colby and Damon’s 
‘developmental continuities’ theses argue that acute and chronic compliance is possible 
for ordinary persons. But, since the standard of possibility predictions and the OIC 
criterion differ, philosophers have to offer their own possibility evaluations drawing on 
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the explanations and predictions of social psychologists. This thesis concludes with the 
general evaluation that acute and chronic compliance with Singer’s Principle, assuming 
its moral demands are interpreted in a lax manner, should be considered possible for 
ordinary persons. 
The third finding is that Pogge’s theory of global egalitarian justice should be 
considered to be conditionally feasible. Having defined the feasibility criterion in 
Chapter 6, the conditional feasibility evaluation accomplished in Chapter 7 examined 
whether the empirical differences between the domestic and global realm justify 
different feasibility evaluations. In opposition to the application of the OIC criterion, it 
was not possible to identify a specific set of psychological, social or political theories 
most relevant to the analysis; in addition, no long-term predictions offered by social 
scientists could be identified. For this reason, the analysis largely focused on an 
empirical assessment of the predictive arguments offered in the philosophical literature 
(Nagel 1991; Miller 1995; 1999a; Caney 2005) and examined how long-term trends of 
globalisation can inform feasibility evaluations. Taking all empirical arguments into 
account, this thesis concluded that Pogge’s theory of global egalitarian justice should be 
considered conditionally feasible. 
Taken together, these three findings support the cogency of Singer’s Principle and 
Pogge’s theory of egalitarian global justice. Moreover, the analysis outlined that the 
definition of the OIC and feasibility criterion are generally insensitive as to how they can 
be empirically applied. In combination with the fact that only very few philosophers 
make empirically informed evaluations, this shows the limited connection between 
moral theory and the empirical sciences. Focusing on this gap, this interdisciplinary 
project has made a significant contribution to the interdisciplinary literature on global 
justice by evaluating the possibility of compliance with Singer’s Principle and the 
conditional feasibility of Pogge’s theory of global egalitarian justice. 
This project has also illuminated the fact that it is difficult to evaluate the practical 
relevance of the present findings as they currently stand. Since most individuals do not 
think that they should comply with Singer’s Principle or have the desire to do so, the 
evaluation that compliance is likely to be possible appears to be of limited relevance. 
Nonetheless, the ascription of an enormous developmental potential to each individual 
may have positive motivational effects; if individuals believe they could do much more 
to relieve suffering, they may feel more confident to live up to their more moderate 
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personal moral aims.  
Considering the practical relevance of the positive conditional feasibility evaluation 
of Pogge’s theory, it has been argued in Section 7.7 that it is equally hard to assess the 
expected consequences of feasibility evaluations in light of the extended time frame. 
Since current political decisions are rarely influenced by long-term feasibility evaluations, 
and since feasibility evaluations are likely to be reconsidered in the future, the political 
influence of the present feasibility evaluations seems to be limited. Moreover, the 
conditionality of the evaluation further reduces its practical impact. Alternatively, the 
finding that global egalitarianism is conditionally feasible strengthens the standing of 
theories global of justice in political debates as the focus of attention shifts from the 
scope of justice to the depths of justice that can be reached by human societies. In the 
end, however, it may be the case that most important practical effects of the present 
evaluation relate to the motivation of individuals; that a positive feasibility evaluation of 
the highly promising ideal of global egalitarian justice may lead certain individuals to act 
immediately. 
The contribution of the social sciences and the subjectivity of evaluations 
Apart from evaluating the cogency of Singer’s Principle and Pogge’s theory, the 
dominant theme of this thesis was to examine the contribution of the social sciences 
with regard to the evaluation of moral theories. Given the difficulty to link empirical 
research and moral theory (Mackie 1990; Elster 1995), this thesis focused on three 
metaethical criteria which function as bridge-principles (Albert 1991: 92) allowing for a 
scientifically informed analysis of moral theories. Overall, the contribution of the social 
sciences can be depicted by the degree of subjectivity of evaluation: the more subjective 
the evaluation, the less important the contribution of social science. Since subjective 
evaluations tend to be more uncertain, we are confronted with a continuum between 
subjective/uncertain evaluations and objective/certain evaluations. This being the case, 
we are now left to examine to what extent the empirical work accomplished in this 
thesis has increased the objectivity of evaluations and to what extent it can even further 
be increased by future work. 
Beginning with the empirical work, the analysis of the determinants of moral heroism and the 
possibility predictions of social psychologists have significantly increased our understanding of the 
conditions of compliance and thus reduced the subjectivity of possibility evaluations. While Griffin’s 
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(1992: 128) claim that a certain ‘arbitrariness’ has to be accepted remains correct, the 
present analysis has shown that scientifically informed evaluations can reduce this 
arbitrariness. This is especially true since the philosophical literature has not, up to this 
point, offered an empirically informed application of the OIC criterion to Singer’s 
Principle; Miller’s (1992: 555) complaint about the limited connection between the 
empirical sciences and moral theory has thus been confirmed. 
With respect to the conditional feasibility of Pogge’s theory, the present analysis has 
equally strengthened the empirical basis of evaluations. While the complexity of the 
question has made it nearly impossible to increase our general explanatory 
understanding of the psychological, social and political issue at stake, it has been 
possible to assess the predictive arguments offered in the philosophical literature. This 
assessment has shown that various predictive arguments rest on empirically flawed, 
problematic assumptions. Furthermore, it has been argued that the debate can 
substantially benefit from the inclusion of long-term trends insufficiently theorised in 
the philosophical literature (for examples see Hurrell 2001; Beck 2006; NIC 2008). 
Considering the limits of empirically informed applications, we can conclude that 
although the application of the OIC and feasibility criterion can significantly benefit from the inclusion 
of scientific research results, we have to accept that possibility and feasibility evaluations ultimately 
remain partly subjective and uncertain. As a consequence, it is also unlikely that the 
application problem and the related lack of an agreement about adequate possibility and 
feasibility evaluations will be overcome. To limit the disagreement, however, it is of 
utmost importance that each philosopher spells out the empirical arguments informing 
her judgment as this is the only way the adequacy of evaluations can be assessed. While 
individuals may trust their own or another person’s sense of possibility in their daily 
lives, the status of each philosopher’s sense of possibility cannot be assessed, nor should 
it play a role in the scrutiny of possibility and feasibility evaluations.188 
In sum, the discussion regarding the contribution of social sciences leads us to 
assume that we can successfully reduce the arbitrariness and subjectivity of evaluations 
by realising an extensive empirically informed evaluation. Furthermore, a strategy is 
                                                 
188 This view challenges Räikkä’s claim that “nothing separates the amateur from the 
professional more clearly than the knowledge of what, under given circumstances, cannot be 
done in principle” (1998: 27). Feasibility and possibility evaluations should not be associated 
with knowledge, nor are we able to evaluate which philosopher is a ‘professional’ with a good 
sense of possibility and who is an ‘amateur’ with a bad sense of possibility. 
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needed to deal with the degree of subjectivity that is unavoidable; this can either be 
done by using a burden of proof or by reconsidering the weight of the feasibility 
criterion. In the following, it will be discussed how future research projects can deal 
with these challenges. 
Relevance of findings and avenues for future research 
This thesis has laid down the ground work for further empirical projects on the 
possibility of compliance with demanding interactional principles like Singer’s and on 
the feasibility of principles of global justice, both conditional and unconditional. Future 
projects may take the research questions of the OIC and feasibility criterion defined in 
this thesis as a starting point; such a basis is especially important for social scientists 
more interested in the empirical application than in the philosophical definition of 
metaethical criteria. The advantage of the research questions outlined in this thesis is 
that they are both philosophically coherent and sensitive to the empirical application. 
Given the breadth of this thesis, future research focusing on a single metaethical 
criterion and a single moral principle or theory may further improve the convincingness 
and reliability of evaluations. In my view, it would be especially important to create 
interdisciplinary research groups combining the explanatory understanding and 
methodological skills from various disciplines. With respect to Singer’s Principle, for 
instance, the empirical basis of evaluations could be strengthened if psychologists took 
the research question of the OIC criterion as the direct basis for their predictions. In 
this manner, the gap between the focus of social psychologists on the determinants 
‘moving particular individuals across a decisional line from inaction to action’ 
(Zimbardo 2007: 485) and the philosopher’s interest on the individual capacity of 
autonomous decision-making could be reduced. Apart from re-examining the general 
evaluation that compliance should be considered possible for ordinary persons, further 
research could focus on differentiated possibility evaluations. Accordingly, it would be 
researched how the presence of certain personal factors increases the probability that an 
individual can indeed comply with Singer’s Principle. 
Regarding the conditional feasibility of principles of distributive or egalitarian global 
justice, there is an equally important need for further research as the limited number and 
depth of empirical arguments offer much leeway to increase the stringency of predictive 
arguments. It is especially important to further evaluate the future role of national 
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identities; in this respect, it should be explored to what extent the literature about the 
origin and political objectives related to the creation of nation-states can be linked to the 
question about the perpetuality of national identities. Furthermore, the similarity of the 
standard of scientific possibility predictions (Walonick 1993; Stern Review 2006; NIC 
2008) and feasibility evaluations facilitates the incorporation of scientific predictions. 
For this to happen, however, the time frame of feasibility evaluations must be 
operationalised in a more precise manner. 
Given the breadth of feasibility debates, interdisciplinary research groups of 
psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, economists, legal scholars and 
philosophers could be well-suited to tackle this issue.189 Research groups and their 
forthcoming publications would not necessarily have to agree on a final answer (as in 
the case of consensus decision methods like the Delphi technique), but could focus on 
an assessment of the pros and cons of each predictive argument.190 In light of different 
interpretations of or weight assigned to each argument, the ultimate feasibility 
evaluations of each member of the research group could vary. In any case, such an 
effort would be likely to increase the stringency of the debate about the conditional 
feasibility of global egalitarianism. 
Having considered how future research can increase the objectivity of possibility and 
feasibility evaluations, the next question is how we should deal with the remaining and 
unavoidable degree of subjectivity. The first strategy relates to the weight of the 
feasibility criterion. Section 7.7 showed that philosophical literature does not define the 
weight of the feasibility criterion in a unified manner (Räikkä 1998; Rawls 1999a; 
Boswell 2005) and that an imprecise definition of the weight tends to conceal the 
consequences of the application problem. Consequently, there is the need for a future 
research project considering how the weight should be defined and whether it should be 
influenced by the subjectivity and uncertainty of feasibility evaluations.191 In this respect, 
                                                 
189 The authorship of feasibility evaluation could, in this way, resemble the authorship of the 
NIC Report (2008), which has been a collaborative work of over a hundred experts from 
various fields. 
190 Such a distinction resembles the NIC Report’s (2008) focus on specific trends on the one 
hand, and the overall evaluation of scenarios on the other hand. A further positive aspect is that 
research groups are likely to increase the neutrality of evaluations (Walonick 1993); in the 
philosophical literature, philosophers tend to either support or reject both the desirability and 
feasibility of a moral aim like global distributive justice (Caney 2005; Miller 1995). 
191 Moreover, an argument is needed as to why the weight of the feasibility criterion should 
not be absolute as in the case of the OIC criterion.  
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Pogge’s (1989: 12) extreme view that the feasibility criterion is irrelevant if a theory of 
justice allows for ‘the comparative assessment of alternative feasible institutional 
schemes’ has to be considered; in fact, this view can also be expressed by the claim that 
the weight of the feasibility criterion should be set to zero in light of the uncertainty of 
evaluations. Accordingly, a future debate about the weight of the feasibility criterion also 
has to address its theoretical and practical relevance (Pogge 1989; Räikkä 1998; Rawls 
1999a; Cohen 2008). 
The second strategy dealing with the uncertainty of evaluations consists in the 
assignment of the burden of proof. Having shown that the burden of proof is 
frequently assigned without an explicit defence (Miller 1995; Räikkä 1998; Boswell 
2005), this thesis has argued that the costs of false evaluations should be the basis for 
the assignment of the burden of proof. Since such a detailed analysis was beyond the 
scope of this thesis,192 it is highly important that a future research project focus on the 
cost of false evaluations and the assignment of the burden of proof. Such an analysis 
may take Zimbardo’s (2007), Colby and Damon’s (1992) or Oliner and Oliner’s (1988) 
view about the expected consequences of possibility predictions as a point of departure; 
with regard to the normative assessment of costs, the analysis may draw on 
philosophical principles like Barry’s (2005: 221) ‘vulnerability presumption principle’.  
The final strand of future research relates to the effectiveness criterion. To evaluate 
the effectiveness of short- and middle-term moral principles or ultimate moral ideals 
(Carens 1996; Gross 1997), a coherent definition of the effectiveness standard must be 
developed. In Chapter 2, I suggested that a probability threshold defining a minimum 
likelihood of compliance could serve as a point of departure. If a coherent definition of 
the effectiveness criterion could be reached, the next task would consist of an 
assessment of the empirical applicability of the effectiveness criterion. Since the view 
that effectiveness considerations should affect the cogency of ultimate moral ideals is 
generally rejected (Singer 2004; Cohen 2008), the rationale of the effectiveness criterion 
would equally have to be defended. 
                                                 
192 In the case of Singer’s Principle, the tentative suggestion was made that the burden of 
proof should be assigned to those who challenge the possibility of compliance (Section 5.5). 
With respect to the conditional feasibility of Pogge’s theory, by contrast, no judgment about the 
relative costs of false feasibility evaluations was made (Section 7.7). 
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Conclusion 
Coming to the end of this thesis, it worth taking a look back. This thesis began with 
the curious incident with the young woman from Eastern Europe and the flyer for the 
Edinburgh World Justice Festival. Three and a half years later, I can tell the woman that, 
according to my empirical analysis, it is possible both for her and myself to 
fundamentally change our lives, making the reduction of poverty an overarching aim. I 
could outline the justification and uncertainty of this judgment and that, having 
compared the costs of false evaluations, I consider the suffering that might be prevented 
to be more important than to make the error of asking her to do what is indeed 
impossible. I do not know whether my evaluation would have any effect, or whether she 
would feel threatened or charmed in light of the developmental potential assigned to 
her. 
Furthermore, I could change the design of the flyers for the World Justice Festival, 
propagating a much more demanding ideal than the end of absolute poverty. As Martin 
Luther King refused to believe that the funds of the ‘bank of justice’ (quoted in Bös 
2005: 158) only suffice for the civil rights of white people, I could claim that, if one 
believes that egalitarian justice is feasible in one country, one has good reasons to 
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